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ART. I. EXISTING STATE OF THE ART OF INSTRUCTING THE DEAF AND DUMB.

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1. *Institution des sourds et muets par la voie des signes méthodiques ; ouvrage qui contient le projet d'une langue universelle, par l'entremise des signes naturels, assujettis à une méthode. Par M. l'Abbé de L'Épée. Paris, 1776.*
2. *Le sourd-muet entendant par les yeux, ou triple moyen de communication avec ces infortunés, par des procédés abrégés de l'écriture ; suivi d'un projet d'imprimerie syllabique. Par le Père d'un sourd-muet. Paris, 1829.*
3. *Vocabulary for the instruction of the deaf and dumb, upon the principles established in the Manchester school. By William Vaughan. London and Manchester, 1828.*
4. *Erster, zweiter, dritter und vierter Berichte des Verwaltungs-Ausschusses der am 28 May 1827, gestifteten Taub-stummen-Schule für Hamburg und das Hamburger Gebiet. Hamburg, 1828—1834.*

FROM the comparative frequency with which the periodical press has been made, in the course of the past few years, the instrument of conveying information to the public relative to the instruction of the deaf and dumb, the principal facts connected with the history of this art, at least in our own country, may be considered as generally known. It will hardly be expected, therefore, that, in treating the subject proposed at the head of this article, the writer should task himself with again repeating incidents, which, if not familiar to all, are probably so to most, and respecting which information may be elsewhere easily obtained.

Every institution erected for the humane purpose of ministering relief to those unhappy beings, whom Providence, in its inscrutable decrees, has condemned to endure the misery of perpetual silence, must be an object both of interest and of admiration to the philanthropist. To his eye every such institution, isolated amid the broad expanse of human selfishness, seems a gentle star, shedding abroad a lustre not of this world, the brightness of that heavenly charity, which breathes itself in the precept, "As ye would that men should do to

you, do ye even so unto them, for this is the law and the prophets."

But as all such luminaries, like those which lend to the sky above us its variety and its beauty, possess a common charm, so they have each their peculiar claims to admiration. "There is one glory of the sun, another of the moon and another of the stars; and one star differeth from another star in glory." In giving an account, therefore, of the art of deaf-mute instruction as it exists, it will be necessary to describe the methods which have characterized different schools, and which have not even yet become blended into one.

We need not take the trouble to inform our readers, that the practicability of instructing the deaf and dumb is a discovery comparatively modern. Within the scope of authentic history, we find no notice of any attempt to remove the obstacles, which nature seems to have interposed between these helpless beings and the knowledge of that world in which, surrounded by darkness and mystery, they live a kind of dreamy and unreal life, till the sixteenth century of the Christian era had more than half passed away. To the philosophers of Greece and Rome, in the brightest days of those republics, the condition of the miserable deaf-mute seemed utterly desperate. The same view of the case has been taken by distinguished men, in times very near to our own; and in all ages, not even our own entirely excepted, this, our wretched fellow-man, has been made more wretched still, by a thousand popular prejudices; some having their origin merely in a sentiment of disgust, like that which we experience in the contemplation of any monstrous existence; and others, yet more injurious, in a creed, which, strange as it may seem, presumed the deaf-mute, on the evidence of his misfortune, to be labouring under the curse of Heaven, and carrying about with him, like Cain, the perpetual witness of God's displeasure. Thus it was for century after century. The wretched, so far from receiving commiseration or relief, were unrelentingly persecuted, or shunned as those who bore upon them the mark of the beast. To them the world was indeed a vale of tears.

The first instructor, so far as we know, Peter Ponce, a Benedictine of Ogna in Spain, died in the year 1584. After him sprang up, in various parts of Europe, including the British islands, isolated individuals labouring in the same

cause, and in general believing, each for himself, that the art had originated with him. But the light which thus broke forth from time to time, at points too widely separated to allow the radiance to blend, was a brightness without a nucleus, and was speedily swallowed up in the general darkness. No instructor founded a permanent school, until the year 1760, when the Abbé De l'Epée established at Paris, at his own expense, an institution which he continued to conduct during a period of twenty-nine years, and which, after his death, was adopted and perpetuated by the government of France. Before that event, however, viz: in the year 1778, an institution under the patronage of the Elector of Saxony, had come into existence at Leipzig, with Samuel Heinicke, a kind of universal genius, a man previously of various occupations, and subsequently of considerable celebrity, at its head.

From this period, the history of the art is blended with that of institutions; earlier than this, it is little else than an account of the doings and of the opinions of individual men. Those who desire more particular information on this subject, will find it in the *Encyclopedia Americana*, Article, Dumb and Deaf, or in the *North American Review*, for April, 1834. Our present purpose is merely to state, in few words, the views which have been entertained from time to time, regarding methods of instruction, and those which, at the present day, are most extensively approved. In order to do this, it will be convenient to name, and briefly to describe, the principal instruments of communication employed with the deaf, and which constitute the medium through which they receive instruction.

The first of these instruments consists of those signs, by which deaf-mutes, though uneducated, contrive to make themselves understood. It would hardly be possible, on paper, to explain precisely what these signs are; hardly possible, at least without exceeding the limits we propose to ourselves here. Much has been said and written of them, in France especially; and much, that has been said and written, has been in a tone of eulogy so extravagant, and often so contradictory to the plainest teachings of common sense, as to be much better fitted to mystify than to enlighten the mind of the tyro. They have been denominated a natural and universal language, intelligible to all men at sight. And this proposition has been set forth in so strong a light,

and in so unqualified a form, as to convey an impression little in accordance with the fact. Very sagacious men have been led to believe in the existence of a natural and universally intelligible language, of which, notwithstanding its natural character, its inherent intelligibility, and the absence of all necessity of learning it, they have grown up in absolute unconsciousness, not to say mere ignorance. No one indeed doubts his own ability to make many gestures, which shall have a meaning for another person : nevertheless, I believe I speak the opinions of common men, when I say, that these are not esteemed to be a language—or rather *the* language so highly extolled by writers on the deaf and dumb. Few men are conscious of the power to conduct a connected discourse, without the use of words ; and people in general do not recognize as a language, an instrument, which does not confer upon them this ability.

That the writer may not be accused of charging too great extravagance upon the eulogists of the natural language of gestures, let the following sentence from a French writer, be taken as characteristic of the class : "There is not a sentiment of the heart, there is not an idea of the understanding, which is not reflected in this language as in a faithful mirror." The present writer has heard, in conversation, precisely the same assertion, in almost precisely the same words, from more than one instructor of the deaf and dumb. Thus there seems claimed for this language of action, a copiousness and an adaptation to the purposes of communication, equal to those of the comparatively perfect spoken and written languages in use among men. Thus too those who receive their information entirely at second hand, fall naturally into the belief, that through the medium of the sign-language, any idea or combination of ideas, can be expressed, with as much clearness and promptness as by means of words. Allow the sign-language of the schools to be thus potential. It by no means follows that any natural and universally intelligible language is so too ; for it is a great mistake to suppose, that the signs which constitute the dialect found in a given institution, are either, as a general rule, natural, or of universal use, or even universally intelligible among the deaf and dumb themselves ; much less, then, are they so to others. In proof of this, the writer may appeal to the observation of the great numbers of intelligent persons who have visited our American institutions, and to the testimony of

M. Degerando, who says, that having been thirteen years engaged, as a member of the administration of the Royal Institution, during which time he was much in the schools, he had never been able to understand the signs there used at all.

It is well to inquire, therefore, how far the language of gestures is a natural language. Thus far, if it be also universal, it is not, of course, peculiar to the deaf and dumb. It is well, nevertheless, to make the enquiry, because, as will appear in another place, many instructors are disposed rigorously to exclude from their systems, every thing in the form of signs, beyond the first and simplest suggestions of nature.

Not to go into a nice examination of all the successive stages of change, through which the sign-language passes, in proportion as it is cherished and cultivated, it will be sufficient to describe those forms under which it appears interesting to the instructor of the deaf and dumb. These are three in number. The first is the real dialect of nature: the second, that which is the result, to a good degree, of reflection, and is found in its perfection in communities of the deaf and dumb. This is, in great part, an expansion of the former, with an abridgment or *reduction* of its elements, to a degree in which they cease to be self-explanatory. It is also, to some extent, composed of signs purely conventional. The third is a still higher expansion of the second, methodized and subjected to the laws of artificial syntax. It is not adapted to colloquial use, but is intended, as will hereafter be explained, to serve as a stepping-stone to alphabetic language.

These forms of the sign-language will be best understood by example. Let a deaf-mute desire to call the attention of another person to some object in view; for instance, to a kite floating in the air. He will use such signs precisely, as would be chosen by a person possessed of speech, supposing any obstacle to prevent the use of his tongue. He will touch the individual and point to the kite, following the direction of his finger with his eye. This, then, is a sign natural, and universally intelligible. It is one of the simplest character, and for convenience is denominated a sign of *indication*.

On the following day, let the same deaf-mute desire to recall the kite to the mind of his companion. He will slowly describe before him the outline of the object, with the index

fingers of both hands. He will seem to attach to the extremity of the figure thus delineated, the ornament called the tail, imitating its flexibility, and designating its length. He will next busy himself with the string, which he will seem properly to fasten, and then to pass along through his hands. At length he will launch his imaginary kite into the air, and mimic the action of the boy engaged in managing the play-thing. Should there be *paper* in sight, he will, in the early part of this process, point it out, and signify, by spreading his hands over the figure of the kite, that the filling-up is of that material. Otherwise, he may dispense with this part of the sign, unless his efforts to make himself understood should be fruitless without it. In this case, he must undertake a separate labour to recall the idea of paper to the mind of his friend. The means of doing this will be determined by circumstances. Reference to some place where paper is known to be deposited; allusion to a book or newspaper by describing its form, and seeming to open or unfold and read; imitating the flexibility of the substance; or, with those who have seen the process of manufacture, calling to mind the paper-mill, and the operations going on within it; these are some of the practicable means of arriving at the desired result. To make the description of the kite more complete, the fingers should be passed along the situation of the wooden part or frame; and the material of which it is composed, should be signified in some manner analagous to the foregoing. Thus we have at length the *natural* sign for a kite. It belongs to a class called *descriptive*.

But such a mass of gestures to denote a single thing, must, obviously, very much obstruct rapidity of communication. Signs *truly* natural are, therefore, only occasionally used by deaf-mutes, in their intercourse with each other, and with their friends. Those which do really serve them as the instrument of communication, belong to the second of the classes named above. Out of the whole picture of the kite but a single feature will probably be retained, to stand as the representative of the object. In the institution with which the writer is connected, the attitude and manner of the boy holding the string is that in most common use.

This is no longer a natural sign. It is called by Sicard, *a sign of reduction*. It has lost the property of universal intelligibility; and if it has not become, to appearance, quite as arbitrary as a word, it is no longer, to say the least, self-

explanatory. Of signs similar to this consists, chiefly, the colloquial language found in institutions for the deaf and dumb, so far as it relates to material things.

In the intellectual and moral world, the power of the *truly* natural language is considerably more limited than we have shown it to be in the material. It is in fact restricted to the designation of the stronger passions and emotions, and of those mental operations, which are usually accompanied by peculiar expressions of the countenance. Such expressions, combined with suitable attitude and gesture, constitute the corresponding natural signs.

But the colloquial language of the institutions is not so feeble in its resources. It resorts to metaphor and allegory, and resting partly upon these helps, and partly upon tacit convention, it accumulates a very copious vocabulary. By metaphor, the straight line is put for rectitude: by allegory, the equal scale is put for justice. By metaphor, physical is put for moral feeling, the speaker pointing to his heart. By allegory, the circle, formed rapidly and repeatedly, represents eternity. These specimens are characteristic of a large class. Any one is competent to judge, how universally such signs are likely to be understood.

But, beside the elements thus far described, the common colloquial language of the deaf and dumb often admits signs totally arbitrary. Some of these seem to have been adopted unconsciously: indeed it is difficult to trace their origin. Others, as for instance many proper names, both of persons and places, are the offspring of necessity. Signs of this class usually originate in little individual peculiarities; but, in large communities, such peculiarities are not sufficiently numerous or striking, to furnish a strongly distinctive sign for every individual. The sign by which the writer is known among the deaf and dumb, is purely arbitrary. It is formed by closing the hand, so as to represent the letter A of the manual alphabet, and placing the thumb-nail of the hand thus closed, against the chin.

It was probably owing, originally, to the existence of a class of rational beings without an audible language, that the discovery was made, of a means of communication to a certain extent copious, universally intelligible among men. Otherwise, we might look with surprise upon the chaos of gestures, (for so it seems to a stranger,) employed by deaf-mutes, when we recollect how often this has been named

to us, as that very language which all mankind are to understand at sight.

The extent to which the language of action may be perfected is almost limitless. As it is, after all, in the countenance, that the chief significancy of its signs exists, continued practice may render the use of the hands almost wholly unnecessary. To this extent did Mr. Gallaudet, the late accomplished principal of the American Asylum, succeed in carrying it; as he has stated in a former number of this magazine. But this success, however it may demonstrate the power and variety of expression of which the human countenance is capable, cannot be received as evidence of the power of *natural* signs. It is now more than three years, since the writer, then connected with the American Asylum, borrowing the felicitous idea of Mr. Gallaudet, himself attempted numerous and satisfactory experiments of a similar description. He became convinced, however, that the expressions of the countenance, and the slight motions of the head and body, necessary in this mode of communication, serve to recall common colloquial signs, of which they are, in fact, a kind of *reduction of the second degree*, a partial, or exceedingly abridged imitation; and, moreover, that certain independent conventions, unknown to the common dialect, are absolutely essential to success. He has seen experiments of the same kind conducted by another gentleman, very expert in the use of the sign-language, with the same result. Thus a stranger, though himself deaf and dumb, and acquainted with the common dialect, prevalent where the experiment is made, would probably find this species of sign-making unintelligible.

In this connection, the writer is reminded of another of Mr. Gallaudet's beautiful ideas, which, with the assistance of one of his associates, he has endeavoured to reduce to practice. From the vocabulary of the English language are selected a number of words, of which the initial letters are designedly the several letters of the alphabet. These words are the names of passions, emotions, or mental operations; and their corresponding expressions in the countenance are regarded as signs of the initial letters merely; thus forming *an alphabet of the countenance*, or *an alphabet of expression*. A few letters are, of necessity, arbitrarily supplied. By means of this alphabet, any word whatever may be spelled to a deaf-mute to whom it is familiar, slowly, it is true, but

as certainly, as with the manual alphabet. It is, of course, mere matter of curiosity and amusement, being susceptible of no useful application in practice.

The language of an institution, once established, commonly remains tolerably constant. Each pupil brings with him, on his arrival, the signs of reduction which he has been accustomed to employ among his friends. But he readily lays aside his own signs for those of the community; nor, in doing this, is his memory burthened with a load, like that of a new vocabulary to a person possessing speech. For the signs of reduction which stand for the same idea, come usually from the same extended description, however they may appear to differ; and the new comer has merely to substitute one form of abbreviation for another. Until he has thus fallen into the use of the prevalent dialect, it will be necessary to employ, in his instruction, only those signs which are purely natural.

Having endeavoured to explain, in some degree, the nature of the elements, which make up the language of action under the second form, our attention is next directed to the law of combination, according to which these elements may be made to enunciate propositions. This is very simple. The language of action, when so comprehensive as to be really self-explanatory, being little else than the portraying of objects and incidents in the air, as a painter would represent them on canvass; we must forget that it is a *language* which we are considering, we must cast utterly aside the notions of syntax stereotyped in our minds, and regard simply the question, "Were I a painter, how should I depict this thing, in order most satisfactorily to exhibit, at once, the relations of its parts, and the progress of events." This is the key to the whole matter. Suppose I should wish actually to paint a proposition of this simplicity: "A man kicks a dog." I should begin naturally with the dog, and afterwards represent the man in the act of kicking. To paint first this act, to exhibit a man kicking the air, would be unnatural. So in the language of action: I must first make the *sign* of the dog, and assign to it a location. I must then make the sign of a man, giving it also a suitable location, and finally represent the action (by actually performing it) as passing in the proper direction between the two. With this illustration, we will leave the sign-language under the second or colloquial form.

Under the first form, this language is, as we have seen, natural. Under the second, it exhibits a combination of nature and of art. Under the third, it appears to have passed entirely over to the opposite extreme, and is wholly artificial. From the first to the second form, the change on the part of the deaf-mute is spontaneous; nay, rather, he is forced into it by strong necessity. His progress exhibits the ordinary and natural march of improvement. But that from the second to the third is unnecessary, unnatural and forced. Were the deaf-mute left to himself, it would never be made, and wherever it is found, it is invariably the work of his teacher. The following is an account of its origin.

The syntax of the sign-language being one of the points in which that mode of communication differs most widely from ours, and its vocabulary being likewise comparatively slender; it occurred to the estimable Abbé De l'Epée, that if these two circumstances could be done away,—if the number of signs could be made equal to the number of words, and if they could be reduced to an order of arrangement, corresponding to that of words in speech; the deaf and dumb might be instructed by a mere process of translation. He addressed himself to the task, therefore, of affecting this desirable improvement. His labours, greatly amplified by his successor, Sicard, gave rise to a species of signs denominated *methodical*. This system contained, or was intended to contain, a sign to represent every spoken word; together with auxiliaries, indicative of tense, mode, &c., and of the parts of speech. Further notice will be taken of this species of signs in another place. We will pause here only to remark, that these methodical signs were, of necessity, in good part not colloquial; and that, though they presented a language having a syntax like ours, such a syntax continued to be quite as unnatural, and quite as unintelligible to the deaf and dumb, as before.

Some instructors have endeavoured to make of signs a written, as well as a colloquial language. In order to accomplish this, they have represented the various members of the body, and the several features of the countenance, concerned in pantomime, by characters on paper. By another set of marks they have contrived to indicate all the varieties of motion; and by a third, the most striking expressions of the countenance. By the combination of these characters they are able to express in writing any sign of action, very much

as spoken words are spelled by means of alphabetic characters. Mimography is the name given to this mode of writing signs. It is not known to be at present in use in any school, excepting in that of M. Piroux at Nancy in France, if even it is still employed there. Most instructors have been disposed to regard it as rather curious than useful.

The art of designing is an important auxiliary to the instruction of the deaf and dumb. In teaching even the simple nomenclature of visible objects, a vast amount of time may often be saved by the help of pictures. For it is not of every object of which there is occasion to speak, that a sign of reduction is to be found in the dialect of the institutions. In such a case, if the object be not itself present, nor any picture representing it, it is necessary to resort to the process of description, illustrated when speaking of the sign-language under the first form. This process will of course be less tedious, in proportion as there exist other signs of reduction to contract its parts; nevertheless it will consume time, which the presence of a picture might save. But design is not of use merely in this way. It may serve to explain phrases and sentences; or to throw light upon difficult subjects, by an allegorical use. Hardly any limit can be assigned to its utility.

There is another auxiliary in use in the school-rooms of our institutions, employed to illustrate the laws of grammar. It consists of certain symbols, devised to represent the parts of speech, and undergoing systematic modifications, to correspond to the grammatical inflections of words. The idea of such symbols originated with Sicard. There are now in possession of the writer, certain old model lessons, once used in the Royal Institution, in which the symbols of the noun and adjective appear, in form closely resembling those now in use in the New-York Institution. The instructors on this continent have expanded the idea of the distinguished inventor, and have given to grammatical symbols a much higher degree of utility, than they could have possessed in his day. Mere description would hardly enable the public to estimate the merits of this method of illustrating grammar to the eye. There is, however, now in a process of stereotyping for publication in this city, a small volume, which will contain the whole system, as at present in use in the New-York Institution, adapted to the purposes of instruction in ordinary schools.

The language of action, design and grammatical symbols are instruments of instruction unconnected with words. As means of exhibiting or using words, we have also writing, the manual alphabet, and articulation.

Of the first, viz: writing, it is unnecessary to speak.

Of the second, indifferently denominated the finger alphabet, the manual alphabet, and dactylology, the public have, also, in general, some notion sufficiently definite. They are aware that its elements are certain positions of the fingers, representing the letters of the alphabet; and that its use is to spell words *literatim*. There are two species of dactylology in use, the first employs but a single hand, and prevails over this country and the continent of Europe. The other employs both, and is confined to the British Isles.

Beside simple alphabetic dactylology, instructors have, at times, devised systems of finger-spelling by syllables. Pereiré, a distinguished contemporary of De l'Épée in Paris, employed such an one with eminent success. Mr. J. R. Burnet, a meritorious young man of Livingston, N. J., deaf since the age of seven, but remarkably intelligent and well informed, and the author of a volume of poems, and papers on the deaf and dumb, about a year since planned out a system of syllabic dactylology, adapted to the English language, which evinced considerable ingenuity, and promised to be practically useful: but it has not yet been submitted to the test of experiment.

Articulation comes next. Little explanation is necessary in reference to this. For the deaf it means precisely what it means for others, the actual utterance of words.

Accompanying articulation, it is attempted usually to teach the power of reading words in the motion of the lips. Both these accomplishments have been actually taught to the profoundly deaf; though necessarily at the expense of much time and patient labour. There are many who hear partially, and are, on that account, more fit subjects for this species of instruction.

With this is completed our survey of the instruments of instruction. We pass next to the matter. This consists, first, of alphabetic language; and, secondly, of all the various subjects of knowledge, which constitute the substance of instruction to those who hear. To teach the first presents the great and peculiar task. It is true that language cannot be

taught apart from that knowledge of which it is the nomenclature. It is therefore undoubtedly true, that fully to understand all the terms of any given language, is fully to understand every subject of knowledge which the language is sufficiently copious to treat of. Nevertheless, to acquire the *use* of a language is a labour as specifically different from that of accumulating knowledge, as to acquire the use of a tool is different from the study of the principles on which the tool is constructed.

In the execution of his task, the instructor is at liberty to choose between the two courses following. He may aim only to convey to his pupil a practical knowledge of language, like that which children acquire, as they grow up; or he may desire to make him also acquainted with the principles of grammar. If the latter be his choice, he may follow out the two branches simultaneously; or he may postpone grammar as a science, until language is practically taught. The simplicity of the latter course recommends it; and it is therefore the one most popular, and most generally pursued.

There are still two ramifications, into which the labour of teaching language subdivides itself. To teach the nomenclature of ideas simply, is not to impart the power of communicating those judgements, which result from the comparison of ideas. The laws which govern discourse, or connected language, constitute, therefore, a distinct division of the subject, requiring the most careful and unwearied attention.

Language being, then, the chief matter of instruction, by what processes shall we expound its difficulties, and simplify its mysteries, to the narrow comprehension of an uneducated deaf-mute? The limits of this paper of course forbid our descending to those minute practical details, which would be necessary to guide a novice in the school-room. We may nevertheless be able to afford some illustration of what would be their nature.

The first ramification of the subject is that of teaching words or nomenclature. We need not remark that words will be of no value to the pupil, unless their corresponding ideas are first clearly and distinctly apprehended. It is the business of the instructor, therefore, to develope in the mind of the learner, a series of ideas, parallel to the words of alphabetic language, and as extensive as the vocabulary to be taught. For this purpose he will avail himself of a variety of processes.

Among these, the simplest are mere *indication* and *description*, which, as employed in teaching the names of visible objects, have been already exemplified. These two suffice for the nomenclature of the material world. In regard to description, it should be remarked, that it avails itself of the forms, qualities, and characteristic motions of material things, of their origin or production, of their purpose or uses, of their habits (if living), and of the fate which overtakes them at last. Any circumstance, which might come into a detailed written account of the object, are brought out if necessary, in the pantomimic scene.

In overstepping the confines of matter, if our resources are separately weaker, they are nevertheless more numerous. The first is *illustration*, a word which means here precisely what it does elsewhere. Suppose I desire my pupil to understand what I understand, when I hear the word *pity*. I represent a miserable woman thinly clad, and shivering with her babe at midnight in midwinter, on the marble step of some stately mansion in Broadway. I describe the tears that chase each other down her care-worn cheeks. I paint her mournful gaze through the gloom of the deserted street, and the blank look of despair, with which at last she suffers her head to fall upon her aching bosom; and, as I regard the image, I have thus created before me, I point to my heart, and throw into my countenance an expression characteristic of the emotion I assume to feel. In view of the circumstances, it can hardly be misunderstood.

The next process is *metaphor*. Let the same word, pity, be the subject. I represent the earth, parched by the heat of summer. I point to the sun, pouring down a most intolerable radiance. I seem, here and there, to see animals panting under the oppressive influence, and men melting in perspiration. The herbage is shrivelled, brown and dry. The soil is baked and intersected with cracks in a thousand directions. Suddenly I see a cloud arise in the west. It expands itself over the surface of the whole heaven. I endow it with animation and thought. I perceive it regarding from the sky the pitiable condition of all the lower creation. I see it dissolving away to tears, and pouring out its pitying moisture, in showers, to re-animate and refresh the drooping world.

Metaphoric illustration must be used with caution. When so used, it diversifies the teacher's labour and the

learner's toil, with an agreeable variety ; and often presents ideas in a very striking light. It is peculiarly useful in cases where simple illustrations, adapted to the learner's capacity, are not easily to be found.

The processes thus far enumerated are of a kind usually called *familiar*, in opposition to others denominated *philosophic*, which we shall proceed to consider.

Of these, the first is *induction*. By this word is meant a mental operation on the part of the pupil himself ; a species of analysis into which he is led by the teacher, and in the course of which, he arrives independently at notions, not before distinctly recognized. I have, for example, a pupil, who has never contemplated edifices, or buildings as a class. Making the usual sign for that in which we live, I enquire (a question easily asked in the sign-language), if my pupil has ever seen a similar object. He answers yes, and I require him to describe it, and to tell its use. I ask then for another, and another, and another, until his stock is exhausted. But I shall not find it necessary to repeat my interrogatory so often. I shall be anticipated. The characteristic of this class of objects will be brought by my questions before the pupil's mind, and he will run on from one thing to another, until there remain no more. I have succeeded in bringing him to contemplate as a class, a number of objects, which he had been accustomed to consider only as individuals. I proceed to give a name to this newly acquired notion.

The second of these processes is *exposition* ; a kind of analysis precisely like the former in kind, but differing in the mode of conducting it. In the former case the pupil unconsciously passes through the requisite steps ; in the latter the teacher does the same with design ; the learner remaining a passive spectator. The process is more rapid than induction, and at the same time less certain. It is, hence, better adapted to a later period of instruction, while the former can only, with safety, be depended on, while the mind is yet for the most part undisciplined. As an example, let us take the correlative personal nouns, *superiour* and *inferiour*. I enumerate all the particulars which may be supposed to render one individual superiour to another, such as superiour power, superiour wisdom, superiour virtue, superiour ingenuity, superiour strength, superiour agility, &c., and intimate that of two individuals, he who possesses all or any one of

these, is entitled to the more honourable appellation. The process is simply definition *a posteriori*.

The third method is that of *definition indirect*. This is of two kinds, *definition by exclusion*, and *definition by contrast*. Both may very well be employed together, for the contrast or direct opposite of an idea is, of course, excluded from the idea itself. Suppose I wish to define *liberality* or *generosity*. By the contrast I may say, in the beginning, that it is the reverse of a niggardly, hoarding disposition. Nevertheless, it is not prodigality, or wasteful expenditure. Neither is it the disbursement of sums, however vast, which one ought to pay. Nor is it the free use of money, from a mean-spirited fear of the imputation of stinginess; nor, for the sake of acquiring the name of a good companionable fellow; nor, in order to compass some secret end; nor, for any reason, in short, but the spontaneous promptings of a noble heart, that despises the lucre of gain, but loves its fellows, and desires to impart to them of its means of enjoyment. This process is one of frequent use, and is one of the most efficient known to the art.

There remains only *definition by synthesis*, or, as it is commonly called, *direct definition*. According to this method, a particular idea is defined by referring to its genus, and pointing out its specific characteristics. Such a method is not adapted to the circumstances of the deaf and dumb, unless at a late period in the course of their instruction.

These being the processes, logically classified, of developing the ideas of deaf-mutes, preparatory to teaching nomenclature, it would be in order to enquire here, what precautions are taken to insure thoroughness in the other branch of instruction, viz: that which embraces the principles of construction or connected discourse. The few remarks we have to make on this topic, will find a place when we come to consider that which peculiarly characterizes the history of the art in modern times.

We are now in a state to understand the wide differences, which have distinguished the systems pursued by different instructors and different institutions. These differences have arisen from the unequal prominence given by different men, to some of the instruments of communication, and the total exclusion of others from their methods. Of simple homogeneous systems, there are four essentially dissimilar, still in practice. In past times, there have not been wanting others,

as we shall presently see. From combinations of the homogeneous systems, there arise others, differing according to the nature of their component parts.

The first and simplest system is that which rests upon the truly natural, unexpanded and unmethodized dialect of the deaf-mute, and aims only to teach language under a written form. It rejects all those contractions, denominated signs of reduction, and dispenses with the use of gestures entirely, as soon as possible. This was, for a long time, the method of the distinguished Dr. John Wallis, Professor of Geometry in the University of Oxford, and almost, if not quite, the earliest of English labourers in behalf of the deaf and dumb.

The second system differs only from the first, in employing the language of action under the second form; or that in which it is no longer universally intelligible, but, by reason of conventions and abbreviations, has become a prompt and easy means of communication. This is the system at present existing in the New-York Institution.

The third is that employed in the sixteenth century by Ponce, the earliest of all instructors, and by great numbers since his time. Its principal instrument is articulation.

The fourth is that which originated with De l'Epée in the latter part of the eighteenth century, and was perfected by Sicard in the beginning of the present, at the Royal Institution of Paris. This, as has been already intimated, depends chiefly upon methodical signs. The celebrity of its originators, and the individual success especially of Sicard, contributed to render this method highly popular in France, and in this country, when the art was new among us. Very little, however, was generally known, at the time, of the systems prevalent on the rest of the European continent, and in the British islands. Greater experience has since induced the Royal Institution to abandon wholly the method of Sicard, and to embrace a mixed method, formed by combining the second and the third, named above.

The methods we have described, except that of De l'Epée and Sicard, are as will be perceived, as old as the art itself. That which depends on articulation was, nevertheless, almost universally the favourite, during the two hundred years which preceded the invention of methodical signs. We have mentioned that Ponce preferred this; and we may add that his pupils are said to have been accomplished articulators. After him, Bonet in Spain; Wallis and Holder in England;

Van Helmont and Amman in Holland; Kerger, Wild, Niederoß, Raphel, Lichtwitz, Arnoldi and Heinicke in Germany; and Pereiré, Ernaud, Desehamps, and even the Abbé De l'Épée himself in France, are known to have attached themselves to this method. One of these, Professor Wild, engaged a celebrated mechanist of Frankfort, named Henry Louis Muth, to construct a machine, which should imitate all the movements of the vocal organs; in order that the deaf-mute might have an opportunity to see distinctly the positions he was required to copy. Another, viz: Heinicke, pretended to avail himself of the sense of taste in teaching articulation. The truth of this pretence has been doubted; nevertheless, he is known to have endeavoured to regulate the positions of the vocal organs, by introducing instruments into the mouth.

Sicard, too, so late as the year 1819, republished a little treatise of De l'Épée, called "The Art of Speaking," with a preface, in which he says, "The deaf-mute is not wholly restored to society, till he has learned to express himself *viva voce*, and to read speech in the movement of the lips. It is only then that his education can be said to be complete." These facts are worth remembering on the part of those, who devour, with astonishment, the accounts, which find their way occasionally into the public prints, of the wonderful success, attained by some modern experimenter, in instructing the deaf to speak.

But though the majority of suffrages were early, as we see, in favour of articulation, the simpler form of the art had its disciples. Wallis transferred himself to this class. Beside him, appeared, in England, Bulwer and Dalgarno; and in Germany, Lasius, and probably others, whose names we know, without being particularly acquainted with their practice.

In France, among the first essays attempted in this art, were those of Father Vanin and of Pereiré, whose methods were both sufficiently remarkable to deserve separate mention. The minute details of neither have come down to us, but we know that Father Vanin made design the great instrument of instruction and the basis of his system. By means of this alone, he sought to explain every thing, even of the mysteries of religion.

Pereiré, on the other hand, depended chiefly on a method of syllabic dactylology, lost with him, by means of which words could be very rapidly produced. The language of

action he rigorously excluded. Articulation was his ultimate aim, it is true, but the channel through which he sought to approach it was peculiar to himself.

Design and the manual alphabet, are, at this day, peculiar to no system. The utility of the first is universally acknowledged, though little has been done toward developing the extensive resources it presents. The second is tolerated every where, on account of its convenience, in producing words without the aid of writing-materials. It is, however, to be feared, that a too early and too constant use of this instrument, may lead to the habit of conceiving words as exhibited by the tedious process of *literatim* spelling on the fingers, rather than as they appear on paper, in which form the mind will speedily become accustomed to regard them as units.

The aim of modern instructors has not been so much to strike out paths new and untrodden, as to remove obstacles from the old. The search for a method radically different from any yet tried, would probably be a fruitless labour, inasmuch as methods are characterized, as we have seen, by the combinations and the applications which they admit, of the instruments of communication; and as these instruments are few and known. Modern industry and modern investigation have been busy with theory, as well as with practice. They have called in the light of philosophy, to aid in discovering a touchstone for the practician, by which to test the genuineness of his methods. They have turned their attention to a branch of the subject, independent of what are called systems, and equally important to all, viz: the order in which the details of that vast subject, language, should be unfolded to the mind of the learner; embracing a consideration, first, of the principles which should guide in determining the due succession of difficulties, presented in the various forms of connected discourse; and, secondly, of the means of facilitating the developement of ideas, by so arranging their nomenclature for the purposes of instruction, as to make each step in advance, a natural guide to the one succeeding.

These are complicated and difficult questions. They are still employing the ingenuity of distinguished individuals. For, though the general and fundamental principles which they involve, are obvious and easy of comprehension, yet the extent of the subject renders their perfect application in practice, a matter of great difficulty.

In speaking of the actual state of the art, at the present day, we should say that it is characterized by most vigorous efforts, to introduce philosophical method into the teaching of language. Half a century ago, and even later, the instruments of instruction, and the means of perfecting them, seemed principally to absorb the minds of instructors. In our own time these, in the estimation of intelligent men, have found their true level; and the best methods of simplifying the task, which these instruments are to be the means of performing, are now the grand object of study.

After this account of existing methods, the writer may be expected to express a preference for some one in particular. There are certain principles, admitted by the ablest writers on the subject, at the present day, to be in accordance with sound philosophy, which may serve as a guide in the formation of such a preference. These are,

1st. That it is expedient for the instructor to borrow the entire language of action in possession of his pupil, as being the earliest available instrument of communication.

2d. That the pupil should be taught to associate his ideas directly with the visible forms of written words.

In proposing to the pupil to receive words as the immediate signs of his ideas, we aim, of course, to subvert his long standing habit, of conducting mental operations by means of pantomimic signs. Every expansion of his natural language, therefore, whatever advantages it may bring with it, is attended with at least one important evil, viz: that it strengthens the pupil's attachment to his old habits of thought and his accustomed modes of communication. It renders the task of supplanting signs of action by words, greater; and the disposition on the part of the pupil to aid in the execution of that task, less. The sagacious instructor, therefore, especially if he have but few pupils, will spend very little labour in correcting and improving, and much less in developing, the meagre dialect they bring him. Whatever expansion it acquires in their intercourse with each other, he will turn to the best advantage he can, in the prosecution of his task. Existing in an expanded state, it may be made of use; but its utility is hardly sufficient to justify its cultivation for this specific object. Indeed, the use of the sign-language, from the earliest period of instruction, should be daily more and more discouraged; and, as the course of education approaches its termination, it should be, if not rigidly

prohibited, at least barely tolerated, and never suffered to appear, save when alphabetic language fails. No teacher can be too watchful in this respect. So copious and so convenient has become the language of the schools, and so elegant and picturesque does it appear in practice, that there is a constant propensity to indulge in its employment; when the less showy and more difficult, but at the same time more useful, language, common to the rest of the world, ought to be substituted; and on occasions most valuable for practical instruction. The ordinary conversations between master and pupil, out of school, too frequently, I should say constantly, go on in the language of action; and the great purpose, for which the community are assembled together, seems wholly forgotten. On this subject M. Recoing, a late luminous writer and able instructor of France, whose volume "by the father of a deaf-mute" is cited at the head of this article, has given us some forcible remarks.

"It is certain," he says, "that the fondness of the deaf and dumb for signs, will turn them away from the habitual use of language: and if the master, on every occasion, instead of giving the conventional word to recal such or such an object, make a natural sign to express his thought, he will doubtless be understood, but the French word will not be learned; or, if known, will not be engraven anew upon the memory. It is undoubtedly true, that he may be able to communicate many simple ideas, as promptly by natural signs, as by the most abridged form of writing; or even more so. But it will be more useful, nevertheless, to say these things, even down to the most simple, in French; because we shall thus form our pupils to the use of that language, which we cannot too constantly inculcate upon them." Again, "since the master cannot cause the words of his mother tongue continually to resound in the ears of his pupil, he must be so much the more careful to write them unceasingly before the eyes; and *never to express himself but in this language*, save to take advantage of a gesture to help out his meaning. The gesture which paints the object, may thus be a useful auxiliary. *But it will never do to reverse the order*, to make of the gesture the capital object, and of the French word, *which ought always to remain in the mind*, a mere accessory."

Such, likewise, is the language of Degerando. "Let us recal the principle unceasingly: the deaf-mute must enter

our ranks ; he must become one of us. It is the language of his country which we desire him to acquire. This should become to him what it is to the ordinary child, what it is to us, his mother tongue. But the adoption of the language of his country can never be perfect and sincere, *if he continues to see in it only the translation of his own signs*: it will not be his mother tongue. It will remain for him, what the learned languages are for us." Again he says, "The deaf-mute must have the resolution often to interdict to himself the language which he has constructed ; for the moment to forget it, if he will be truly initiated into that, which is in circulation among his kind. To familiarize him with our language, *it is necessary to familiarize him with our mode of conceiving it*; from which he is distracted by the language peculiarly his own."

In commenting upon this passage, M. Recoing remarks, that the words "*often*" and "*for the moment*," are "a concession too indulgent, made to ancient prejudices."

In illustration of the evils resulting from the existence of too copious a dialect of the language of action, Degerando cites the example of the company of young Egyptians, sent to Paris by the Pacha of their country, to acquire a knowledge of the arts and the learning of Europe. Having been placed together in the same school, they made, for a long time, little progress in the acquisition of French ; because like the deaf and dumb, they conversed continually in a language of their own. On this account they were separated, and distributed among different schools ; when, immediately, the advantageous effect of denying them the use of their mother tongue, became manifest in the remarkable rapidity of their improvement.

If, then, even that degree of expansion, which in large institutions, seems, in the nature of things, inevitable, is to say the least, not to be desired ; what shall we say of the system of instruction, of which the first great dogma is, expansion to the highest possible degree : nay, more than this, expansion beyond even the limit, within which signs are of colloquial use ; and expansion, which is not expansion merely, but rather the destruction of all that is natural in the language of action, and the erection of a stupendous artificial structure upon its ruins ; artificial in its materials, and artificial in the mode of their combination. We have already said, that the dialect of the institutions is not properly

a natural language. This is true; nevertheless it retains one characteristic of that from which it springs, and which is in fact natural, and that is its syntax. This at least continues to be truly natural, after the individual signs have forfeited their claim to that character; and this last trace of nature it is, which the principle of methodical signs comes to destroy. For, in place of a collocation of signs which the deaf-mute comprehends, it proposes to substitute one which he does not comprehend; and thus to present him with a set of unintelligible elements, arranged in an unintelligible order. I say unintelligible elements. Such they are, of course, whenever without the circle of colloquial signs; or, more accurately perhaps, when standing as the representatives of ideas, as yet beyond the limit of the pupil's intellectual range. But may not the corresponding ideas be defined? True, they may: but then, again, of what manner of use is the sign? To what end is it adopted, if not to serve as an auxiliary in defining the idea? The purpose of the school is not to teach signs, but words; and the labour thus spent in defining a *sign*, is the very labour, and no other, required to teach a *word*. Now, were it the fact, that each methodical sign brought with it to the pupil its corresponding idea, and thus saved us the labour of developing the same in his mind; then we would, with pleasure, accept the freight and dismiss the vehicle. But the truth is quite otherwise. We are asked to accept the vehicle, and to furnish it with its freight; in order that we may, the next moment, undo our labour. Truly the system of methodical signs is an unwieldy and cumbrous machine, and a dead weight upon the system of instruction in which it is recognized.

This system is, moreover, exceedingly deceitful. It deceives both instructor and pupil, by affording to the latter a mechanical guide to the construction of sentences, which he does not understand. It is, still further, even at the present day, practically imperfect. Not all the labours of Sicard, and they were Herculean, with those of De l'Épée to aid him in starting, nor all those of his numerous disciples, have yet brought the system to that perfection which its theory demands, or filled up its limitless vocabulary of signs.

M. Recoing, whose writings have been already quoted, and who is distinguished for his glowing zeal in the cause of the deaf and dumb, has taken the trouble to collect a list of distinguished names, behind which to intrench himself, in

fulminating anathemas upon the system of methodical signs ; and it is a fact in no small degree remarkable, that since the days of De l'Épée, excepting his great disciple Sicard, all Europe has produced no single individual of note, to advocate this mischievous system ; while its opponents have been numerous, zealous, and able. Its latest champions in France, M. Jamet of Caen, and M. Dudésert of Condé, are only remarkable, the former for his singular inaccuracy of information, and the latter for a spirit of ultraism never dreamed of even by Sicard. He admits no signs which are not wholly arbitrary ; rejects, of course, all natural signs, in the most decided and peremptory manner, and prohibits the use of such, in the mutual intercourse of the pupils themselves. The systems of Jamet and of Dudésert, are not indeed identical with that of Sicard. These gentlemen have some notions peculiar to themselves. They say, for example, that as we possess ideas, words, and also pronunciation ; the deaf and dumb should have the same, or something equivalent. Their methodical signs stand therefore for *pronunciation* ; they stand, unvaried, for the words they represent, whatever changes of meaning the latter may undergo ; and they stand strictly for single words, and not indifferently for synonymous terms. By deviating then from the system of Sicard, these instructors do not seem to have become more philosophical in theory, or more felicitous in practice.

The radical evil lies here. In all its forms, the methodical sign system rests upon an erroneous theory. Its supporters claim that the deaf and dumb must always, of necessity, think by the instrumentality of their language of pantomime. This doctrine is absurd upon the face of it, and may be met and confuted by arguments of precisely a similar character to those, once successfully employed to combat the assertions of the early teachers of articulation. For be it remembered that these men denied even to pantomime, what more recent teachers have denied to written words, the power or fitness to serve as the instrument of thought : a prerogative which they claimed in behalf of the voice alone. But these doctrines have both alike been long since exploded, and are now quietly inured among the rubbish of the past.*

*The writer has observed with regret, in one of his own countrymen, a new advocate, at this late day, of the several absurdities exposed in the text. With still greater regret has he noticed the lack of courtesy on the part of the same gentleman, toward one, who had certainly intended him no disrespect ;

Methodical signs, therefore, remain without a plausible excuse for their continued existence ; and are probably destined to disappear with the next generation.

Some instructors, in whose methods this artificial system has held a prominent place, have expressed a conviction, unaccompanied by argument, that signs of this description cannot be entirely abandoned. Methodical signs have been abandoned already. In fact they never had an existence, until about half a century ago, and two entire centuries after the time of Ponce. They have no existence, now, in those schools which have never received the method of De l'Épée. They never, of course, had an existence in the numerous articulating schools, which have overspread Great Britain and the continent of Europe, even to the heart of France itself : yet, without their aid, multitudes of pupils have even learned to talk. They have no existence at the present time, except as matter of memory, in those institutions, which have once employed, and subsequently abandoned them ; among which may be mentioned that with which the writer is connected, and the Royal Institution of Paris.

It is too late to express a conviction that methodical signs cannot be abandoned. This should have been done before the abandonment took place, at least before it took place in the school of Sicard. Were the writer to express a conviction, that there is no such place as Paris, the Parisians would, questionless, remain living entities, in spite of his doubts. So is it in this case. Whoever may withhold his belief from the assertion, the deaf and dumb will, nevertheless, continue to be instructed without the use of methodical signs ; as they have been already, for more than two centuries and a half.

The writer cannot help believing, that those who deny the practicability of this, make the denial, because practice has not taught them to modify their school-room processes, to meet the new exigency introduced by the change. They

and who, in giving his own views to the public, through the pages of the North American, was totally unconscious that he was assailing any pet doctrines of Mr. Jacobs of Kentucky. His views, for which he prefers no claim to originality, he conceives, are likely to stand : for even when Mr. Jacobs shall have succeeded in exterminating them here, and he seems to flatter himself that time is not far distant, he will find all Europe on his hands after all ; as, indeed, he may be early apprised, on the appearance of the fourth circular from Paris, now due, but delayed by the press of matter. The man, who seems to make a merit of reading no French, should speak in these matters with less confidence ; for the French and the German instructors *think* profoundly before they write ; and they *read*, if Mr. Jacobs does not, the productions of their brethren, though in foreign tongues.

would speak with more accuracy, were they to assert the impossibility of discarding methodical signs, and of still continuing to instruct *as though methodical signs were still in use*. A knight of the twelfth century, divested of his mail, and accoutred as a modern warrior, might be supposed to say, "I cannot dispense with that massive armour. I am convinced that such weapons and such defences are essential to the noble art of war. They can never be laid aside." And why? Because he conceives that he must always do battle, with lance in rest, as a mailed knight should.

If the objectors, along with methodical signs, will abandon the unwise method of *verbatim* dictation; if they will throw their pupils a little more upon their own resources, and force them to *think*, as often as they *write*; if they will start from a point no higher than that at which the pupil is fully competent to begin with them, and be sure never to advance with so impatient speed as to leave him behind; if, finally, they will themselves *write a great deal*, and make signs comparatively little, before the eyes of their classes in the school-room, and in their conversations with individuals out; they will shortly see whether the artificial and mischievous system of methodical signs cannot be abandoned. In view of the comparative labour imposed upon the instructor by the two methods proposed, severally considered, a sluggish man may prefer that which exacts the least thought, which affords him a mechanical means of *teaching against time*, which involves the necessity of little preparation for his daily task, and of quite as little scrutiny into the *actual* progress of his pupils. But a wise man, a benevolent man, I might almost say a conscientious man, will choose rather a method, which admits of no such perversion, and one of which it is a characteristic to verify the completeness of its results as it proceeds; in spite of the labour which such a method imposes, and in spite of the time which it exhausts.

In reference to articulation, the writer expresses, as he believes, the opinion of the vast majority of teachers and others, when he says, that, in the cases of those whose organs of speech are flexible, whose voices are agreeable, and whose sense of hearing is not entirely extinct, it seems highly desirable that this accomplishment should be taught. How much more desirable, then, is it, when the individuals, though deaf from an early age, have not become absolutely dumb, but only *silent*; and when they may yet be easily induced to

utter words from memory. To teach such persons to recognize written or printed words, as the same they have been accustomed to pronounce, only under a different form, is still something of a task, unless they have been made acquainted with alphabetic characters, before losing their hearing. But the power of correct articulation exists, and this it is, which, in ordinary cases, it constitutes the great labour to impart. The class of persons here spoken of, is not so small as is commonly believed. There are ten, at least, out of one hundred and forty pupils now present in the New-York Institution, capable of speaking, several of them fluently, and two or three of the number quite competent to conduct, on their own part, a conversation in words, reading replies on the lips, with the help of an occasional explanatory sign.

The preference of the writer would therefore be for a mixed method, combining, as does that of the Institution at Paris, at the present time, the second and the third of the homogeneous methods, and rejecting methodical signs. It is this method, which, in large institutions, will doubtless ultimately prevail. But in a case, in which an instructor is able to confine his whole attention to an individual pupil, or to two or three, *apart from a community of deaf-mutes*, the first or the third pure method, uncombined with any other, seems rather to be chosen.

A few remarks will be superadded, in reference to that, which has been already mentioned, as constituting, in this art, the peculiar labour of modern times, viz : the perfection of a philosophical method of teaching language. It is now a principle, regarded as fundamental in the art, that deaf-mutes must acquire a knowledge of alphabetic language, by means essentially the same as those, by which ordinary children learn to speak.

Starting from this principle, the first enquiry naturally is, what is it which ordinary children acquire in learning a language? Not words merely, for words are not valuable for their own sake, but for that of their significancy. As the signs of ideas, words *are* valuable; for they enable their possessor at any moment to awaken in the mind of another, the precise notion which exists in his own; and thus constitute a palpable evidence, that both have before them, at once, the same object of contemplation.

The child, in learning language, has, then, to make an

acquisition much more important than that of words—the acquisition of ideas. It is, furthermore, essential that his ideas should be identical with those of other men, and that, for both, they should attach themselves to the same words. These conditions are equally essential to the utility of language. Unless they exist, no one can be certain that he is understood; nor will words supply the evidence, they are usually supposed to do, that two minds are, at the same moment, occupied with the same idea.

In this remark, it may not be amiss here to observe, we have a probable clue to the origin of much of the misunderstanding and controversy, which interrupts the harmony of those, whose real opinions are not materially at variance, and who would else be friends. Whole folios of polemics spring into existence, because an unfortunate word represents one thing for one man, and another thing, differing from the former “but in the estimation of a hair,” for another.

Such differences are evils in some degree necessary, and resulting from the constitution of things. For while the child, in early life, is engaged unconsciously in acquiring ideas, he is, so to speak, his own teacher: or rather he is learning without a teacher at all; he is carrying on a series of inductions upon the language of his fellow-men. The same may be said in reference to much of what he gains in later years. The number of ideas thus independently acquired may be loosely estimated, by considering, how great a part of the words, any individual believes himself to understand, have been unconsciously treasured up. Corresponding to each of these, the individual must, also unconsciously, have imbibed one or more ideas, right or wrong. Years of attentive observation are often necessary to perfect the notion associated in his mind with a single word. He is, in the meantime, conscious in many cases, of the successive modifications which this notion undergoes, in its transition from stage to stage of gradually diminishing error. He is ultimately assured of its correctness, by observing its uniform fitness for the circumstances, in which he finds the corresponding word introduced among men.

Mere words, then, are but a subordinate part of the knowledge, which ordinary children gather up in early life; since they exist only in consequence of the pre-existence of the ideas, of which they are the registers and the instruments.

The idea and the word stand to each other in the relation of soul and body. The one manifests itself through the other; the former is the essence, the latter, the abiding-place and organ.

But the mere possession of ideas, even with corresponding signs, is not all that is necessary to the intercommunication of minds. The objects of our knowledge exist in certain states, they present themselves to our judgements in certain relations, and they often act upon and affect each other's modes of existence, or their own. All these circumstances are variable. For every possible variation, there must be either a new nomenclature, or a single given set of words must be made to assume corresponding variations, either by the aid of auxiliaries, or by a change of form, or of position, or of both. Hence originates the science of grammar.

The circumstances just enumerated constitute a class of general notions, many of which have to represent them, no particular words; but rather a certain order of collocation, or certain inflections, of whatever words may be before the mind. These notions are laws of construction: they constitute the syntax of a language.

Though a part of our ideas, they are not, in general, distinctly abstracted, or made the prominent objects of our contemplation: they are nevertheless recognized in each individual case, and thus they render us a constant and silent service, indispensable to the power of communicating our thoughts. They enable us, by combination in phrases and sentences, to supply the deficiencies of our vocabularies; and it is, in fact, but a wide extension of the principle of generalization to say, that all sentences whatever, are but individual, though complex signs, in lieu of which, a perfect nomenclature, were such a creation possible, would possess only single words, and would constitute a language, in which the necessity of syntax would no longer be felt. Could we suppose the infinite mind to employ signs like our own as the instrument of thought, instead of grasping all things by the power of intuition, we might presume it to avail itself of precisely such a nomenclature. The supposition, however, implies an absurdity; and to a finite mind, moreover, were it otherwise, the construction and the attainment of a language so boundless, would be alike impossible. Syntax is, therefore, a necessary part of every conventional mode of

expressing ideas among men. A practical acquaintance with it is attained by speaking children, quite as imperceptibly as any other part of their knowledge, and almost simultaneously with words.

Children, then, in learning language, are making three distinct acquisitions, viz: (naming them in the order of their relative importance) ideas, the laws of construction, and words. These attainments are made so nearly together that, in practice, they may be regarded as really simultaneous. In strict truth, however, ideas must be allowed to take precedence of words in the order of time, and words of the principles of construction. Still this precedence is but momentary, and, in the case of a speaking child, after the very earliest essays at utterance, is hardly perceptible. The sooner, in fact, an idea is attached to its name, and the sooner the relations existing and the actions occurring between objects, are associated with corresponding combinations and modifications of words, the lighter in the end will be the burthen imposed upon the memory of the learner, and the earlier, the stronger and clearer will be his perception of the utility of artificial language.

It follows, therefore, as a general rule for the guidance of the instructor of deaf-mutes, that ideas should be first developed, according to the methods heretofore suggested, and then named: and furthermore, that, *from the very beginning*, the laws of construction should be practically taught by the combination of words into sentences.

We have then, here, a definite point of departure. To trace out the course to be thence pursued, across the vast ocean of language, would be to write a practical treatise, which we cannot propose to ourselves in this place. A few principles, exceedingly general, and constituting the extreme outline of the task, only can be named.

Since, then, the instruction of deaf-mutes is assimilated to the process by which the speaking child acquires language, and since the question has been answered, *what* it is which the latter acquires, let us next ask, *how* is this acquisition made. Nothing can be less subject to method, than the succession of words and phrases, that address themselves continually to the ear of the child who hears. He learns, nevertheless, to speak, not in consequence of this want of method, but in spite of it. The same thing is so often reiterated in his hearing, the remembrance of it, when just fading away,

is so constantly revived in all its freshness, that in spite of his inattention and indifference, and in spite of the confused jumble of words, with which it comes accompanied, it effects, at last, a permanent lodgement in his memory.

As the language, which it is the lot of the child to hear, is chosen, for the most part, without reference to the exigencies of his case, vastly many more words are obviously spent upon his ear, than would be necessary, were the principle on which he learns, which is induction, made the basis of a method, and were this method substituted for the chance instruction, he actually receives.

The speaking child can afford to dispense with systematic instruction. Not so with the deaf and dumb. For them all superfluous words and sentences must be retrenched. The time allotted to their instruction in alphabetic language is short; this language is not present to them at all times and in all places, as spoken words are to those who hear; and, finally, no means have yet been devised, and probably none will ever be, for exhibiting words in a visible form, with as much rapidity and as little labour, as accompany speech.

The instructor is, therefore, compelled, by the necessity of the case, to reject from his regular course, every use of language, which is not an essential part of instruction to the speaking child.

In proceeding now to the actual execution of his task, the teacher will, of course, in the outset, fasten upon the simplest form of construction possible. A dozen or twenty well selected words will be an ample vocabulary for a beginning. Much, however, depends on the choice of these words. They should belong all to the class of nouns, excepting a single one, which may best be an active verb. The nouns should be selected with special reference to their fitness to enter into combination with each other, under a variety of forms. To this vocabulary, additions will be made from day to day. Other parts of speech will be introduced, and other forms of construction; and these latter will present a series of difficulties, increasing as gradually as possible.

It will be a principle, also, to present but one new thing at a time; to divide the difficulties, and thus, according to the old saw, to conquer.

At every period of instruction, the precise extent of the circle which bounds the pupil's ideas, will be kept in view. This circle will be continually enlarged, by intrenching upon

the confines of the unknown beyond ; and not by sudden and violent leaps, far over the boundary, and into the midst of darkness.

A great desideratum with instructors, is a vocabulary, containing all the words it is considered expedient to teach, within the period allotted to instruction, arranged in that order, in which each following idea seems to be the immediate offspring of the preceding ; an order which Degerando denominates, that of the genealogy of ideas. In the absence of such a general guide, to prepare which has been found a work of great difficulty, the instructor will form his own vocabularies, with an eye constantly upon this principle.

These are all the explanations, which an article of this kind will admit, respecting the details of practice. They will suffice to show, that, in saying that deaf-mutes must acquire language, very much as ordinary children acquire it, nothing is affirmed derogatory to the pretensions of the art under consideration to a distinguished rank in the intellectual scale. Enough appears, even in this meagre account, to prove, that, in the task set before the instructor, there is ample room for the exercise of all his talent, and all his ingenuity, and all his perseverance.

The principles detailed in this paper, are those of the institution with which the writer is connected. In the reports of that institution, more especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth, they may be found more fully discussed.

ART. II. REVIEW OF WAYLAND'S MORAL SCIENCE.

By Rev. C. S. HENRY, Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy,
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The Elements of Moral Science. By Francis Wayland, D. D., President of
Brown University, and Professor of Moral Philosophy. New-York,
Cooke & Co., 1835. 8vo. pp. 448.

THIS is a new work on morals for academical use which has recently made its appearance; and we welcome it with much satisfaction. It is the result of several years' reflection and experience in teaching, on the part of its justly distinguished author; and if it is not in every respect perfectly what we could wish, yet, in the most important respects, it supplies a want which has been extensively felt. It is, we think, substantially sound in its fundamental principles; and being comprehensive and elementary in its plan, and adapted to the purposes of instruction, it will be gladly adopted by those who have for a long time been dissatisfied with existing text-books, particularly the work of Paley. The style is simple and perspicuous, and at the same time, manly and forcible.

In regard to the *general spirit* of the work, we will only remark, that, in our view, it is an eminent merit of the author, that he has made a system of *Christian* morals. President Wayland has not—like too many writers on these subjects—seemed to have felt it necessary to forget that he was a Christian, the moment he sat down to write as a philosopher. In the treatment of these subjects, by many of our writers, there is an almost *Pagan* disavowing of philosophy from Christianity and its distinctive truths. That writers, treating of man's nature, relations and duties, and professing to be believers in a divine revelation, should pursue their enquiries, and construct their systems, with such entire neglect, or such slight and merely formal recognition of the most important, the only authoritative, source of facts, is a method of procedure either infidel or cowardly; at all events, unphilosophical and inconsistent. We are glad to observe that President Wayland has not followed such examples.

In regard to the *method* of the work, the following passage may be given from the author's preface :

"Being designed for the purposes of instruction, its aim is to be simple, clear, and purely didactic. I have rarely gone into extended discussion, but have contented myself with the attempt to state the moral law and the reason of it, in as few and as comprehensible terms as possible. The illustration of the principles, and the application of them to the cases of ordinary life, I have generally left to be performed by the instructor, or by the student himself. Hence, also, I have omitted every thing which relates to the history of opinions, and have made but little allusion even to the opinions themselves, of those from whom I dissent. To have acted otherwise, would have extended the undertaking greatly beyond the limits which I had assigned to myself; and it seemed to me not to belong to the design which I had in view. A work which should attempt to exhibit what was true, appeared to me more desirable than one which should point out what was exploded, discuss what was doubtful, or disprove what was false."—p. x.

It is obvious that very much is thus left to the teacher; and that the benefit to be derived from the work by the student will very greatly depend on the ability of the teacher. It would, however, be scarcely possible, within tolerable limits, to follow any other general method, in a treatise aiming to be systematic and complete, upon a subject embracing such an extensive range of topics. At the same time it appears to us exceedingly desirable in an elementary work, that some space should be given both to the illustration and application of principles, and to the history and criticism of opinions. A principle, or a position in general terms, to be fully apprehended by students, must commonly be accompanied by instances of illustration and application; and there are few teachers who would not be aided by one or two such instances, to serve as a direction to their minds in the course of illustration. Nor will the present work be found altogether wanting in this respect; on the contrary, some apt and beautiful, and some quite original, illustrations will be met with.

With respect to the history and the criticism of opinions, nothing of the former, and very little of the latter, will be found in this work; and, as the author intimates in the pas-

sage above cited, scarcely any allusion to different or opposite views occurs. On this point we would remark, that although it is very certain, that when one is in possession of the truth in a *positive* form, he has the materials for the criticism of opinions—for the judgement, negatively, of what is *not true*; yet at the same time, it is equally certain that, on many subjects, the mind never adequately possesses the true *positively*, till it possesses it also *negatively*,—or in other words, till it actually applies it to the discrimination and appreciation of varying or opposite opinions. This may be considered as especially true in regard to the great questions that pertain to the Theory of Morals; and in treating these subjects, the most desirable method, it seems to us, would be, from an impartial survey of the facts, and all the facts, to construct, in a *positive* form our statements of general truths; and then, to group around them, in the briefest manner, the varying and opposite principles, just indicating their points of departure and divergence, and their final consequences. The conflicting opinions on these subjects may all be comprehended under a definite and not a large number of general systems, and, with brief references to the principal writers, would not greatly extend the limits of an elementary work; while such brief *indicia* would be of great service to the student in his future reading and reflections, and in forming those discriminating and critical views of the relations of the positions which he takes to be true to other positions, without which he can scarcely be said to *possess* even the positive system he adopts.

We now proceed to give a brief view of the contents of this work, with such remarks as may occur in passing. It is divided into two parts; the first treats of Theoretical Ethics, and the second of Practical Ethics. In treating of Theoretical Ethics the first chapter is taken up with the question concerning the origin of our notion of the moral quality of actions.

In discussing the question: *what is a moral action?* the author adduces several considerations to show that there is an element in the actions of men which does not exist in the actions of brutes; and he asks what this element is. The solution is brief, but it is sound:

“If we should ask a child, he would tell us that the man *knows better*. This would be his mode of explaining it.

“But what is meant by knowing better? Did not the

brute and the man both know [in the case supposed], that the result of their action would be harm? Did not both intend that it should be harm? In what respect, then, did the one know better than the other?

"I think that a plain man or a child would answer, the man *knew* that he *ought not to do it*, and that the brute did *not know* that he *ought not to do it*; or he might say, the man knew, and the brute did not know, that it was *wrong*; but whatever terms he might employ, they would involve the same idea. I do not know that a philosopher could give a more satisfactory answer. If the question then be asked, what is a moral action? we may answer, it is the voluntary action of an intelligent agent, who is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, or of distinguishing what he ought, from what he ought not to do."—p. 9.

This, in our opinion, is the correct view, and it goes to the bottom of the subject; we understand of course that the will and intelligence of the agent are implied in every particular action of which the quality of *moral* is predicated. The ideas of *right* and *wrong*, and of *ought to do*, and *ought not to do*, are immediately and irresistibly connected together. Whenever an action is contemplated as *wrong*, then, inseparable from it, in every moral being, is there a conviction that he *ought not to do it*,—a conviction which is irresistible, immediate and independent of any other consideration whatsoever. Such is our moral constitution.

After showing that the moral quality of acting resides wholly in the intention of the agent, the author next goes on to discuss the question concerning the *origin* of our notion of the moral quality of actions. He here takes up several theories that have been maintained on this point, such as—that the notion of right and wrong is a *modification* of some other idea—that it is derived from an exercise of the *judgement* (in the logical sense of the word)—that it is derived from *association*—and finally, that it is derived from the idea of the *greatest amount of happiness*. These several theories are briefly, but very thoroughly, discussed and refuted. We have not room to exhibit the course of argument on all these topics. We will only briefly notice the last, the theory of the "Greatest Happiness principle," so called, which has within a few years been the subject of a good deal of discussion and controversy.

The author states the question thus: "It is said that our

notion of right and wrong is derived from our idea of the productiveness of the greatest amount of happiness, or in other words, that an action is right or wrong because it is productive of the greatest amount of happiness." He then goes on to remark that it must of course be taken for granted in this position, that the ideas of right and wrong, and of productiveness of the greatest amount of happiness, are two distinct ideas; else it would be absurd to speak of the one as derived from the other: and that the word *because*, in this position must be used to signify either, 1st, that the idea of the greatest happiness is the stated *antecedent* to the idea of right or moral obligation,—or 2d, that the idea of moral obligation is an idea comprehended under, and referred to, a *more general* idea, namely, that of the productiveness of the greatest happiness. In the former of these senses, the question is one purely of fact, and the appeal to facts easily refutes the position. So far is the position from being true, that the author might have shown that it is more correct to say, that the idea of the greatest amount of happiness is rather the *consequent* of the idea of conformity to moral obligation.

Taking the question in the other sense, the author reduces the position to the assertion, that the "two ideas are in their nature" merely "co-extensive," that is, "that whatever is productive of the greatest amount of happiness, is right; and that whatever is right, is productive of the greatest amount of happiness." Of course it would be a difficult thing to show which idea is to be referred to the other. The only conceivable meaning, then, he adds, which can be put upon the assertion is this: "that we would not be under moral obligation to perform any action, unless it were productive of the greatest amount of happiness, thus making moral obligation rest upon this other idea, that of the greatest amount of happiness." This position, the author asserts, is not self-evident, and even if it be granted that the two ideas are coincident, that is, that we are always under obligation to do whatever is productive of the greatest amount of happiness; and that, whatever we are under obligation to do, is productive of the greatest amount of happiness,—it would by no means establish the above position. But, he affirms it is impossible for us absolutely to *know*, that the two ideas are coincident. "The government of God *could not be more perfectly right* than it is; but whether it could have involv-

ed less misery, or have produced more happiness, I do not know that we have the means of ascertaining."

We will remark here, that the whole plausibility of the "greatest happiness principle," seems to us to be owing to a confusion of ideas. If it was merely asserted that right doing is productive of the greatest amount of happiness, and that those actions which are productive of the greatest amount of happiness are, on that account, *not made or constituted* right, but *proved or indicated to us*, to be right, —we do not know that, for ourselves, we should feel any particular interest to refute these assertions; for there would be implied what we contend for as fundamental,—namely, that the idea of right is, in its essence, independent of its consequences, that is, the greatest happiness;—and moreover, these assertions would not deny what we contend for as equally a fundamental principle, that the idea of *obligation* reposes ultimately and solely upon the idea of *right*. Still, we should remark, that both the theory of "general consequences" and of "the greatest amount of happiness," considered merely as the *criterion or guide to us*, in the performance of duty, is nothing but *ideal*, at least, from the limitation of our faculties, is any thing but universal and certain in its *practical* application. The *will of God* affords us a rule which is liable to no such objection.

Without going fully into the course of argument pursued by the author on this topic, we will give the reader his concluding remarks:

"For these reasons, I think it is not proved, that an action is right, because it is productive of the greatest amount of happiness. It may be so, or it may not, but we ought not to believe it to be so without proof; and it may even be doubted whether we are in possession of the media of proof, that is, whether it is a question fairly within the reach of the human faculties; and so far as we can learn from the Scriptures, I think their testimony is decidedly against the supposition. To me, the Scriptures seem explicitly to declare, that the *will of God alone*, is sufficient to create the obligation to obedience in all his creatures; and that this *will*, of itself, precludes every other enquiry."—p. 25.

We give also his general conclusions on the whole subject under discussion:

"It seems to me, therefore, that these explanations of the origin of our moral sentiments, are unsatisfactory. I be-

lieve the idea of a moral quality in actions to be ultimate, to arise under such circumstances as have been appointed by our Creator, and that we can assign for it no other reason, than that such is his will concerning us.

"If this be true, our only business will be to state the circumstances under which our moral notions arise. * * *

* * * The view which I take of this subject is briefly as follows :

"1. It is manifest to every one, that we all stand in various and dissimilar relations to all the sentient beings, created and uncreated, with which we are acquainted. Among our relations to created beings, are those of man to man, or that of substantial equality, of parent and child, of benefactor and recipient, of husband and wife, of brother and brother, citizen and citizen, and citizen and magistrate, and a thousand others.

"2. Now, it seems to me, that as soon as a human being comprehends the relation in which two human beings stand to each other, there arises in his mind a consciousness of moral obligation, connected, by our Creator, with the very conception of this relation. And the fact is the same whether he be one of the parties, or not. The nature of this feeling is, that the one *ought* to exercise certain dispositions towards the others to whom he is thus related ; and to act towards them in a manner corresponding with those dispositions.

"3. The nature of these dispositions varies of course with the relations. Thus, those of a parent to a child are different from those of a child to a parent ; &c. * * But different as these may be from each other, they are all pervaded by the same generic feeling, that of *moral obligation*, that is, *we feel that we ought* to be thus or thus disposed, and to act in this or that manner.

"4. This, I suppose to be our constitution, in regard to created beings, and such, do I suppose, would be our feeling irrespective of any notion of the Deity. That is, immediately upon the conception of these and such like relations, there would immediately arise this feeling of moral obligation, to act towards those sustaining these relations in a particular manner.

"5. But there is an uncreated Being to whom we stand in relations infinitely more intimate, and inconceivably more solemn, than any of those of which we have spoken. It is

that infinite Being, *who stands to us* in the relation of Creator, Preserver, Benefactor, Lawgiver, and Judge; and *to whom we stand* in the relation of dependent, helpless, ignorant, and sinful creatures. *How much* this relation involves, we cannot possibly know; but so much as this we know, that it involves obligations greater than our intellect can estimate. We cannot contemplate it, without feeling, that from the very fact of its existence, we are under obligations to entertain the disposition of filial love and obedience towards God, and to act precisely as he shall condescend to direct. And this obligation arises simply from the fact of the relation existing between the parties, and irrespective of any other consideration; and if it be not felt when the relations are perceived, it can never be produced by any view of the consequences which would arise to the universe from exercising it.

"6. This relation, and its consequent obligation, *involves, comprehends, and transcends* every other. Hence it places obligation to man on a new foundation. For if we be ourselves thus under illimitable obligations to God, and if, by virtue of the relation which he sustains to the creation, he is the Protector, Ruler and Possessor of all, we are under obligations to obey him in every thing. And as every other being is also his creature, we are bound to treat that creature as he shall direct. Hence we are bound to perform the obligation under which we stand to his creatures, not merely on account of our relations to them, but also on account of the relations in which we and they stand to God.

"And hence, in general, our feeling of moral obligation is a peculiar and instinctive impulse, arising at once by the principles of our constitution, as soon as the relations are perceived in which we stand to the beings, created and uncreated, with whom we are connected."—p. 26—28.

With these views, in the main, we concur, especially with the general conclusion stated in the last paragraph. We believe that the idea of *obligation* reposes on that of *right*, and that this latter is an ultimate idea, arising, by the necessity of our constitution, immediately on the perception of our relations. For this reason, we cannot agree with the assertion made in the first of these passages, "that the *will of God alone* is sufficient to create the obligation to obedience," if the author means thereby to lay it down as a uni-

versal truth, that the will of God is the *last ground* of obligation. We are not certain that such is the meaning; it would certainly contradict some of the most fundamental positions of the work, and which, in our opinion, constitute its distinctive and superiour merit. To us it seems obvious, that the feeling of obligation to obey any particular command of God, supposes such a perception of our relations to him and of his character, as to make it in our view right to obey, and wrong to disobey his commands, and that generally, and antecedently to any particular command. "Right," says the late Dr. Adams of Oxford, "implies *duty* in its idea. To perceive an action to be right, is to see a reason for doing it in the action itself, abstracted from all other considerations whatever; and this perception, this acknowledged rectitude in the action, is the very essence of obligation, that which commands the approbation and binds the conscience of every rational human being."*

We believe this general position to be comprehensive of every particular case of obligation; yet for the sake of elucidation we will here make a distinction between that general class of divine injunctions termed *positive*, and those commonly denominated *moral*. In regard to the former class—including actions which we should not be under obligation to perform, if it were not for the express divine command, as for instance the observance of the Sabbath,—we may indeed say that the command *constitutes* the obligation to perform *the particular action*; but it does so only because of the antecedent and *general* obligation to obey the divine commands. In other words, the obligation to do the particular thing enjoined, resolves itself into a more general obligation, resting upon the idea of right, and springing from the perception of our relations to the Divine Being. In such cases, the obligation to perform any particular action enjoined, implies that the character of God, and our relations to him, are such as give him authority to command, and make it our duty to obey. Hence it is not so correct to say that his command *makes* a thing right, as that it is right to obey his commands; his command would not put us under obligation to perform any particular action, if we were not antecedently under the general obligation of obedience to him; and if we should separate the ideas of infinite wisdom

* Sermons on the Nature and Obligations of Virtue.

and rectitude from our conception of the character of God, we cannot conceive it possible that the obligation should be felt in regard to the commands of a mere Omnipotent Sovereign. The consideration that it is our *interest* to obey such a being, is certainly not the sentiment of *moral* obligation; it may be *prudent* so to do, but it is not *virtue* nor *piety*. Nor can the sentiment of gratitude to our Creator, Preserver, and Benefactor, be conceived as the basis of an unlimited obligation to obey his commands, apart from the consideration of his infinite rectitude. In regard to our fellow-beings, we can easily suppose commands imposed upon us by a benefactor, which the most unbounded gratitude would never beget in us the feeling of obligation to obey; and the same would be equally true in regard to God, did not our conception of his character involve, beside the relation of Creator and Benefactor, the idea also of his infinite rectitude,—a conception which precludes the supposition of his ever commanding any thing that is wrong. God being such as we conceive him to be—infinite in wisdom to comprehend, and in rectitude to command, only what is right, we necessarily feel that it is right to obey and wrong to disobey his commands. We necessarily suppose that all God's commands are grounded in rectitude; and this conviction is a necessary condition of that feeling of obligation to submit to the *authority* of God, which is grounded on a perception of the relations in which we stand to him—a perception which necessarily begets in us the conviction that it is *right* that we should submit to the authority of such a Being. Hence it is, that, in regard to certain actions, we may say, the command of God *constitutes* the obligation *to do those particular actions*, because without such an express command we should not be under obligation to do them; though at the same time, we necessarily presume that there is a reason for the command—that it is grounded in rectitude—whether from the limitation of our faculties, we are able to discern it, or not. And in such a case, the reason why we are under obligation to obey a particular command of God, resolves itself into the more general principle, that *on the ground* of God's character and of our relations to him, it is *right* that we should obey his commands.

But in regard to another class of actions, included in the *moral* precepts, as they are sometimes termed in distinction from the positive,—it is impossible to conceive that the com-

mand of God *constitutes* the obligation to perform those actions, even in the sense above stated ; for that would imply that we should not be under obligation to perform them, if they were not expressly commanded, and would generally make the divine command the condition and limit of duty. This, however, would contradict the assertion of St. Paul, who says of the Gentiles "not having a formal law, that they are a law unto themselves." That the command of God does not *constitute* the obligation to perform certain actions, for instance, towards our fellow men, must be considered as expressly admitted in the statement of President Wayland, that the feeling of obligation arises "immediately on the conception of our relations," and "would be our feeling irrespective of any notion of the Deity." Nothing indeed can be more certain, than that our obligation to perform certain actions towards our fellow beings, would be felt, even if they had never been commanded by God. The sentiment of obligation is grounded upon the idea of right, and nothing is necessary to beget it, in rational and free beings, but a perception of the relations in which they stand. When, therefore, the author says that our relation to God "places our obligation to man upon a *new foundation*," we confess we find it difficult to attach any meaning to the assertion, that would not make him inconsistent with himself. To say that our relation to God *removes* the foundation of obligation furnished by our relations to our fellow-men, and *substitutes another*—to wit, the command of God as the *constituting* cause of obligation—in its place, appears contradictory and entirely untrue ; and to say that our relation to God so *modifies* our relations to man, as that his command then comes to *constitute* the obligation to perform certain actions towards our fellow-men, an obligation which by the author's own admission, we feel irrespective of the Deity, appears equally contradictory and untrue. That our relations to the Deity are such that the command of God to us to perform our duties to our fellow-men, should come in to *quicken* or strengthen the original feeling of obligation, we are certainly not disposed to question : and if this be what the author means, we should only remark that the language is unfortunately chosen. So likewise in regard to our moral obligations to the Deity himself, we cannot conceive that the command of God *constitutes* the obligation. We cannot conceive that our obligation to "love the Lord our God with

all our heart" is based upon his command to do so; for then it would follow, that if we had received no such command we should be under no such obligation; and those to whom the command has not been given, are free of the obligation; whereas contrary to this we cannot but feel that we should be under the obligation of supreme love and reverence to God, even if we had not been thus commanded, and that all mankind are under the same obligation, whether they have received the command or not.

It may, perhaps, be said, that by the "will of God" as the constituent of right, and the ground of obligation, it is not necessary to mean exclusively the *express* commands of God, but that the *necessary conviction* of obligation of which we have spoken, arising immediately upon the view of our relations, is also to be considered as the will of God, or expressive of his will. To this it is sufficient to reply, that although these necessary dictations of our moral nature, arising in view of our relations, are unquestionably *conformable* to the will of God, and in a certain and very high sense, we regard them as the *voice of God in us*, yet they are by no means originally conceived of by us as *commands* of God. Analysis never gives us the formula: *it is the will or command of God*, as expressing the ground of the consciousness of obligation felt in view of our moral relations; but always this: *it is right*, or *it is wrong*; to do thus or thus, and therefore *we ought*, or *ought not*, to do it. The instinctive utterance of conscience is not: *God commands you to do thus, or thus*,—but: *do thus, or thus*.

In fine, we cannot admit the general position, that the will of God is the ultimate ground of obligation. The command of God is indeed the *maxim* (*maxima regula*), the highest *rule* of duty; but not the *ground* of obligation. It is an *authoritative* rule, we allow; for God is the eternal representative and administrator of absolute rectitude and justice. Using the term, Will of God, to denote his moral nature, or the principle of the divine activity, we might indeed say, that his will is forever ONE WITH eternal rectitude, truth, and goodness. But this is a point upon which we do not wish here to enter. We take the term in its more common signification of *command*; and our general position is, that God's command, does not *make* a thing right; he commands it because it *is* right. His command is an infallible criterion of rectitude, though not

the principle of obligation. Nor is this a trivial distinction in speculation. To confound the *criterion* of duty with its *ground*, is to do away the essential difference between right and wrong. But so far is the mere enactment of God from being the *constituting* cause of the difference of actions, and the ground of obligation, that even in taking it as the *exponent* or *rule* of duty, we are compelled to presume a perfection of moral rectitude in God, which determines him to the enactment of that only which is right; and consequently there is such a thing as right and wrong *antecedently* to the consideration of the command of God,—the essentially and immutably right. Of course, so far is the command of God from *constituting* a thing right, and being the ground of our obligation, that we are compelled, by our moral constitution, to suppose the antecedent idea of right to be the *very ground of the command*. Hence, in our view, the assertion, that “the will of God precludes every other enquiry,” is universally true only in regard to the *rule* of duty, meaning thereby, that when we have ascertained the will of God in any case, we are infallibly certain of what is *right*, and consequently of our *duty*.

We have dwelt thus long upon this point, not because we suppose the general views we maintain are contrary to those of the author of this work, nor because we think he intended distinctly to advance the theory we have endeavoured to controvert; else he might have spared himself the trouble of writing the first or theoretical portion of his book; certainly he would not have expressed himself in the manner he has done on many fundamental points. Still we have thought it necessary to express our views in regard to the passages that have been the subject of animadversion, because we think them calculated to mislead the minds of some, especially if taken up without due consideration of the general tenour of the author's positions.

Next follows an admirable chapter on conscience,—on the fact of it, the mode of its decision, its supreme authority, and the general laws to which its action is subject. We do not know that so complete, lucid, and satisfactory a discussion of this subject, is any where to be found within the same compass. In regard to the question, whether conscience be a distinct and special *faculty*, after showing that the same general grounds exist for regarding it as such, which deter-

mine us to assign particular modes of mental action to special faculties, in other cases, the author remarks :

" But after all, this question is, to the moral philosopher, of but comparatively little importance. All that is necessary to his investigations, is, that it be admitted that there is a moral quality in actions, and that men are so constituted as to perceive it, and to be susceptible of certain affections in consequence of that perception. Whether these facts are accounted for, on the supposition of the existence of a single faculty, or of a combination of faculties, will not affect the question of moral obligation. All that is necessary to the prosecution of the science, is, that it be admitted that there is such a quality in actions, and that man is endowed with a constitution capable of bringing him into relation to it." p. 34.

He then takes up the most common objections to the supposition of the existence of such a faculty, and briefly, but sufficiently exposes them, by showing that moral convictions are universal ; that the differences of opinion and practice which have been so often brought forward to disprove it, never deny the distinction between right and wrong, but differ only in the application of the idea ; that no nation or individuals can be found to justify what is wrong, as wrong ; that the utmost reach of the objections from this quarter, only goes to prove an *imperfectly developed* conscience ; and that the same course of objection would prove mankind destitute of taste or understanding, because these faculties are less perfectly unfolded in a savage state. The last objection, he notices, is thus stated :

" It has been objected, that if we suppose this faculty to exist, it is after all useless, for if a man please to violate it, and to suffer the pain, then this is the end of the question, and, as Dr. Paley says, 'the moral instinct of man has nothing more to offer.' To this it may be answered : the objection proceeds upon a mistake respecting the function of conscience. Its use is to teach us to discern our moral obligations, and to impel us towards the corresponding action. It is not pretended, by believers in a moral sense, that man may not, after all, do as he chooses. All that is contended for is, that he is constituted with such a faculty, and that the possession of it is necessary to his moral accountability. It is in his power to obey it, or to disobey it, just as he pleases. The fact that a man obeys or disobeys conscience, no more

proves that it does not exist, than the fact, that he sometimes does, and sometimes does not, obey passion, proves that he is destitute of passion."—p. 38.

We are no advocates for the phrase "*moral sense*," indeed we are averse to the employment of such a term; but that there is that in the moral constitution of man, apart from all the influences of custom, education, &c., which makes the distinction between right and wrong, and the consequent feeling of obligation, to be a *universal and necessary* fact of consciousness, we strenuously maintain; and we think the passage above quoted an abundant reply to the shallow sophism of Paley. Indeed we find it difficult to conceive how the utterer of such an objection could have had any notion of the distinction between a moral and a mechanical agent. A *law* for rational and free beings, a moral law, can, of necessity, be nothing but an obligation; the command of conscience can be nothing but a categorical imperative, which man may violate or obey as he chooses; else, necessarily, all distinction between moral and physical law vanishes, and all responsibility is destroyed. We will here give a passage from Cousin which bears on this point, and in our view is very justly and happily expressed: "The conception of right and wrong instantly gives that of Duty, of Law; and as the one is universal and necessary, the other is equally so. Now a law necessary for the reason in respect to action, is, for a rational but free agent, a simple obligation, but it is an absolute obligation. Duty obliges us, though without forcing us; but at the same time, if we can violate it, we cannot deny it. Accordingly, even when the feebleness of the liberty and the ascendancy of passion, makes the action false to the law, yet reason, independent, asserts the violated law as an inviolable law, and imposes it still with supreme authority upon the wayward conduct as its imprescriptible rule. The sentiment of reason and of moral obligation which reason reveals and imposes, is consciousness in its highest degree and office; it is moral consciousness, or Conscience properly so called."*

After remarking upon one office of conscience, namely, to discern the moral quality of actions, President Wayland goes on to speak of its *impulsive* power. We give the passage, as it contains some things which are equally fundamental and important.

* Elements of Psychology, p. 113.

"Besides this discriminating power, I think we may readily observe a distinct *impulse* to do that which we conceive to be right, and to leave undone that which we conceive to be wrong. This impulse we express by the words *ought*, and *ought not*. Thus, we say it is *right* to tell the truth; and I *ought* to tell it. It is *wrong* to tell a lie; and I *ought not* to tell it. Ought, and ought not, seem to convey the *abstract* idea of right and wrong, together with the other notion of *impulsion* to do, or not to do, a particular action. Thus, we use it always TO DESIGNATE A MOTIVE TO ACTION, as we do *passion*, or *self-love*, or any other *motive power*. If we are asked why we performed any action, we reply, we acted thus, because it *gratified* our desires, or because it *was for our interest* upon the whole, or, because we felt that *we ought* to act thus. Either of them is considered sufficient to account for the fact; that is, either of them explains the motive or impulse, in obedience to which we acted."—p. 39.

The author goes on in the next section to consider the Supremacy of Conscience, as the most authoritative impulse of our nature. This he argues from the very conception which men form of this faculty,—from our feelings when comparing the actions of men with those of brutes,—and from the necessity of such a supremacy, in order to secure the object for which man was created. In our view the demonstration of this point requires but a short argument. It is a fact of universal consciousness, that the command of conscience is never of the nature of a *hypothetical* imperative, that is; *act right for the sake of* something else, *in order to* this or that end, but always of an *absolute* imperative, that is: *act right, for the sake of right*, or rather *will right* for the sake of right, for morality has to do with the will or intention. We say the analysis of the command of conscience gives this as the universal fact of consciousness; and certainly it is impossible to conceive that any person who has a proper notion of man as a moral being, should intelligently subordinate this impulse to any of the other active principles of human nature. If the highest end of man's existence be not a *moral* end, he is made for no end, worthy of our consideration; and surely that principle of our nature which directs us with absolute authority to the fulfillment of that end, must be regarded as the highest and most imperative principle of action.

The third chapter is taken up with the discussion of the nature of Virtue. We stand in certain relations, apprehended by our intellectual faculties; and by virtue of our moral constitution, we become aware of certain conduct, corresponding to those relations, as *right* and *obligatory*. In a *perfectly constituted* being, President Wayland says, the intellect, under its proper conditions, would necessarily and correctly *discern* those relations, and the conscience would *indicate and command all the duties* growing out of them. "Hence," he adds, "in a being perfectly constituted, it is manifest, that virtue, the doing of right, or obedience to conscience, would mean the same thing." He then proceeds, however, to consider the subject in relation to a being whose moral constitution has become disordered. This disorder may be of two kinds—in not correctly perceiving his relations, or in not feeling all the corresponding obligation. In such a case, his responsibility will *not be limited* by the extent and accuracy of his knowledge of his relations, and of the corresponding feeling of obligation, *apart from all other considerations*, but will depend on the *means he had* for knowing his relations, and on the *cause* of the imperfection of his sentiment of obligation, that is, whether it was the result of his own conduct, or not.

We confess, however, we do not see any material ground for insisting particularly on such a distinction between virtue in perfectly constituted, and virtue in imperfect beings. For it is obvious, that virtue is essentially the same in both cases; the conditions of responsibility stated in regard to the latter case, are necessarily presupposed to exist in the former case. The essential principle of virtue, in our view, may be stated as a ruling purpose, intention, or will, to obey the dictates of conscience, or to do whatever we know to be right, and that because it is right.

The subject of the next chapter is Human Happiness. Our limits permit us to state only the general conclusion, which is, that human happiness consists in the exercise of our powers, and in the gratification of our desires, within the limits assigned to them by our Creator.

The fifth chapter treats of self-love. It is the nature of passion to seize upon the present gratification without regard to the consequences. Hence man needs another active principle to direct him in such a manner as to promote his happiness on the whole. "When we act from

simple respect to present gratification," says President Wayland, "we act from passion. When we act from a respect to our whole individual happiness, without regard to the present, only as it is a part of the whole, and without any regard to the happiness of others, only as it will contribute to our own, we are then said to act from self-love."

The rank of self-love, as an active principle, is superiour to that of passion, inasmuch as our happiness, on the whole, is of more consequence than the happiness of any particular portion of our existence; it is inferiour to that of conscience, by as much as moral beings, capable of virtue, are superiour to sensitive beings, capable merely of happiness. And if virtue should be degraded, in our judgement, into a mere instrument of happiness, the superiority of conscience over the impulses of self-love and passion is still apparent.

"Thus," says the author, "suppose I deliberate whether I shall spend a sum of money in self-gratification, or else in an act of benevolence, which is plainly my duty. If I pursue the former course, it is very uncertain whether I actually secure the gratification which I seek, while I lose the pleasure of rectitude, and am saddened by the pains of remorse. The pleasure of gratification is soon over, but the pain of guilt is enduring. Or, again, I may perform the act of benevolence from love of applause, or some modification of self-love. I here obtain with more certainty the reputation which I seek, but I loose the reward of conscious virtue. Or, thirdly, if I do the act without any regard to my own happiness, and simply from love to God and man, I obtain all the rewards which attach to the action by the constitution under which I am placed, and also enjoy the higher rewards of conscious rectitude.

* * * * *

"If these remarks be true, we see,

"1. That when conscience speaks, the voice of self-love must be silent. That is to say, we have no right to seek our own happiness, in any manner at variance with moral obligation. Nevertheless, from several courses of action, either of which is innocent, we are at liberty to choose that which will most conduce to our own happiness. In such a case the consideration of our happiness is justly ultimate.

"2. The preceding chapter has shown us that man was designed to be made happy by the gratification of his desires.

The present chapter teaches us, that, when the gratification of desire is at variance with virtue, a greater happiness is to be obtained by self-denial. Or, in other words, our *greatest* happiness is to be obtained, not by the various modes of self-gratification, but by simply seeking the good of others, and in doing the will of God, from the heart.

"3. And, hence, we may arrive at the general principle, that every impulse or desire is supreme *within its own assigned limits*; but that, when a lower comes into competition with a higher impulsion, the inferior accomplishes its own object, by being wholly subject to the superior. Thus, desire, or the love of present gratification, may, within its own limits, be indulged. But, when this present gratification comes into competition with self-love, even passion accomplishes its own object best, that is, a man actually attains to more enjoyment, by submitting present desire implicitly to self-love. And so self-love is ultimate within its proper limits; but when it comes into competition with conscience, it actually accomplishes its own object best, by being entirely subject to that which the Creator has constituted its superior.

"4. The difference between self-love, as an innocent part of our constitution, and selfishness, a vicious disposition, may be easily seen. Self-love properly directs our choice of objects, where both are equally innocent. Selfishness, is the same disposition to promote our own happiness, upon the whole, but it disposes us to seek it, in objects over which we have no just controul; that is, which are not innocent, and which we could not enjoy, without violating the rights of our neighbour."

We rejoice at the ground here taken by the author. After the thorough confutation of the grounding principle of the *Selfish System* by Bishop Butler, and the various and convincing lights, in which it has been placed by subsequent writers, it is astonishing that any modification of it should continue to be maintained. Yet we have heard it laid down in express terms from the chair of theology, that "moral obligation is the necessity, which a moral agent feels, of performing certain actions as the indispensable means of his highest happiness;" and that "*a regard to happiness is the only influence that can move a moral being to action.*" The plausibility of this fallacious doctrine unquestionably lies chiefly in the confusion of the principle with its consequence.

Happiness is, indeed, in a certain sense, the invariable concomitant or consequent of virtuous action; but it is not its object. That the connection between virtue and our highest happiness, discerned by the enlightened reason, may be a subsidiary, quickening influence, we are not disposed to question; but we deny that it is the ultimate and sole motive of any action, that can properly be denominated virtuous.

The doctrine in question is at variance with the universal consciousness of human nature. In the contemplation of our relations, certain actions are, by the necessity of our constitution, presented to the mind as *right* and *obligatory*. This sentiment of obligation is immediate, springing directly from the contemplation of the actions as right, and is independent of any other consideration whatever. It is a sentiment that is simple, and essentially distinct from any other impulse of our nature. It is a disinterested sentiment, just as pity, love of the beautiful, and of the true, are disinterested sentiments. The sentiment of obligation is never hypothetical, that is, that we ought to do right for the sake of some other object; such a feeling is not found at all in the analysis of conscience; it is authoritative and absolute, having for its direct and sole object the action contemplated as right. It is also an *active* principle of our nature, that is, the feeling of obligation to an action, simply as right, is a sufficient reason for the doing of the action; just as self-love is an active principle, and sufficient to account for actions within its sphere. We maintain that the constitution of our nature is such, that the conviction of *duty*, the feeling of obligation to do any action considered simply as right, is felt by us to be a *motive*. That a thing is right, is recognized by us as a reason for doing it, that it is wrong, as a reason for not doing it, apart from any other consideration. Such is the impulse of our nature—the command of conscience. We may indeed refuse to yield to it, just as we may refuse to yield to other impulses of our nature; but that does not prove it not to be an active principle, and intended to be an effectual motive. On the contrary, just in proportion as the simple consideration of *duty*, actually prevails with any other person as the motive of his actions, is our estimation of his virtue. If we were to tell a man, he should not do a given action because it is wrong, and he were to reply, that this was *no motive* to him, we should feel either that he was mistaken,

or that he had lost his reason, or that he was a moral monster, who wilfully denied his own nature. So also, in proportion as the simple consideration of an action as wrong, is *insufficient* of itself to deter a man from doing it, and requires other motives, addressed to his self-love, to render it effectual, we feel that his character is *defective* in the essential principle of virtue. That such is the fact, any person may be satisfied who will carefully observe his own consciousness; and it is abundantly illustrated in the current language, in which the criticism of men's motives and characters is expressed in common life.

We have said that the chief plausibility of the doctrine in question arises from confounding the motive, or final object of action, in the fulfillment of duty, with the happiness or satisfaction connected with it. Because the performance of duty is understood to secure our highest happiness, or is accompanied by a certain present inward satisfaction, it is therefore urged, that this happiness or this present satisfaction, either or both, is the final object of the mind, the ultimate motive of the action; and the power of the simple feeling of duty to be itself the motive, is denied. But there is a very clear distinction between the *object* of any of the special impulses of our nature, and the gratification, which, by the constitution of things, is connected with obeying them. This pregnant distinction was first observed and clearly stated by that truly great and original thinker, Bishop Butler, and since his time has been amply illustrated by different writers, among the more recent of whom the reader is referred to the work of Dr. Chalmers, published among the Bridgewater Treatises, and to the view of Ethical Philosophy, by the late Sir James Mackintosh; in these works some valuable contributions to the illustration of this subject may be found. This distinction strikes at the root of the selfish system. This system declares that man's ultimate object, in the performance of his duty, is his own individual advantage. Now in respect to all the special impulses or affections of man's nature, and more particularly in respect to a virtuous affection, it may be shown, that the object is something apart from himself. Chalmers, whose course of thought we now follow, illustrates this by the instance of compassion. Here the feelings are drawn away *from* himself, *to* the sufferer. He is occupied with the object of his affection, not with the pleasure of its indulgence. Yet this

does not prevent the pleasure from being felt, the more felt, indeed, the less it has been pursued for its own sake.

What is thus true in regard to virtuous affection, is also true in regard to many other special impulses of our nature, even of such as have been ranked under the selfish. In point of fact, the only interested affection of our nature is self-love, in the strict sense of the words, that is, an affection whose proper and sole object is the good of self. This is a calm, reflecting, and general regard to our own happiness. But the special impulses of our nature, our appetites and passions, are distinct from self-love; the good of self, or happiness, is not the discriminative object of the affection; but each has its own peculiar object, in which it terminates, without regard even to the pleasure which accompanies the attainment of its object.

On this topic Sir James Mackintosh has the following remarks:

"In contending that the benevolent affections are disinterested, no more is claimed for them, than must be granted to mere animal appetites and to malevolent passions. Each of these principles alike seeks its own object, for the sake simply of obtaining it. Pleasure is the result of the attainment, but no separate part of the aim of the agent. The desire that another person may be gratified, seeks that outward object alone, according to the general course of human desire. Resentment is as disinterested, as gratitude or pity, but not more so. Hunger or thirst may be, as much as the purest benevolence, at variance with self-love. It is absurd to say with some, that the pleasure of benevolence is selfish, because it is felt by self. Understanding and reasoning are acts of self, for no man can think by proxy; but no man can call them *selfish*. Why? Evidently because they do not *regard* self. Precisely the same reason applies to benevolence. Such an argument is a gross confusion of self, as it is a *subject* of feeling or thought, with self considered as the *object* of either. It is no more just to refer the private appetites to self-love, because they commonly promote happiness, than it would be to refer them to self-hatred in those frequent cases where their gratification obstructs it." We cannot forbear adducing also in this place, the following passage from the work of Chalmers, before referred to:

"We have already said that the distinction, so well established by Butler, between the object of our affection, and

its accompanying, nay, inseparable pleasure, was the most effectual argument that could be brought to bear against the selfish system of morals. The virtuous affection that is in a man's breast simply leads him to do what he ought; and in that object he rests and terminates. Like every other affection, there must be a pleasure conjoined with the prosecution of it, and at last a full and final gratification in the attainment of its object. But the object must be distinct from the pleasure, which itself is founded on a prior suitableness between the mind and its object. When a man is actuated by a virtuous desire, it is the virtue itself, that he is seeking, and not the gratification that is in it. His single object is, to be or to do rightly—though, the more intent he is upon this object, the greater will, the greater must be, his satisfaction. Nevertheless, it is not the satisfaction which he is seeking: it is the object which yields the satisfaction—the object too for its own sake, and not for the sake of its accompanying or its resulting enjoyment. Nay, the more strongly and therefore the more exclusively set upon virtue for its own sake, the less will he think of its enjoyment, and yet the greater will his actual enjoyment be.”*

After these citations it may be needless to pursue this topic further; but there is one argument, that we are not aware has any where been brought forward, which we cannot forbear briefly to suggest. Its object is to convict the selfish system of a gross paralogism. We take it for granted, that those who maintain the ultimate motive to the performance of duty, to be the agent's own advantage or happiness, would readily reject the *grosser* motives of self-seeking, such as doing the act of duty for the sake of credit, pecuniary advantage, &c. We take it for granted, that they refer to the inward and inherent pleasure or satisfaction, which, by the constitution of our nature, is connected with virtue. We know this is the refined form of the selfish system, held by those whom we have now especially in view. This pleasure, they affirm to be the ultimate motive to virtuous action. Now we maintain that on this ground, the impossibility of virtue is demonstrable. For how can the motive operate, till it exists? How can this inward pleasure be a motive, till it is felt? And how can it be felt, till a virtuous action is done? But how can the first virtuous

* Dr. Chalmers's *Bridgewater Treatise*, Adaptation of Nature to the Constitution of Man.—p. 78.

action be done, before the pleasure of virtue is known, so as to furnish the only available motive? By the selfish theory then—its best and most refined form—a sentiment is constructed as the only possible motive to virtuous action, which sentiment can never be felt or known, except in the doing of duty. In order to give existence to this sentiment, an act of duty must be performed, *without the presence* of the *only* motive, which, by the hypothesis, can render obedience to duty possible. What is this theory but a vicious and suicidal paralogism? The first act of virtue, and by consequence all others, is impossible; unless it be said—as indeed we have understood it to be affirmed, when we have pressed this objection—that the *first* act of duty is done by some *fortunate blunder* of the agent, *without any motive*, and thus the inward pleasure might be discovered, which was thenceforward to constitute the ultimate and availing motive to virtue! This indeed would be destructive to the universality of the theory; but it is the only way, imperfect as it is, to get out of the difficulty.

Contrary to all this, while we believe that inward happiness is the invariable accompaniment and consequence of duty performed, yet it is felt only when duty is done simply as duty,—when the regard fixes upon that as its ultimate object. In this sense it is true of happiness, what the Prophet spake of another subject: “I am found of those that sought me not; I am made manifest unto those that asked not after me.” Happiness is like the *ignis fatuus*—the fireball of the swamp; when we pursue it directly, the breath of our pursuit wafts it from our grasp; but when we follow Duty alone, Happiness will be found at our side, and springing up in our hearts. Happiness is indeed united to Duty, only the duty must be first done as duty—the feeling of obligation must be the motive. The purest happiness is found in the most self-forgetting performance of duty.

We have perhaps dwelt too long upon this subject; but we cannot but regard it as of fundamental importance. The selfish system—in every modification of it—we cannot but regard as utterly at variance with the facts of universal consciousness, and, in its logical consequences, entirely subversive of moral distinctions—making virtue a *mere means* to an end, without intrinsic excellence, destroying all difference, in kind, between Virtue and Prudence, and between Remorse and Regret. In its practical consequences, this sys-

tem, taught in the school of theology, and made the basis of a vicious theory of conversion in popular instruction from the pulpit, has, in this country and in these times, borne the most pernicious fruits. If it be not indeed the *πρωτον φαρμακον*, the fundamental and comprehending LIE, yet it is one of the chief and most pestilent of that nest of errors whose influence, in the form of false and fanatical doctrines, fanatical feelings and measures, has, we cannot doubt, occasioned many spurious conversions, dishonoured the venerable name of religion itself, and we fear will appear at a future day to have been ruinous to the souls of multitudes. It is a system which justifies a style of preaching consisting exclusively in appeals to the imagination and the sensibilities, with entire disregard of the conscience properly speaking. It is a system which legitimates conversions, (or the "declaration of a resolution to serve God" which is taken for conversion,) where there is not the least evidence of any proper feeling of the "exceeding sinfulness of sin," nor of the implantation of any new spring of moral action, nor indeed of any thing save a deeper conviction, (often however as transient in its practical influence as it is spurious in its kind,) that it is a man's *interest*, on the score of prudence, to serve the Lord his God—a conviction, too, that is as perfectly compatible with a *heartly regret* that a man *must* give up sin, or be damned, as the trembling faith of the devils (James 2: 19,) is consistent with entire hostility to the God before whom they tremble.

The next four chapters are taken up with the discussion of the imperfection of conscience—of Natural Religion, as an additional source of light and motives—and its insufficiency without a still further influence. Then comes the consideration of a positive revelation, or of the Holy Scriptures, as the rule of duty. This forms the transition to the second book, which treats of Practical Ethics. In the opening of this part of the work, the author has the following remarks:

"In the preceding pages it has been my design to illustrate the moral constitution of man, and to point out the sources from which that truth emanates, which is addressed to his moral constitution. My design, in the present book, is to classify and explain some of the principal moral laws under which God has placed us, in our present state. We

shall derive these laws from natural, or from revealed religion, or from both, as may be most convenient for our purpose.

"The Scriptures declare that the whole moral law is contained in the single word, LOVE.

"The beings to whom man is related in his present state are, so far as this subject is concerned, God, his Creator, and man, his fellow-creature. Hence, the moral obligations of men are of two kinds; first, LOVE TO GOD, OR PIETY; second, LOVE TO MAN, OR MORALITY.

"This book will, therefore, be divided into two parts, in which these two subjects will be treated of in their order."—p. 153.

It is not our purpose to go into any particular analysis of this portion of the work. Nor is this necessary to the design we had in view, which was briefly to glance at those more general and fundamental principles that give to every such work its distinctive character. We will only observe in regard to the second part of this work, that it embraces a very complete and regular view of human relations and duties. The arrangement is good, the statements and illustrations clear, and the views maintained are, in our opinion, generally sound and just. Our limits will allow us only to refer to a few of the more important topics, and to give a few extracts as a specimen of the manner and spirit of this part of the work.

In regard to the Sabbath the author gives a different view from that of Paley. His course of argument is substantially taken, as he informs us, from the valuable treatise of Mr. J. J. Gurney, on the history, authority, and use of the Sabbath.

The author has treated the present engrossing and agitating subject of Slavery in a manner remarkably sound, temperate and judicious. He shows that the principles on which slavery proceeds violate the personal liberty of man as a physical, intellectual, and moral being; that the influences of slavery are highly injurious to national *wealth*, and to the *morals* of both masters and slaves. He then endeavours to show that the moral precepts of the New Testament—particularly the golden rule, are diametrically opposed to slavery. On this topic he says:

"If any one doubts respecting the bearing of the Scripture precepts upon this case, a few plain questions may throw additional light upon this subject. For instance—

"1. Do the precepts and spirit of the Gospel allow me to derive my support from a system which extorts labour from my fellow-men, without allowing them any voice in the equivalent which they shall receive, and which can only be sustained by keeping them in a state of mental degradation, and by shutting them out in a great degree from the means of salvation ?

"2. Would the master be willing that another person should subject him to slavery, for the same reasons, and on the same grounds, that he holds his slave in bondage ?

"3. Would the Gospel allow us, if it were in our power, to reduce our fellow-citizens of our own colour to slavery ? But the Gospel makes no distinction between men on the ground of colour or race. God has made of *one blood all nations that dwell on the earth*. I think that these questions will easily test the Gospel principles on this subject."—p. 224.

He then considers the objection "that the Gospel never forbids slavery, and still more, by prescribing the duties of masters and servants, it tacitly allows it." President Wayland admits the facts assumed in this objection, but denies the inference; on the ground, that the moral *principles* of the Gospel being subversive of slavery, these facts must of course be explained in some other way than as allowing the practice of slavery. He then attempts to show, from the circumstances under which the Gospel was first promulgated, that there is good reason why it should oppose slavery by subverting its *principle*, rather than by a *formal prohibition* of it. Then as to the precepts given for the conduct of slaves, he says, that these precepts do not proceed upon the ground, that the masters had a right to claim such a course of conduct from their slaves, but they are given, because, upon other grounds, such conduct is pleasing to God. Thus, he says, the duty of obedience from the slave to the master "is never urged, like the duty of obedience to parents, *because it is right* ; but because the cultivation of meekness, and forbearance under injury, will be well-pleasing unto God. Thus servants are commanded to be obedient to their own masters, 'in singleness of heart *as unto Christ*,' 'doing the *will of God* from the heart, with good will doing service *as to the Lord, and not to men*.'—Eph. vi. 5—7. Servants are commanded to 'count their masters worthy of all honour, that the name of *God and his*

doctrine be not blasphemed."—1 Tim. 6: 1. 'Exhort servants to be obedient, &c., that they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things.'—Titus 3: 9. The manner in which the duty of servants or slaves is inculcated, therefore, affords no ground for the assertion that the Gospel authorizes one man to hold another in bondage, any more than the command to honour the king, when that king was Nero, authorized the tyranny of the emperor; or than the command to turn the other cheek, when one is smitten, justifies the infliction of violence by an injurious man."

The author's concluding remarks are so sound, temperate and seasonable, that, though the passage is long, we cannot but indulge ourselves in the pleasure of placing them before our readers.

"Before closing this part of the subject, it may be proper to consider the question, what is the duty of masters and slaves, under a condition of society in which slavery now exists.

"I. As to masters.

"If the system be wrong, as we have endeavoured to show, if it be at variance with our duty both to God and to man, it must be abandoned. If it be asked when, I ask again, when shall a man begin to cease doing wrong? Is not the answer, *immediately*? If a man is injuring us, do we ever doubt as to the *time when* he ought to cease? There is then no doubt in respect to the time when we ought to cease inflicting injury upon others.

"But it may be said, immediate abolition would be the greatest possible injury to slaves themselves. They are not competent to self-government.

"This is a question of fact, which it is not in the province of moral philosophy to decide. It very likely may be so. So far as I know, the facts are not sufficiently known to warrant a full opinion on the subject. We will, therefore, suppose it to be the case, and ask, what is the duty of masters *under these circumstances*?

"1. This situation of the slaves, in which this obstacle consists, is not by their *own act*, but by the *act of their masters*; and, therefore, the *masters are bound to remove it*. The slaves were brought here without their own consent, they have been continued in their present state of degradation without their own consent, and *they* are not responsible for the consequences. If a man have done injustice to his

neighbour, and have also placed impediments in the way of remedying that injustice, he is as much under obligation to remove the impediments in the way of justice as he is to do justice. Were it otherwise, a man might, by the accumulation of injury, at last render the most atrocious injury innocent and right.

"2. But it may be said, this cannot be done unless the slave is held in bondage until the object be accomplished. This is also a question of fact, on which I will not pretend to decide. But suppose it to be so, the question returns, what then is the duty of the master? I answer, supposing such to be the fact, it may be the duty of the master to hold the slave; not, however, *on the ground of right over him*, but of *obligation to him*, and of obligation *to him*, for the *purpose of accomplishing a particular and specified good*. And, of course, he who holds him for any other purpose, holds him wrongfully, and is guilty of the sin of slavery. In the mean while, he is innocent, *in just so far as* he, in the fear of God, holds the slave, not for the good of the master, but for the good of the slave, and with the entire and honest intention of accomplishing the object as soon as he can, and of liberating the slave as soon as the object is accomplished. He thus admits the slave to equality of right. He does unto another as he would that another should do unto him; and, thus acting, though he may in form hold a fellow-creature in bondage, he is in fact, innocent of the crime of violation of liberty. This opinion, however, proceeds upon the supposition that the facts are as above stated. As to the question of fact, I do not feel competent to a decision.

"II. The *duty of slaves* is also explicitly made known in the Bible. They are bound to obedience, fidelity, submission, and respect to their masters, not only to the good and kind, but also to the unkind and froward; not, however, on the ground of *duty to man*, but on the ground of *duty to God*. This obligation extends to every thing but matters of conscience. When a master commands a slave to do wrong, the slave ought not to obey. The Bible does not, as I suppose, authorize resistance to injury, but it commands us to refuse obedience, and suffer the consequences, looking to God alone to whom vengeance belongeth. Acting upon these principles, the slave may attain to the highest grade of virtue, and may exhibit a sublimity and purity of moral character, which, in the condition of the master, is absolutely unattainable.

"Thus, we see, that the Christian religion not only forbids slavery, but that it also provides the only method in which, after it has once been established, it may be abolished, and that with entire safety and benefit to both parties. By instilling the right moral dispositions into the bosom of the master and of the slave, it teaches the one the duty of reciprocity, and the other the duty of submission; and thus, without tumult, without disorder, without revenge, but by the real moral improvement of both parties, restores both to the relation towards each other intended by their Creator."—p. 227—229.

The following judicious remarks are the conclusion of a discussion concerning the liberty of the press:

"I cannot close without remarking, that a most solemn and imperative duty seems to me to rest upon judges, legislators, jurors, and prosecuting officers, in regard to this subject. We hear at the present day very much about the liberty of the press, the freedom of enquiry, and the freedom of the human intellect. All these are precious blessings—by far too precious to be lost. But it is to be remembered, that no liberty can exist without restraint; and the remark is as true of intellectual as of physical liberty. As there could be no physical liberty if every one, both bad and good, did what he will, so there would soon be no liberty, either physical or intellectual, if every man were allowed to publish what he will. The man who publishes what will inflame the licentious passions, or subvert the moral principles of others, is undermining the foundations of the social fabric; and it is kindness, neither to him, nor to society, quietly to look on until both he and we are crushed beneath the ruins. The danger to liberty is pre-eminently greater, at the present day, from the licentiousness than from the restriction of the press. It therefore becomes all civil and judicial officers, to act as the guardians of society, and unawed by popular clamour, and unseduced by popular favour, resolutely to defend the people against their worst enemies. Whatever may be the form of a government, it cannot long continue free, after it has refused to acknowledge the distinction between the liberty and the licentiousness of the press. And much as we may execrate a profligate writer, let us remember, that the civil officer who, from pusillanimity, refuses to exercise the power placed in his hands to restrain abuse, deserves at least an equal share of our execration."—p. 239.

With these citations we must conclude our imperfect no-

tice of this valuable work. There are some points of minor importance, that we might mention, on which we do not entirely coincide with the author's views, and some others, in regard to which we are doubtful whether he has correctly stated the whole truth. But on the whole, as we have said, we consider the work as greatly superiour to any of the books hitherto in use for academical instruction.

ART. III. LETTER ON COLONIZATION.

FROM REV. ALEXANDER PROUDFIT, D. D. Secretary of the New-York Young Men's Colonization Society.

To the editor of the Lit. and Theol. Reviews.

VERY RESPECTED FRIEND,

WHEN any question in science, or politics, or religion, is agitating the public mind, it is the privilege of every citizen, as opportunity offers, to communicate his own views; and, if these are correct, the honest enquirer after truth may be brought to a proper conclusion, the wavering may be confirmed, those who have erred in opinion may be reclaimed, the objections of the caviling may be silenced, and the great interests of society advanced. There is perhaps no question at present of deeper solicitude to the American community, to the patriot, or philanthropist, or Christian, than the interests of our coloured population, and the most eligible mode of promoting them. We all sympathize with them in their present degraded condition; we are all anxious to elevate their intellectual and moral character; but, among their professed friends, it is the great and embarrassing question, by what means this object may be attempted with the greatest probability of success? As I am associated with those who prefer restoring them to the country of their fathers, I will therefore, through the medium of your valuable periodical, give a very cursory view of the history of colonization, in different periods of time, and afterwards contemplate the advantages which would probably result to the coloured people among ourselves, and ultimately to the nations of Africa, by reinstating them, with their own consent, in the homes of their ancestors.

It is obvious from history, both civil and ecclesiastical, that the custom of colonizing is almost coeval with the creation of the world, and is intimately interwoven with the progress of society in every age. Soon after men began to multiply upon the face of the earth, we find different families forming themselves into little groups or associations, and, as adventurers, going abroad into some foreign region for the purpose of promoting their interests by agricultural, or commercial, or other occupations: and it has been noticed by naturalists, that as the animal tribes are frequently improved by a change of local situation, transitions of this nature tend equally to the benefit of man; that by a change of soil, of climate, of the mode of living, and of other associations the health of the emigrants is promoted, the period of human life is protracted, and other motives for enterprize are presented, which conduce to the greater expansion and improvement of the human mind. By indulging this propensity for migrating from country to country, the various members of the great human family are brought more immediately into contact, and become acquainted with each other; the bond of union among the different kindreds of the earth is strengthened; man is led to feel more intimately related to man, and the consideration that we belong to a particular country or tribe is merged in the more generous reflection that the world is our home, that all kindreds are our brethren, and rising superiour to sectional considerations, we feel obligated to advance the interests of the whole. I have remarked that this transition, from one country to another frequently conduces to the improvement of health, and to protract the period of human life; and this fact is confirmed by the history of our own ancestors. Our fathers, who emigrated to this continent from the old world, have probably enjoyed more health, and in many instances have lived to a greater age than their cotemporaries whom they left in their native country.

The history of the world, during a period of four thousand years, consists, in no inconsiderable degree, of a history of colonizing; of tribes removing from one region to another, actuated by motives of avarice, or ambition, or inspired with a hope of improving their condition, religious or civil. Thus we find a colony of Phenicians, at an early period, leaving Asia, their native residence, pushing their adventures into Africa, under the auspices of Dido their princess, founding the city of Carthage, and soon becoming competitors with

Rome, the mistress of the world. We find the offspring of Abraham colonizing from Canaan to Egypt with Jacob their father, and after the lapse of four hundred years, by the divine direction and with Moses their commander, returning as a colony from Egypt to Canaan. And immediately after the discovery of this continent by Columbus, in the fifteenth century, we find some from almost every kingdom in Europe associating together, and as colonists seeking an asylum in the new world, and in various instances this migratory spirit has been overruled for advantages the most important both to the church and society. The Jewish nation amidst all their wanderings, from the exit of Abraham their ancestor out of Urr of the Chaldees, until their tribes, "multiplied as the stars of heaven," obtained the possession of the promised inheritance, were a "light shining in this benighted world;" they were honoured during a period of more than fifteen hundred years to be the repository of divine truth, diffusing the knowledge of the living God among the nations with whom they sojourned. And who can conceive the benign results to individual happiness, to the improvement of civil society, to the extension of the Christian church, and to the illustration of the rights of man which have been already produced, and will probably through all coming ages be produced, by the enterprize of our pilgrim fathers who came, as colonists, to this western continent? They have introduced a new era in the civil history of our world; they have opened an asylum for the reception and repose of the oppressed from every nation; they have exhibited in a new light the doctrine of the rights of man, and formed a civil constitution which, if preserved by us their offspring, will probably be imitated as a model of free government by other kindreds to the end of time.

But in the whole history of colonization, through all preceding ages, there is perhaps not a solitary instance in which the experiment has incurred less expense, has experienced less disaster, has been less accompanied with the sacrifice of human life, and few which under the continued smiles of a benignant Providence promise more extensive or lasting advantages, than the colonies planted by American philanthropists on the margin of Africa. Although the Jewish nation emigrated from Egypt by the immediate command of Heaven, and had "the pillar of cloud and of fire," the pledge of the Divine presence, to direct them in their journeyings, yet their

history is little else than a history of disaster, of disappointment, and suffering. So grievously were they tried by Pharaoh, at the Red sea, at the waters of Mara, by fiery serpents, by the invasion of the Amalakites, and other enemies, that they "murmured against Moses and against God, asking if there were no graves in Egypt, that they were brought to die in the wilderness;" and of the many thousands who departed "from this their house of bondage," two only survived to reach the land of promise. And all who are acquainted with the origin of the first settlements in this country will acknowledge, that the discouragements hitherto experienced by the Colonization Society, in its benevolent designs, scarcely admit of a comparison with the appalling difficulties encountered by our fathers who, as pioneers, first penetrated the forests of America. "The colony planted at Jamestown, Virginia, in May, 1607, consisted of a hundred persons, and before September of that year was reduced to fifty, and soon after to thirty-eight, when it was reinforced by the arrival of one hundred and twenty. In 1609 a farther addition of one hundred persons was made, and the colony then amounted to five hundred souls, but by imprudence, extravagance, and dissipation they were reduced in six months to sixty persons. In 1611 the colony had increased to two hundred. In 1622 it had become still more populous, when it was attacked by the Indians, and three hundred and forty-seven men, women, and children, were cut off. About one hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling had been expended in planting the colony, and more than nine thousand persons had been sent from England; and yet at the expiration of seventeen years it consisted of one thousand and eight hundred persons; while on the coast of Africa, with no governmental patronage and without royal smiles or favour, against wind and tide, against scorn and prejudice, in thirteen years, there are connected with the colonies about four thousand souls."

Probably there has rarely appeared in our world a generation more self-denied and holy; more solicitous to preserve the purity and promote the prosperity of Zion, than the Puritans who first touched the shores of this continent on the rock at Plymouth; and how appalling in their nature and rapid in succession were the difficulties which they were called to endure? Wave of adversity after wave met their little bark, and threatened to overwhelm them at every mo-

ment in the execution of their enterprize. Obstacles, insurmountable to the eye of sense, were thrown in their way by the hand of heaven and of earth, as they attempted to retire from England to Holland, afterwards at their embarkation for this country, during their voyage over the Atlantic, and after they reached the shores of America. Many of them died by disease, others fell sacrifices to the severity of the climate, others perished with hunger, and others were cut off by the relentless hand of the savage. They were men of no ordinary resolution, and destined by divine Providence for the execution of no ordinary purposes, or their faith must have failed amidst trials so complicated and long continued. Preferring "the flesh pots of Egypt" to a grave in the desert, they must have abandoned their undertaking, and returned to their native country.

I therefore repeat the assertion, without the apprehension of being charged with extravagance, by any who are acquainted with the history of colonization, either in ancient or modern times, that all the discouragements experienced by us in relation to the colonies in Africa scarcely admit of a comparison with any similar attempt recorded in the annals of the world. And if we can ascertain the favour of God by the smiles of his providence, we may conclude that our purpose has been accepted of him, and has received his benediction. And if our motives are pure, and our measures are pursued with prudence, and patience, and perseverance, why need we doubt of success in the issue? The object of the Society is to relieve the oppressed; and will not this design meet the approbation of Him "whose tender mercies are over all his works;" who has commanded us to "undo the heavy burdens, and let the oppressed go free?" Through these colonies, as a moral light-house erected on the shores of Africa, we wish to pour the radiance of divine truth on her benighted population, and bring another portion of our globe within the sphere of the "Sun of Righteousness;" and can this design fail to enjoy the favour of Him who has "sent his Son to be the Saviour of the *world*"; to be a light to lighten the Gentiles, and for salvation to the *ends* of the earth."

In a recent communication, I represented the condition of the colonies in their spiritual aspect; the large proportion of them who have come out of the world by a visible profession of religion, and their uniformly exemplary

deportment ; I will now exhibit, from sources of information equally authentic, their comforts in a temporal respect, and their prospect of future growth and prosperity. Mr. Wilson, who has resided among them for many years in the capacity of a preacher, gives the following account : " Liberia, for eligibility of situation, is not often excelled, and the facilities held out for a comfortable living, are rarely equalled ; industry and economy are sure to be rewarded with a generous competency ; for proof of which I refer you to a Williams, a Roberts, a Barber, and others who, a few years ago, possessed very limited means, but are now living in all the affluence and style which characterize the wealthy merchant and gentleman in Virginia." Mr. Elliott, after a long residence in Africa, and enjoying opportunities for extensive observation, remarks, " that the colonists all seem comfortable and contented ; they are engaged in getting timber, in building houses, and clearing the country, in which they are making good progress ; the land is fine, and a little back from the sea is rich and productive ; indigo, coffee, pine-apples and other fruits grow wild. I have visited the coast from Sierra-Leone to a hundred miles leeward from Cape Palmos, and think that Bassa-Cove* is the best spot that could have been selected for a colony ; the reports that the slave-trade has been carried on at the old colony are utterly false ; very few are intemperate, and the traffic in spirits is much diminished through the influence of temperance societies ; some few are discontented, but these are the worthless and the idle." The testimony of another Colonist, dated Monrovia, March 3, 1835, is equally satisfactory. " God in his providence has been pleased to spare my life, and my health is so good, that I intend to open my school soon ; I don't think that sickness and mortality have been more common here, since my arrival, than in different parts of the United States ; the settlers are generally civil and moral ; religion has formed a connexion with temperance, and an intoxicated person is rarely seen ; there is a Bible-class and a Sabbath-school at the Cape ; taking into consideration the great 'field that is ripe for harvest,' and that there are some to labour therein, we may thank God and take courage." And Dr. McDowal, the colonial

* The Colonies recently established by the Colonization Society of New-York and Pennsylvania, are located at this place.

physician, mentions in a letter dated Edina, near Bassa-Cove, May 26, 1835, and received to-day, "that the men in the colony are busy putting up their houses on their farm lots; in general they say they are contented, and would not go back to America. This is particularly the sentiment of the most intelligent among them."

Such is the situation, both in a temporal and spiritual respect, of these colonies, and with what emotions of pleasure must the Christian philanthropist contemplate these scenes of order and felicity? How is his imagination delighted while it draws a contrast between the former dependent, depressed, degraded condition of the colonists, and their present privileges, and future prospects? How is he animated to go on in the execution of a scheme fraught with blessings incalculable to children of the same family with himself? What pleasure must it afford to all who are co-operating in this scheme of benevolence to learn from testimony not to be questioned, that their beneficiaries appear temperate, industrious, prosperous in their secular pursuits, enjoying all the comforts of life, enjoying also the means of cultivation both mental and moral, and many of them apparently exulting in that liberty with which the sinner is made free by the Son of God!

I intended in this letter to have presented our prospects of sending, through these colonies, the blessings of civilization and Christianity to the tribes of Africa; but that must be reserved as the subject of another communication. That through the divine benediction upon the efforts of the benevolent institutions of our country and world, the earth may be speedily filled with the knowledge of the Lord, is the prayer of

Your fellow labourer in the Gospel,

ALEXANDER PROUDFIT.

REV. LEONARD WOODS, Jun'r.

ART. IV. EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.

By REV. GEORGE B. CHEEVER, Salem, Mass.

The Evidences of Christianity, stated in a popular and practical manner. By Daniel Wilson, A. M. Vicar. Boston: Crocker & Brewster; New-York: J. Leavitt, 1829, 1830.

Essays on the nature and uses of the various Evidences of Revealed Religion. By Gulian C. Verplanck, Esq. New-York: Charles Wiley, 1824.

THE work which we place first at the head of this article, seems to be generally regarded, for practical use and a holy influence, as the best of all the works that have been written on the important subject of the Evidences of Christianity. It commands a position which no other work has completely filled. While it occupies thoroughly the ground of the scholar in learned and logical argument, it makes its appeal to the *consciences* of all men, and commends itself especially to the pious feelings of the Christian. It contains an immense mass of information, gathered from every source, and is distinguished likewise for a noble elevation and comprehensiveness of view. It gives prominence to great principles, and pursues them, and in the pursuit, collects and pours in upon the mind a vast multitude of thoughts and observations, cumulative as to the argument, and illustrative of its nature and application.

Among the works to which Bishop Wilson refers, as having come under his notice in the study of the subject, is that volume, the title of which we have placed beneath his own. "To these names," the Bishop observes, after a list of authors whom he has consulted, "he has peculiar satisfaction in adding that of an American writer of singular talent, with a good deal of the mind of our Bishop Butler, Mr. Verplanck, whose work abounds with deep and original thought. A reprint has not yet been made of this masterly work."

This praise is high, and well deserved. We hope to be able, on some future occasion, to present a separate review of the merits of this volume. Meantime, we cannot but express our surprise, that among the multitude of works constantly reprinted in this country from England, a native work, so original and profound as that of Mr. Verplanck, should have been neglected. It contains pages, whose

thoughts might make the subject-matter of volumes; and yet it is hardly to be found in our book-stores.

It is highly pleasing to recognize in this writer an appeal to a nobler philosophy than that which has so long ruled the general mind; an appeal to "those mysterious, but certain, first truths and rational instincts, which are implanted in the breasts of all men, and which prepare them to confess the power of a Creator, to apprehend his perfections, and to know the obligation of his laws. The germs and seeds of all intellectual and moral knowledge, they are not the less efficient, because they are not embodied in words, nor sorted and fashioned into systems. If philosophers will not confess them to be of reason, they must then be considered as something nobler and more divine than reason itself. They may lie dormant, in the darkness of ignorance, or the corruption of gross vice; but when the occasion which is to call them into energy arrives, they develop themselves, we know not how: heaven's beams shine upon them, and they burst into life and power."

This truly eloquent and philosophic passage is extracted from the 69th page of Mr. Verplanck's volume.

While Mr. Verplanck gives a proper place to the "external corroboration" of Christianity, as "well fitted to command attention, and to invite to serious examination, thus giving a more authoritative character to its whole system of doctrines," he at the same time unfolds the superiour power and importance of its internal evidences. "It appears to me to be not less the sound conclusion of reason, than it is the doctrine of revelation itself, that the leading and practical truths of religion are made manifest by their own light, and present themselves to be judged by their own evidence. Like all important truths, not directly cognizable by means of the senses, they must and do require patient attention; and, like other truths having a moral and practical tendency, they may be shut out from our minds by pride, evil passions and prejudices; and their reception or rejection will of consequence depend much upon moral causes, external to the mere exercise of the reasoning power: since there is no better ascertained law of our nature, than that in moral enquiries, whether relating to action or opinion, the tendencies of a stubborn will necessarily have a strong controul over the decisions of the understanding."—p. 62.

After an exhibition of the manner in which the Christian

religion addresses itself to man, he observes: "Surely there needs no laboured argument to prove that there are common principles of our nature, rational faculties and moral qualities, for which all this was intended and adapted, so that if the revelation be true, it will be seen and felt to be so, not indeed by every man, and fully and in all its parts, but still quite distinctly by all who give it the reception which it requires. If it be from God, it bears upon its face that it was made for man, since it treats concerning him, and is fitted for his needs and uses; and it cannot be that man should have no witness in himself, which he may question concerning its truth."—p. 65.

"The most unlettered Christian may, independently of all external evidence, found his faith upon proofs, never, it may be, formally brought out in words, and seldom taking in his mind the logical form of argument, or which he is able to unfold with precision to others: but still, upon most strictly rational proofs, drawn from his direct perceptions of the conformity of the doctrines which he believes to his own individual nature and reason, his duties, his weakness, his vices, and his instinctive and irrepressible hopes and fears; of the agreement of the precepts and examples of revelation to whatever his understanding can conceive to be 'true, honest, just, lovely, and of good report;' from the untaught and unuttered testimony which the promptings of his own heart afford to the value of the assistance, the consolation, the pardon, which it offers; from the congruity of what it teaches of his Maker's being and government with his own partial and dim, but not less irresistible convictions of infinity, eternity, omnipotence—of immutable justice, goodness and wisdom; convictions, to which it is probable that no effort of his reason could have ever led him, but which, when once presented to the intellect, and considered without self-willed opposition, are immediately felt and acknowledged. Knowing and feeling all this, he rejoices to find that which was the dark surmise and the anxious wish of his heart, declared by revelation and confirmed by his reason.

"All these views are so congruous to our nature, as rational and moral beings, that I cannot doubt that they do constantly present themselves secretly and silently to the thoughts of thousands of Christians wholly unaccustomed to general speculations, and completely unable to communicate the grounds of their own belief to other minds. Thus is afford

ed an internal evidence of truth, to all who can think or feel ; which requires no previous knowledge but the knowledge of their own hearts, and which the arts and doubts of scepticism cannot shake, because they can never reach it."—p. 67, 68.

The truth of these reflections finds confirmation in the experience of every attentive mind. The point to which they tend is placed, in the gospel itself, in a blaze of light, and entirely above contradiction. The whole tenor of the Bible is independent and authoritative, and there are single passages of Scripture, in which the ground and duty of faith in Christianity, and the guilt of unbelief, are set forth with great clearness and power. Of this nature is the passage 1 John 5: 10 ; "*He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself: he that believeth not God, hath made him a liar ; because he believeth not the record that God gave of His Son.*" Both faith and infidelity are considered not merely as *intellectual*, but peculiarly *moral* exercises of the soul. It is the unequivocal duty of all men to believe : for unbelief springs purely from evil in the heart, not perplexity in the head. Unbelief, according to the inspired Apostle, makes God a liar. It does so, in whatever degree it be indulged ; it is in the highest measure insulting to God ; it is considered by him as the most deadly product of human depravity, and he has affixed to it the seal of his wrath, in curses more awful, than are denounced against any other crime. It is viewed, indeed, as in itself the source and essence of all crime, inevitably leading to all imaginable forms of wickedness.

What are denominated Evidences of Christianity wear a very different aspect in the light of this passage, from that which they have too often been made to assume. Were the heart right with God, no external evidence would be needed. On the other hand, the prevalence of selfishness in an unregenerate man makes the exercise of true belief absolutely impossible. "How *can* ye believe, which receive honour one of another, and seek not the honour which cometh from God only?" Our Lord, on another occasion, asserts the necessity of *repentance* in order to belief, thus: "Verily, I say unto you, that the publicans and harlots go into the kingdom of God before you ; for John came unto you in the way of righteousness, and ye believed him not ; but the publicans and harlots believed him ; and ye, when ye had seen it, *repented not afterwards, that ye might believe him.*"

A parallel passage is that well known one of our Saviour, "He that will do my will, shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God." Nor did he ever point out any other mode of knowledge. The Jews were rebuked, because they sought for external evidence. "Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe." "An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign." "This is an evil generation; they seek a sign." Our Lord came unto his own, and his own received him not; it was because of their depraved dispositions. Divinity carries in itself its own proof: it is nothing but depravity, that makes external evidence necessary. Our Lord, even while he condescended to work miracles, as one means of overcoming this depravity, and leading the heart to a spiritual faith, at the same time rebuked the Jews for needing miracles in order to believe.

The value of external evidence, though of great importance in its proper place, has been overrated; for the great body of men, it is, for all practical purposes, of little use. "There are," says Bishop Wilson, "ninety-nine out of every hundred of those for whom the sacred Scriptures were written, who are not capable of any certain or effectual conviction of their divine authority by such arguments as learned men employ. If men brought up in heathenism must wait for a certain conviction of Christianity, till they have learning and acquaintance with the history of polite nations, so as to see clearly the force of such kind of arguments, it would make the evidence of the gospel cumbersome, and its propagation among them infinitely difficult." "The number of those, who can argue and reason, and weigh historical proofs, is very few. The number of those, who can feel the power of the gospel, and discern its glory, is vast as the human race."

Nor is it probable that the Bible would possess any less power over the human race, were its external historical evidence all annihilated. Even *that* evidence, merely intellectual as it is, will never be truly appreciated by a selfish mind. That scepticism, which is the native, genuine product of depravity in the heart, and not the result of want of evidence in the understanding, will still prevail, even amidst the most powerful array of external proof. It is only a benevolent heart, a heart submissive to God, that truly comprehends and deeply feels the power of any portion of the Evidences of Christianity.

The Bible is a sun, which God has hung up for our illumination, in the midst of the firmament of our moral existence. It is the *Moral Sun*, by which we move about our business, in whose light we see all things as they are, and without which, there would be no clear distinction of moral colours. A humble, benevolent heart *sees* and *feels* the Bible to be true, by spiritual vision, just as the bodily eye beholds the sun, by physical vision. And it would be just as philosophical to doubt the existence of the physical sun above us, till we should find its creation attested in history, as it is to doubt the truth of revelation, till we find historical evidence of the Scriptures. A pure mind has the evidence of consciousness and intuition, and can no more doubt the Bible to be from God, than an affectionate child, who has just received a letter from a beloved parent, would think of doubting whether that parent wrote it.

Historical evidence may be dispensed with. If the history of the creation were annihilated, the sun would not shine less brightly. So, if all the external evidence of revelation were annihilated, the power and glory of the Scriptures would not be diminished. There they shine, and there they will continue to shine, with unabated splendour, a transcript of the glory of God for all ages, uninjured, though a second deluge should roll over the earth, and sweep all other recorded knowledge from existence. "Evidences of Christianity!" says Mr. Coleridge, "I am weary of the word! Make a man feel the *want* of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust it to its own evidence,—remembering only the express declaration of Christ himself; 'No man cometh to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him.'"

"Christianity, (says this great writer,) is especially differentiated from all other religions, by being *grounded on facts*, which all men alike have the means of ascertaining; the same means, with equal facility; and which no man can ascertain for another. Each person must be herein, querist and respondent to himself. Am I sick, and therefore need a physician? Am I in spiritual slavery, and therefore need a ransom? * * * * * To collect, to weigh, and to appreciate historical proofs and presumptions, is *not* equally within the means and opportunities of every man alike. The testimony of books of history is one of the strong and stately pillars of the church of Christ: but it is not the foun-

A parallel passage is that well known one of our Saviour, "He that will do my will, shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God." Nor did he ever point out any other mode of knowledge. The Jews were rebuked, because they sought for external evidence. "Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe." "An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign." "This is an evil generation; they seek a sign." Our Lord came unto his own, and his own received him not; it was because of their depraved dispositions. Divinity carries in itself its own proof: it is nothing but depravity, that makes external evidence necessary. Our Lord, even while he condescended to work miracles, as one means of overcoming this depravity, and leading the heart to a spiritual faith, at the same time rebuked the Jews for needing miracles in order to believe.

The value of external evidence, though of great importance in its proper place, has been overrated; for the great body of men, it is, for all practical purposes, of little use. "There are," says Bishop Wilson, "ninety-nine out of every hundred of those for whom the sacred Scriptures were written, who are not capable of any certain or effectual conviction of their divine authority by such arguments as learned men employ. If men brought up in heathenism must wait for a certain conviction of Christianity, till they have learning and acquaintance with the history of polite nations, so as to see clearly the force of such kind of arguments, it would make the evidence of the gospel cumbersome, and its propagation among them infinitely difficult." "The number of those, who can argue and reason, and weigh historical proofs, is very few. The number of those, who can feel the power of the gospel, and discern its glory, is vast as the human race."

Nor is it probable that the Bible would possess any less power over the human race, were its external historical evidence all annihilated. Even *that* evidence, merely intellectual as it is, will never be truly appreciated by a selfish mind. That scepticism, which is the native, genuine product of depravity in the heart, and not the result of want of evidence in the understanding, will still prevail, even amidst the most powerful array of external proof. It is only a benevolent heart, a heart submissive to God, that truly comprehends and deeply feels the power of any portion of the Evidences of Christianity.

The Bible is a sun, which God has hung up for our illumination, in the midst of the firmament of our moral existence. It is the *Moral Sun*, by which we move about our business, in whose light we see all things as they are, and without which, there would be no clear distinction of moral colours. A humble, benevolent heart *sees* and *feels* the Bible to be true, by spiritual vision, just as the bodily eye beholds the sun, by physical vision. And it would be just as philosophical to doubt the existence of the physical sun above us, till we should find its creation attested in history, as it is to doubt the truth of revelation, till we find historical evidence of the Scriptures. A pure mind has the evidence of consciousness and intuition, and can no more doubt the Bible to be from God, than an affectionate child, who has just received a letter from a beloved parent, would think of doubting whether that parent wrote it.

Historical evidence may be dispensed with. If the history of the creation were annihilated, the sun would not shine less brightly. So, if all the external evidence of revelation were annihilated, the power and glory of the Scriptures would not be diminished. There they shine, and there they will continue to shine, with unabated splendour, a transcript of the glory of God for all ages, uninjured, though a second deluge should roll over the earth, and sweep all other recorded knowledge from existence. "Evidences of Christianity!" says Mr. Coleridge, "I am weary of the word! Make a man feel the *want* of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust it to its own evidence,—remembering only the express declaration of Christ himself; 'No man cometh to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him.'"

"Christianity, (says this great writer,) is especially differentiated from all other religions, by being *grounded* on *facts*, which all men alike have the means of ascertaining; the same means, with equal facility; and which no man can ascertain for another. Each person must be herein, querist and respondent to himself. Am I sick, and therefore need a physician? Am I in spiritual slavery, and therefore need a ransom? * * * * * To collect, to weigh, and to appreciate historical proofs and presumptions, is *not* equally within the means and opportunities of every man alike. The testimony of books of history is one of the strong and stately pillars of the church of Christ: but it is not the foun-

dation ; nor can it, without loss of essential faith, be mistaken or substituted for the foundation. There is a sect, which, in its scornful pride of antipathy to mysteries, affects to condemn all inward and preliminary experience, as enthusiastic delusion, or fanatic contagion. Historic evidence, on the other hand, these men treat, as the Jews of old treated the brazen serpent, which was the relic and evidence of the miracles worked by Moses in the wilderness. They turned it into an idol : and therefore Hezekiah, (who clave to the Lord, and did right in the sight of the Lord, so that after him arose none like him among all the kings of Judah, nor any that were before him,) not only removed the high places, and brake the images, and cut down the groves, but likewise brake in pieces the BRAZEN SERPENT that Moses had made ; *for the children of Israel did burn incense to it.*"*

It is a remarkable fact, that a large portion of the Evidences of Christianity, and that the most important, is one, which the very nature of the scheme of Socinianism (alluded to in the preceding extract) compels its adherents to avoid. They might well make an idol of historical evidence, for it is the only evidence to which their scheme permits them to recur. The most valuable class of evidences, those on which experimental religion itself rests, are of such a nature, that while they establish the truth of Christianity, they do at the same time demonstrate the falsehood of that system, which denies the prominent and fundamental doctrines of the Gospel. It may not be unimportant to devote a few pages to the consideration of this point : perhaps its discussion may present the general subject of the Evidences of Christianity in a light somewhat novel ; and should any of our readers be of that class, who deny the Deity of Christ, and the evangelical system of which that doctrinal truth is an essential part, we shall be grateful if they will bestow a few candid moments upon the examination of these views.

Let us just notice, from the class of external evidences, the more remarkable of the prophecies relating to Jesus Christ, and descriptive both of his person and his office. What information, then, is to be obtained concerning the *person* of our Saviour, from the prophetic descriptions of the Old Testament ? The result of the closest and most critical examination is briefly this : it is foretold in the Old Testa-

* Aids to Reflection, p. 369, 370.

ment, that he should be both God and man: this wonderful union is clearly and undeniably pointed out. He is described as the descendant of Adam, Abraham, and David, on the one hand, and at the same time, the prophetic descriptions incontrovertibly ascribe to him with great copiousness and repetition, the names and attributes of God,—the titles and the most peculiar and exalted characters of Supreme Deity.

On a rapid glance at some of the prophecies in detail, we find that he was to be the seed of the woman (*a*), the descendant of Abraham, conferring blessings on the world (*b*), the Prophet like unto Moses (*c*), the Messiah, Son of God, Preserver and Ruler of the world, in whom all that trust are blessed (*d*), the Holy One of God (*e*), the King mighty in majesty, God triumphing and reigning forever (*f*), adored by angels (*g*), the Creator, eternal and unchangeable (*h*), the Lord, the King, infinitely holy, the Lord of Hosts, Jehovah (*i*), he was to be Immanuel, God with us (*j*), Jehovah, the object of trust and reverence (*k*), the wonderful, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace (*l*), he was to be Jehovah, the Saviour, and Shepherd (*m*), he was to be Jehovah, our Righteousness (*n*), the Sovereign, whose goings forth were from eternity (*o*), the Fellow of Jehovah (*p*), the Lord of the temple, the Angel of the Covenant (*q*).

Now, the conclusive result of all this is one, viz: That the promised Messiah should come in the actual possession of two natures,—the human, with its essential properties, and the divine, with its inseparable perfections. No arts of criticism can evade the conclusion that the Messiah is depicted in the prophecies, not only as the Son of David, but as the eternal God. The argument may be thus summed up in the words of Dr. J. Pye Smith; "Jesus of Nazareth, all who are called Christians acknowledge to be the long promised and expected Messiah: therefore, all the properties and characters, by which the records of Divine Prophecy have described the Messiah, must belong to him, in the strictest and most entire signification. Did the Christian Scriptures

(*a*) Gen. 3: 15. (*b*) Gen. 22: 18. (*c*) Deut. 18: 18. (*d*) Psalm 2. (*e*) Ps. 16: 8—11. (*f*) Ps. 45: 2—8. (*g*) Ps. 97: 7. comp. Heb. 1: 6. (*h*) Ps. 102: 25—27, comp. Heb. 1: 10—12. (*i*) Is. 6: 1—5. comp. John 12: 41. (*j*) Is. 7: 14. (*k*) Is. 8: 13, 14. (*l*) Is. 9: 5, 6. (*m*) Is. 40: 3—11. (*n*) Jer. 23: 5, 6. (*o*) Mic. 5: 1—4. (*p*) Zech. 13: 7. (*q*) Mal. 3: 1.

(the Scriptures of the New Testament) do no more than afford satisfactory evidence of the simple proposition, *Jesus is the Messiah*; we should be obliged by necessary inference from the prophetic descriptions, and by all the rules of honest criticism and interpretation, to conclude that his person comprised the unique and mysterious *union* of humanity with DEITY."

What, then, do the Christian Scriptures, (the New Testament Scriptures,) in reality assert? Is there a fulfilment of these prophecies? There is, in the clearest, fullest, most satisfactory manner. He was *to be* the Son of David; and he *was* born of the Virgin Mary. He was likewise to be the Son of God, and Lord of David, the Being, whose goings forth were from eternity, the Creator and the Mighty God; accordingly we find him such,—the true God, and eternal Life, the Maker of all things, the Being who could say, Before Abraham was, I AM, one with God and, in power and glory of declared equality with the Father. His human nature is not more evident than his divine. If the opening of the first Gospel is "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the Son of Abraham," the opening of the last is also "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, AND THE WORD WAS GOD." In the Old Testament, he is Jehovah our Righteousness; in the New, he is God manifest in the flesh. In the Old Testament, he is the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father; in the New, he is God over all, blessed forever. Our Lord himself, in one remarkable passage, explicitly referred to the union of these two natures in his own person. "What think ye of Christ? Whose son is he? They say unto Him, The son of David. He saith unto them, How then doth David in spirit call him Lord, saying, The Lord said unto my Lord, sit thou on my right hand, till I make thine enemies thy footstool. If David then call him Lord, how is he his Son? And no man was able to answer him a word." Matt. 22: 42—46. Christ is likewise called in the Apocalypse both the *root* and the *offspring* of David; referring doubtless to the same wonderful union of Deity and humanity.

In his ninth lecture on the Evidences, Bishop Wilson has treated this part of his subject in a short compass, with great excellence. The following extract furnishes a powerful summary of that part of the prophetic argument, to which we have asked the special attention of our readers.

"Such particulars were foretold of the Messiah, as constituted, in connection with those already considered, a character of the most peculiar kind, and uniting qualities and attributes apparently the most contradictory; and therefore, if found in the person of our Lord, proving his Messiahship in a still more decisive manner. For, besides his sufferings already noticed, he was to be a branch from the root of Jesse (*a*), to grow up as a tender plant, and as a root out of dry ground be rejected and despised of men, to be oppressed and afflicted (*b*), to be a worm and no man (*c*), to be the servant of rulers (*d*), to be a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence (*e*), to have no form or comeliness, to be hated without a cause (*f*), to endure shame and reproach (*g*), to be accused by false witnesses (*h*), to have his visage marred more than any man (*i*); in a word, to be emphatically the Son of man (*j*), a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief (*k*).

"And yet, on the other hand, the Messiah was to be the Son of God (*l*), the Shiloh (*m*), the Star out of Jacob (*n*), the Redeemer, the living one (*o*), the chief Corner Stone (*p*), the Lord of David (*q*), the Ruler and King of Israel (*r*), Emanuel, God with us (*s*), Wonderful, Counsellor, the Mighty God, the Father or Possessor of Eternity (*t*), whose goings forth were of old from everlasting (*u*), the Supreme God (*v*), Jehovah (*w*); in a word, the object of adoration, hope, devotion, confidence, love, and religious homage (*x*), the Eternal and Immutable Being (*y*), the Creator of all things (*z*)."

"It is hardly necessary to observe, that these high, and yet humiliating descriptions; these prophecies of depressed mortality and exalted glory; these names of manhood and of deity; of frailty and of power; of the creature and the Creator; were all fulfilled, and fulfilled clearly and plenarily in the person and character of Christ; and fix, *by the apparent contradiction which they involve*, the identity of his person. This Man of Sorrows he was, as well as King of Glory. Nor has there ever appeared a person beside him, during the four or five thousand years, which have elapsed since some of these prophecies were delivered, to whom

(*a*) Is. 11: 1. (*b*) Is. 53: 2, 3, 8. (*c*) Ps. 22: 6. (*d*) Is. 49: 7. (*e*) Is. 8: 14. (*f*) Ps. 69: 4. (*g*) Ps. 69: 7. (*h*) Ps. 35: 11, 20. (*i*) Is. 52: 14. (*j*) Ps. 8: 4-7. (*k*) Is. 53: 3. (*l*) Ps. 2: 7, 12. (*m*) Gen. 49: 10. (*n*) Num. 24: 17. (*o*) Job 19: 23-27. (*p*) Is. 28: 16. (*q*) Ps. 110: 1. (*r*) Is. 6: 1-3. (*s*) Is. 7: 14. (*t*) Is. 9: 5, 6. (*u*) Micah. 5: 2. (*v*) Is. 45: 21-25. (*w*) Jer. 23: 6. (*x*) Ps. 2: 12. 97: 7. (*y*) Ps. 118: 25-29. (*z*) Is. 45: 10, 11.

these wonderful, and varied, and numerous, and apparently contradictory particulars, were ever capable of being applied."

"It may assist the mind in conceiving the force of this part of the argument, to be reminded, that the probability of any number of particular facts occurring in the case of any one person, is exceedingly small, supposing only fifty independent circumstances had been predicted of the Messiah, and that there was an equal chance, to use the language of mathematicians, for the happening or the failure of any one of the supposed particulars, the probability against the occurrence of all the particulars in any way, is that of the fiftieth power of two to unity, that is, greater than eleven hundred and twenty-five millions of millions to one. And this computation is exclusive of the considerations of time and place. It supposes also the affairs of the world to be left to blind chance. I only mention this circumstance in a cursory manner; the argument needs it not.*"

The sameness of testimony in the Old and New Testaments in regard to the person of Jesus Christ is a delightful subject of contemplation. In regard to his divine glory, as well as his human nature, it is demonstration. Blinded indeed must that mind be, which can resist it. It is likewise an essentially important part of the evidence for the truth of Christianity. At the same time it is a part, which any system, that denies the Divinity of Jesus, utterly destroys. It "makes God a liar." And a Socinian, if he were perfectly consistent with his own scheme, must inevitably be an infidel. For, here is a long series of the clearest prophecies in the Old Testament, which, according to his hypothesis, have never been fulfilled in any degree. The consequence is clear. Revelation, to him, is contradictory.

To perceive the full force of this argument, we must remember how constantly in the New Testament the testimony of prophecy is appealed to, as a foundation of faith in Christ. It is not miracles; it is the testimony of the Holy Spirit by the prophets in regard to Christ. "Search the Scriptures," said our Saviour, "for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and *they are they, which testify of me.*" Again, "All things, written by the Prophets concerning the Son of

* Wilson's Lectures, Lecture 9.

Man, must be accomplished." Again, "*All things must be fulfilled*, which were written in the Law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me."

To him give all the Prophets witness. The whole Scriptures of the Jewish nation look forward to him, the Desire of all nations, the Glory of the latter temple, God manifest in the flesh. If, now, any prominent part of those predictions remained unfulfilled, it would falsify the whole Gospel. By far the most prominent part would remain unfulfilled, had not the Being, on whom they terminated, appeared invested with the titles, and possessing the attributes of God; making himself equal with God; saying to all the people, I and my Father are One; before Abraham was, I AM; proclaiming himself Lord of the Sabbath; demanding for his words an authority equal to the Law of God; proclaiming himself the forgiver of sins, the Author of Eternal Life, the Redeemer, the Governour, and Judge of mankind; receiving the homage of his disciples as their Lord and their God; and proclaimed by them, after his ascension, as the Creator and Governour of the universe, King of kings, and Lord of lords, GOD OVER ALL, BLESSED FOREVER! We say, the Evidence of Christianity would have been fatally incomplete, if this concurrence with the voice of Prophecy, in the proclaimed fulness of the Godhead bodily, had been wanting. With the infidel it would have been impossible to have contended. He might have taken his stand on the glory of the ancient prophecies, and demanded the proof of their fulfilment, before he could properly be called on to believe. Were the hypothesis of the Socinians true, the infidel would have all the vantage ground, and the believer no position, on which he could make a stand.

Thus far we have spoken of predictions in the Old Testament concerning the *Person* of Jesus, as GOD OVER ALL; the same remarks may be made of the Old Testament predictions concerning the *Office* of Jesus, as the SAVIOUR of all. We need only refer to the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, for a full and affecting exhibition of the great doctrine of Atonement. "Surely, he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows; yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed. The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all. He was

cut off out of the land of the living : for the transgression of my people was he stricken. It pleased the Lord to bruise him : he hath put him to grief : when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin,—by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many ; for he shall bear their iniquities. He was numbered with the transgressors ; and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors.” What could be more full, more definite, more incontrovertible, than these expressions ? What more evident, more *out-shining*, than the whole meaning of this remarkable chapter ?

And here again, the hypothesis of those who deny the Scripture doctrine of atonement through the sufferings and sacrifice of the Son of God, destroys the evidence of Christianity, and “makes God a liar.” For God, by the mouth of his holy Prophets, declared that the predicted Messiah should be the world’s atoning Saviour ; and if he was *not* bruised for our iniquities, if he was *not* wounded for our transgressions, if the Lord did *not* make his soul an offering for sin, if he did *not* bear our sins in his own body on the tree, then, the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah is one amazing falsehood, and Christianity itself falls to the ground. So completely does the system, which denies the Divinity and atoning sacrifice of Christ, in its manifest, legitimate, and necessary consequences, surrender the whole Gospel, and lay bare its foundations to the attacks of infidelity.

Let it be remembered, that the argument for the truth of Christianity, which arises from the fulfilment of the explicit predictions in regard to the atoning sacrifice, which our Lord was to accomplish in being made an offering for sin, is powerful, perhaps above any other. This is clear from the manner in which the sacred writers make use of it ; and we may refer for a striking instance, to the well-remembered interview of Philip with the eunuch. The place of the Scripture, in which the eunuch was reading, was the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah ; and at the same scripture Philip began, and preached unto him Jesus.

But if the Apostle, instead of preaching Christ from that passage, had resorted to sophistry for evading its force, if he had denied its evident meaning, and attempted to explain it away, the eunuch might well have retorted upon him, and probably would, in words something like the following : “If the prophecies on which your religion is founded, are of

such a nature, that you seek to avoid their direct and manifest meaning, and are ashamed of the conclusions to which they lead, and if, after all their richness, particularity, and mysterious grandeur, you are forced to explain them away, so that they mean absolutely nothing, I may as well dismiss them from my notice, and return to Ethiopia in the faith with which I set out. In their plain signification, they would only lead me astray, and with your interpretation, they are not only worthless, but false." Such, we think, must have been the result, had a modern denier of the Atonement, expounded unto him this scripture. He would have gone on his way in blank infidelity. Such was not the result; for, beginning at this same scripture, the inspired Evangelist preached unto him an atoning SAVIOUR; Christ an offering for sin, the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world: and in Jesus Christ, and him crucified, he went on his way rejoicing. He went to repeat to all around him the wonderful story of the love, the sufferings, the ignominious death upon the cross, the resurrection, ascension, and interceding mercy of the Lord of Life and Glory, made an offering for sin!

There is great poverty in the expedients, by which unbelievers seek to evade the force of passages that prove the Deity and Atonement of Christ. The same difficulty meets them in a thousand shapes. It is not the getting rid of one or two powerful texts, that will strike this doctrine from the Bible; for they are omnipresent and indestructible through every part; not to be separated any more than you can draw the azure from the sky. Take for instance, the means used to avoid the natural and inevitable inference from the worship paid by Thomas to our Saviour, as his Lord and his God. A denier of our Lord's Divinity will argue that it was an exclamation of surprise and ignorance; he makes it, in fact, a sort of modern profaneness. But in other parts of the Scriptures, we find not only the saints on earth invoking and offering divine worship to Jesus Christ, but the saints and angels in *the heavenly world* described as employed in the same acts of adoration before the throne of God and the Lamb. And is there profaneness in *that* world? Are the multitude of the redeemed acting from surprise and ignorance, when represented as worshipping the Lamb in Heaven?

The Scriptures are made both contradictory in their

descriptions, and inevitably idolatrous in their tendencies, by the denial of the supreme Deity of our Lord Jesus Christ. In one page of inspiration, the Sovereign of the Universe declares, "Besides me there is no God, and my glory will I not give to another. I am God, and there is no God with me." In another, we are informed that "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was *with* God, and the Word *was* God." At one time the glory of Jehovah breaks out in jealous denunciation against him, who would transfer that glory to the creature. At another, we are pointed unto Jesus as the AUTHOR and FINISHER of our faith, the Author of Eternal Life, the Creator of the Universe; and all men are commanded to honour the Son, even as they honour the Father." "Cursed be the man, that trusteth in man,"—and "Blessed are all they that put their trust in Him,"—are sentences from the same infallible volume. In one place, we find God vindicating divine honour and divine worship only to himself; in another, commanding the adoration of the universe to be paid to Christ, ("Let all the angels of God worship him,") and sharing with him, in the heavenly world, the adoration of "every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, saying, Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, forever and ever."

The Bible is a book so wonderfully complicated, yet so divinely harmonious, in the arrangement of its truths; they are so important in themselves, and so essentially connected, and dependent on each other; supporting and supported, and giving and receiving mutual evidence and power; that the denial of any one fundamental doctrine cannot but greatly weaken the evidence of all, and introduces contradiction and absurdity in the place of clearness and harmony. If we pursue this subject a few moments, in the examination of other disputed, but fundamental truths of Scripture, we shall find, in every step of our enquiry, that to deny these truths, is to destroy the evidence of Christianity, and, in the words of the beloved disciple, to "make God a liar."

We have noticed the doctrines of the Deity of Christ and the Atonement. Human depravity, Regeneration by the Holy Ghost, and the endless punishment of the wicked, may properly come next in review.

Mr. Coleridge has said, "It is a strong presumptive

proof against materialism, that there does not exist a language on earth, from the rudest to the most refined, in which a materialist can talk for five minutes together, without involving some contradiction in terms to his own system." A similar remark may be made in regard to that system in religion, which denies the entire depravity of the human heart. We might almost say, the common language of every community affords conviction of its falsehood. How large a portion of the English language is constructed out of crime, crime in the feelings, and crime in the conduct, we are not prepared to say. It would be a curious subject of enquiry. This, we believe, is true, that many of the most common proverbs are no other than a reiteration, in various forms, of the grand Scriptural truth, that *the heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked.*

All history likewise proves the truth of this doctrine; for all history is but a record of human passion and its consequences. All men's consciences prove it true; whatever a man's theory may be on this subject, when conscience rouses up, amidst light from eternity, her voice is one of dreadful, unmingled condemnation. All experience proves it true. Experience on this subject is but an affirmative echo to the declarations of history and the voice of conscience; and all together are a confirmation, in the reality of things, to the truth of the descriptions in the Bible. The Scriptures affirm that all mankind are entirely alienated from God, their hearts supremely selfish, and at enmity against him. This view in the Bible corresponds perfectly with the state of the world; it is the same view, which results from the examination of the human character, in history, experience, and individual consciousness.

Here is another portion of the Evidences of Christianity. We find that men are just such beings in reality, as the Bible has described them. Now we say, it is also a portion, which the system of those who deny the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel, destroys. If the character ascribed to man in that system were the character ascribed to him in the Scriptures, then the representations in the Scriptures would be at variance with the actual state of mankind in the world. The voice of the Scriptures would be contrary to the voice of history, of experience, and of conscience; we should no longer find in men such beings as the Bible has described them. We may rely upon it, that on this ground

the infidel would take his stand, if the descriptions in the Bible coincided with the descriptions which those give, who deny the doctrine of human depravity.

One of the grandest branches of the internal evidences of Christianity is this,—the suitableness of the Christian Revelation to the obvious state and wants of man as an ignorant and sinful creature. And in consequence, as Bishop Wilson admirably remarks, “the point of view, from which to behold this object aright is from the midst of human weakness, misery, and sorrow. The Bible professes to be a remedy for sin and guilt, for darkness and fear, for forebodings of futurity, and dissatisfaction at earthly sources of happiness. So long as you think yourself not of this number, the Gospel is not capable of appearing to you in this branch of its evidence, at least in the most striking and important parts of it, as emanating from a Divine Hand.”* This remark is forcibly applicable to our present point. The Bible describing man as ignorant and guilty, and professing to be a remedy for that ignorance and guilt, if, instead of looking upon Christianity from the midst of human selfishness, ignorance and wretchedness, we suppose a state of comparative innocence, and pardonable imperfections, and survey it from that point, Christianity must appear to us a false system, unadapted to the situation of mankind. Deny the Scriptural doctrine of human depravity, and we make Christianity, as exhibited in the Scriptures, a false, confused, and foolish system. We do in fact “make God a liar.”

This difficulty seems to have been felt, at times, by those who deny that doctrine, and in attempting to evade it, they have treated the Scriptures just as we have supposed an infidel would, if the descriptions in the Bible had coincided with the descriptions of those, who reject the evangelical system of truth revealed in the Gospel. They have, in point of fact, denied the applicability of the descriptions in the Bible to the present state of mankind. They have endeavoured to represent the Scriptures as an imperfect revelation, suited only to an early, unenlightened state of the world, and containing a Christianity to be superseded and laid aside, as human perfectibility advances, for a system better adapted to man’s dignity and glory, in the rapid ad-

* Lectures, Vol. II. p. 49.

vance of that perfectibility. This is the legitimate result of the denial of human depravity. It makes the Scriptures for us a false book, and their Author, as speaking to us, a liar. Consequently it destroys our revelation.

From the doctrine of depravity, let us pass for a moment to that of regeneration. Here again, the declarations of the Scriptures are corroborated by evidence from observation and experience. The Bible declares that an entire renovation of the human heart is necessary; that men "*must be born again*," born of the Spirit of God, being naturally destitute of that holiness, without which no man shall see God. It declares that "*the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.*" All this is proved by experience. These are facts of testimony, on the part of thousands of credible witnesses in every age. There are multitudes, who have had experience both of the state of nature, and the state of grace, and have testified as to the infinite difference between them, and the nature of the change from the one to the other.

In this view, both the meaning and truth of the Bible, in regard to Regeneration, is matter of human testimony; and if men believe any fact on human testimony, they must believe in the reality of that change of heart, which the Scriptures declare to be essential. Take a list from the multitude of witnesses in every age, among whom have been men of the strongest minds ever created, and of unwarped integrity, even in the world's confession; men like Luther, Leighton, Usher, Baxter, Hall, Taylor, Howe, Henry, Sir Matthew Hale, Sir Robert Boyle, Sir Isaac Newton, Edwards, Pascal, Watts; and we have a great cloud of witnesses, more than we have for the attestation of any truth whatever in all history, declaring that Christianity in experience is that Regeneration which the Bible describes it to be, and asserting, *from experience*, the efficacy of the Scriptures in producing that result, which they declare to be their intended and legitimate operation.

Now it is manifest that a system, which denies both the doctrine of Regeneration in the Scriptures, and the need of it in the heart, destroys all this portion of the evidences of Christianity, and in fact makes the Bible a falsehood. Or rather, it makes it an immense burlesque; an array of means without an object. It exposes it not merely to the contra-

diction, but to the ridicule of infidels, making it a book unworthy to have proceeded from the hands of its Divine Author.

Let us consider, for a moment, the doctrine of the Atonement, in connexion with this view of the doctrine of Regeneration. The Scriptures declare that it is the preaching of that doctrine, which shall convert the world to God. It is *that foolishness*, the Cross of Christ, which shall be the instrument in this mighty work. The nature and marks of this conversion, or regeneration, consequent on the preaching of the Cross of Christ, are also described with too much clearness to admit of mistake. Experience and observation prove this also. It is the very result, which inevitably follows the preaching of an atoning Saviour. No other preaching ever has had the least power. Not the mightiest moral persuasion, without Jesus Christ and him crucified, could turn the wandering, ruined soul, a step towards its God. Men of eloquence have tried, but failed. It is a heartless effort. They might as well shout to the raging waves of ocean. God puts, and will put, that honour only on his own truth, JESUS CHRIST, AND HIM CRUCIFIED; "*unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ, the power of God, and the wisdom of God.*"

Now, the denial of this doctrine destroys another grand portion of the Evidences of Christianity. For, if that doctrine be not true, then a false doctrine is found possessing that power in the conversion of men, which the Bible declares belongs only to itself, but which the Bible, without that doctrine, never has been known to produce. Who does not see that this leads directly to infidelity? The cheerless result of their system, its failure to produce the result promised in the Scriptures, would be, on the supposition it were the system contained in the Bible, a standing conviction of falsehood in Christianity. Either their system is not true, or the Bible is false. And whether they suppose the atonement cut out from the Bible, or explained away from it, they have a book as the alleged foundation of their Christianity, foretelling certain results from its own exhibition, not one of which ever takes place.

Christianity is a system, which is to be tried personally by every individual, before he is authorized to pass judgement upon it. It is a system professing the most blessed and glo-

rious results, redemption from the pollution and misery of sin, deliverance from the power of depravity, regeneration in the soul, a change into the image of the blessed God, and perfect peace and happiness in him. How then is the trial to be made? This is infinitely important, and on this point the Scriptures are very clear. Take for instance, out of a great number of passages of similar import, the following from the opening verses of the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans: "Therefore, *being justified by faith*, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ: by whom also we have access by faith into this grace, wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God." Here it is evident that *justification by faith in Jesus Christ* is the sole ground of that peace, which Christianity promises. It is the only way of access into the grace of the Gospel, the only foundation of hope in God.

Now then, if any one aims at this result *without* justification by faith; if he seeks "the peace of God, which passeth all understanding," in the *rejection* of this fundamental doctrine, the result is rendered impossible, and he seeks, in fact, the destruction of Christianity. He destroys its whole argument, and Christianity to him is a lie. It has promised him peace, but he finds it not, nor can any find it in the way he has taken. Nor does it work in the perishing soul, nor will it, nor can it, any of those results, which it belongs to justification by faith to produce, and which the Bible will not produce without that doctrine. The same may be said of the doctrine of Regeneration. If any man aims at those results without regeneration, he will not find them. But the Bible predicts them. The scheme, therefore, which rejects those doctrines, "makes God a liar."

An admirable illustration, suggested by Bishop Wilson, is peculiarly applicable to this part of our argument. The medicinal preparation which bears the common name of Peruvian bark, is well known to have been increasing in use and reputation up to the present day, as a safe and powerful remedy in various classes of disease. It has the testimony of thousands to its efficiency;—men who, in their restoration from sickness to life, health, and comfort, have experienced the truth of its alleged healing excellence. Now suppose a man to substitute a preparation other than the true bark, though bearing its name, and to make trial of the false preparation, insisting all the while, and persuading himself,

that he is trying the actual medicine. The consequence is, it fails of its efficacy; and if he is consistent, he will declare that the pretended virtue of the bark is false. Just so, the pretended trial of Christianity, when its fundamental doctrines are denied, is the substitution of a false preparation, and must result in unbelief. Christianity is the medicine of the soul diseased with sin; it restores the sinner from spiritual death and condemnation, to spiritual life, health, and pardon. But if the trial be made with any preparation other than the true medicine, its efficacy cannot be experienced. Deny Regeneration and the Atonement, and the results of Christianity to you are impossible. The remedy is no longer efficacious. You have taken away its healthful ingredients; the qualities that constitute its regenerating efficacy; the ingredients that make it the power of God unto salvation.

The same may be said of the solemn doctrine of endless punishment to the wicked. No sinner would be converted from the error of his ways without it. Knowing, therefore, the terror of the Lord, says the Apostle, we persuade men. Not that this doctrine alone would be effectual; but it is absolutely necessary in connection with the others; the others would be ineffectual without this. If you deny this doctrine, or explain it away from the Scriptures, your power over the conscience is lost; any attempt to produce the result predicted as belonging to the exhibition of truth must inevitably fail. You can never make the lost soul flee from the wrath to come, when you have told him there is no wrath to come. Here also, the system that denies the fundamental doctrines of the gospel "makes God a liar." The results he has promised do not take place. Nor can they take place, nor ever will, unless men will use the doctrines of the Gospel just as he has revealed them.

Let us take a homely illustration. Suppose you should hand a gun to a man that has never seen one, telling him at the same time that it will fire, and explaining, as near as you can without making the experiment for him, what that result is. Suppose now, that he should take the gun, examine it, and take off the *lock* as a useless appendage, and then undertake to shoot with it; asserting, all the while, that the lock is no part of the machinery, and does not belong to it. In this simple illustration we have precisely the manner in which many persons treat the Bible. *They take away the lock*, the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel; and then they

can no more produce conviction or conversion, than they could fire a gun without its lock, or its flint, or its priming.

Here we must close our argument, for our limits do not permit us to pursue it further. We have dwelt upon it long enough, to make evident some instructive lessons. An opinion is too prevalent that the discussion of the Evidences of Christianity does not necessarily involve the consideration of particular truths of Christianity, in regard to which men differ; and that a man may believe in Christianity and defend its Evidences, and yet reject in succession every one of its fundamental tenets. We cannot see that such denial is any thing else than infidelity. Certainly it leads to infidelity, and grows out of its essence in the heart. We have made a rapid survey of the essential truths of revelation, and we find that the rejection of them in every case destroys the Evidences of Christianity, and "makes God a liar." Such rejection is therefore in the highest degree iniquitous, it being a direct insult to the majesty and truth of Jehovah. It could proceed from nothing but a heart that has been living without God in the world, and is utterly in a state of alienation from him. "*Having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart.*" Hence the tremendous condemnation with which error is treated in the Scriptures. It proceeds from a wrong state of the heart; it is the inevitable consequence of estrangement from God. Nearness to God is nearness to truth; distance from him is darkness; for God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. And it were an unworthy conception of the character of God, and of his construction of man as a spiritual being, to suppose that he has made the laws and properties of matter, or the principles of pure science, capable of greater certainty than spiritual truth. To a holy being spiritual truth is the brightest of all truth. Error is the result of sin, and makes God a liar. Nor is it any thing but its commonness, that prevents men from feeling this. Every one deems it an insult to have his own word doubted; but to doubt the word of God is so common, that men absolutely cease to behold its moral turpitude.

Errors of one kind and another have so long been maintained, have been rising so perpetually one after another in the world, that the soul has become accustomed to them, and they do not strike it with dread, but even put it upon find-

ing an excuse, and considering the rejection of Scriptural truth an innocent frailty, or, at the uttermost, an intellectual misfortune, rather than a moral depravity. Suppose now, that ever since our blessed Lord tabernacled in the flesh, error had taken its flight from the earth, and that no propositions had been declared or gained credit, but those which he delivered to his disciples, and through them, in their writings, to the world. And suppose that the belief of these truths had been growing stronger, with the accumulated faith of millions, in every successive generation to the present, and the accumulated examination of the multitude of minds employed upon them for more than eighteen hundred years. By this process, all that is essential in the system of Divine truth, would certainly have gathered a brightness to the souls of men above the brightness of the sun, and our spiritual atmosphere would have been of a sparkling clearness, and God's word, as our moral hemisphere, would have shone sweeter in the radiance of its undisputed truths, than the brightest sky of a cloudless winter's night. Let us suppose now, that, for the first time, some daring hand should throw the blot of unbelief over any portion of this fair scene; would it not fill the bosoms of all men with horror and indignation? They would feel with great force the meaning of that remarkable passage, to which we have alluded: "He that believeth not God HATH MADE HIM A LIAR; because he believeth not the record that God gave of his Son." Error, in its least approach, would be seen in all its deformity. It would be as if we should suddenly have our vision arrested by a patch of black in the cloudless sky above us.

In becoming prevalent, error loses its deformity, like every other sin. It strengthens and grows, and becomes sanctified by age; generation after generation adds to it; millions of minds contribute to its power. It is formed like those great coral reefs, built from the bottom of the ocean, by innumerable animalculæ, and perhaps unknown and undiscovered, till some noble, richly freighted ship perished on its rugged top.

If we will look aright, every thing conspires to teach us, that mere knowledge is not the living truth, nor can give any heartfelt evidence of it. The intellect alone, unassisted by the Spirit of God, will not find this evidence. It discovers only the husk, but not the kernel; sensible things are all it looks at. The great world of spiritual realities it knows

nothing of, and from having no experience of them, it too often proceeds to their denial. The living beauty of the Word of God is neither witnessed nor felt; it is a hidden beauty, hidden, like the life of the saint who feeds upon it, with Christ in God. Hence the necessity of Christian grace in lively exercise, for a discovery or relish of the divine beauty of the Scriptures. Where faith is dim, or the heart worldly, or a besetting sin stands over the soul like a task-master, the Bible to the spiritual vision, is like a dead painting to the eye; there seems in it neither life nor beauty. Let the same passage be read in the exercise of lively faith, when the soul is victorious over sin, when Christ is near, and the heart filled with his love, when heavenly hope is strong, and the view of eternal realities vivid, and then it sparkles with glory; it is a revelation of heaven, a sudden shining out of Jehovah from between the cherubim; every verse, line, word, is instinct with the sacred fire, and condensed with meaning. Selfishness must necessarily cloud the mind to religious truth; just as mists overshadow the beauties of evening. Sweep away those clouds, let the heart be open to the love of God; let it enter, and imbue, and purify the soul, and the stars of truth shall take their place clearly, one after another, in the soul's moral hemisphere, till the expanse is hung with serene orbs, whose light shines sweetly in the path we tread, and whose celestial beauty transports the affections to Heaven.

As in water face answereth to face, so the heart of regenerate man to the light, and power, and glory of God's word. The human heart unregenerate is as a mirror, over which you have hung a long black pall. Hold up that mirror to any object in God's creation, to the trees, or the sky, or the sun at noon-day, and there would be no reflection. Hold it up to the stars at evening, and through the cloth that covers it there is no answering image. Now remove the covering, and hold up the mirror without its veil, and there is the image, clear and bright as the reality. Just so, the pall of sin is on the heart of the sinner. Hold up before it every doctrine of the Bible in succession, with the eloquence of an archangel, and you would not reach it; there could be no experience or reflection of the truth. God in Christ might be exhibited before the mind with great power and glory; all those glorious realities that require a spiritual faith for their discernment, might be displayed in the vividest colour-

ing that language can bear; and still there could be no answering image through the gloomy veil of sin. But now remove that veil. Make the heart submissive to Christ, and then hold up to it the Scriptures; regeneration, the atonement, the punishment of sin, the holiness and sovereignty of God; and what do we see? A clear, sweet, living image of the glory of the Saviour, and the truth of every page. Whatever be the object first presented to the mind, after the veil of selfishness is withdrawn, there will be a calm and delightful reflection of it. The spirit of caviling is gone, objections are done away, and the heart rests upon the Saviour, in grateful obedience to his will, and adoration of his Divine Glory.

Spirit of Love, thou Power Divine, come down;
And where thou walk'dst a sufferer, wear thy crown:
Bid the vexed sea be still, the tumult cease;
Prophet, fulfil thy word, reign Prince of Peace!
O, give that peace the world knows not, and throw,
Light of the world! thy light on all below;
Shine through the 'wilder'd mind, that man may see
Himself and earth restored, God, all, in Thee!

DANA.

There is nothing in the world, that has such an array of argument in its favour, as the system of evangelical religion revealed in the Gospel. The display of its evidences is one of the brightest tissues of demonstration ever spread out before the admiring mind. The obligations under which we lie with respect to it are infinite; nor is it a matter left to our option, whether we will receive it or not. It comes to us with all the authority of the Author of our being, as a gift from him, and a revelation of his will, to teach us our duty, and to point out the only way by which we can enter heaven; and if, while we profess to receive it, we scorn its medium of mercy, or retain a heart at enmity against God, the enjoyment of its light will only intolerably augment the guilt of disobedience and consequent perdition of the soul.

ART. V. BAXTER'S SAINTS' REST.

By Rev. JOHN WOODBRIDGE, D. D., New-York.

The Saints' Everlasting Rest, by the Rev. Richard Baxter, abridged by Benjamin Fawcett, A. M. New-York, published by the American Tract Society.

THE leading Puritans of the seventeenth century were extraordinary men, from whom, since the peculiar controversies of those times are viewed in the calm light of history, the successors of their most violent enemies will scarcely presume to withhold the eulogium due to distinguished wisdom, intrepidity and piety. They were indeed a race of moral heroes, genuine chevaliers of the cross, whose names, however assailed by the advocates of arbitrary principles on the one hand, and ferocious infidels on the other, will ever be dear alike to the lovers of evangelical truth, and the intelligent friends of civil, political and religious liberty. The memory of no one of these worthies is more precious than that of *Richard Baxter*, the humble pastor of Kidderminster, who watched for souls as one who must give account.

"The proud he tam'd, the penitent he cheer'd,
Nor to rebuke the rich offender fear'd.
His preaching much, but more his practice wrought,
A living sermon of the truths he taught."

We may, with the strictest propriety, apply to him the words of another, descriptive of the pulpit performances of a celebrated preacher in our own country.* "Mount Sinai seemed to thunder from his lips when he denounced the tremendous curses of the law, and sounded the dreadful alarm to secure impenitent sinners. The solemn scenes of the last judgement seemed to rise in view, when he arraigned, tried, and convicted self-deceivers and formal hypocrites. And how did the balm of Gilead distil from his lips, when he exhibited a bleeding, dying Saviour, to sinful mortals as a sovereign remedy for the wounded heart? He spake as on the border of eternity, and as viewing the glories and terrors of an unseen world." For original force

* Character of Rev. S. Davies, by Rev. D. Bostwick.

and activity of mind, high intellectual acquirements, industry, firmness of religious principle, unflinching integrity, simplicity that knows no guile, benevolence, tenderness and ardour of piety, and the consecration of all his powers to the best of causes; Baxter stood pre-eminent among as noble a company of confessors, as the world in later ages has ever witnessed. Had his lot been cast among the early Christians, he would have been not an inferiour associate in the honours of an Ignatius, a Polycarp, a Justin, and a Cyprian. This venerable and apostolic man lived in a very momentous period, when commotions in the social system were casting off ancient abuses, and preparing the world for the permanent establishment of free institutions, and the wide diffusion of the principles of the Gospel. He was born in 1615, five years before the landing of the pilgrims on the rock at Plymouth, and closed his laborious and useful life in 1691; leaving in his numerous writings, all of which treated of subjects worthy of his pen and heart, a rich legacy to future generations.

HIS SAINTS' REST is one of the most popular, practical and valuable of his publications; and will probably be read with ever increasing interest in proportion as piety advances. It was first written, when he was little more than thirty years of age, being withdrawn from public labours on account of ill health, and in almost continual expectation of the glory which filled his soul, and gave him a pen, dipped in its own soft and radiant colours. He was from home, and had no opportunity of consulting any other books than his Bible and Concordance. He afterwards preached the substance of his treatise, in a course of weekly lectures, to his people in Kidderminster; and he printed it in 1650, it being the first of his practical publications. The following is his own account of the circumstances in which it was composed.

"While I was in health I had not the least thought of writing books, or of serving God in any more public way than preaching, but when I was weakened with great bleeding, and left solitary in my chamber at Sir John Cook's in Derbyshire, without any acquaintance but my servant about me, and was sentenced to death by the physicians, I began to contemplate more seriously on the everlasting rest, which I apprehended myself to be just on the borders of. That my thoughts might not too much scatter in my meditation,

I began to write something on that subject, intending but the quantity of a sermon or two; but being continued long in weakness, where I had no books and no better employment, I followed it on, till it was enlarged to the bulk in which it is published. The first three weeks I spent in it was at Mr. Nowel's house, at Kirby Mallory, in Leicestershire; a quarter of a year more, at the seasons which so great weakness would allow, I bestowed upon it at Sir Thomas Rous' house at Rous Lench, in Worcestershire; and I finished shortly after at Kidderminster.

"The marginal citations I put in after I came home to my books, but almost all the book itself was written when I had no books but a Bible and a Concordance; and I found that the transcript of the heart hath the greatest force on the hearts of others. For the good that I have heard that multitudes have received by that writing, and the benefit which I have again received by their prayers, I here humbly return my thanks to Him that compelled me to write it."

Baxter aimed at no display. He was above it. He reflected, he reasoned, he felt deeply; he longed to communicate to others the emotions of his own soul; his rhetoric was that of his heart, and of the imagination kindled by the inexpressible interest, attractiveness and grandeur of his subject. In the rapidity and force of his movements, you are reminded of the cataract; in his vehement addresses to the conscience, you seem to hear the thunder's reiterated peals; in the glory of the themes he presents, and the benevolence of his spirit, you are cheered as by the beauty and gladness of nature, in summer's loveliest morning. We have, we think, sometimes heard him called the Demosthenes of the English pulpit. He had the native energy, without the secular aims, the pride, the ambition, the elaborate diction, and the studied point of the illustrious Athenian. Demosthenes lived for the earth; Richard Baxter for heaven. The former sought to serve a state; the latter, a world, alienated from God, and perishing in its guilt. "He was," says Dr. Bates, as quoted in Fawcett's Preface, "animated

* Narrative, as quoted by Rev. L. Bacon, in his life of Baxter, pp. 92, 93. "There are few testimonies," Mr. Bacon very justly observes, "to the great intellectual vigour, and the extraordinary industry of Baxter, more surprising than the fact, that 'The Saints' Everlasting Rest,' which at its first publication was a quarto volume of eight hundred pages, was written in six months while the author stood languishing and fainting between life and death."

with the Holy Spirit, and breathed celestial fire to inspire heat and life into dead sinners, and to melt the obdurate in their frozen tombs.—His books of practical divinity have been effectual for more numerous conversions of sinners to God, than any printed in our time; and while the church continues on earth, will be of continual efficacy to renew lost souls. There is a vigorous pulse in them, that keeps the reader awake and attentive.” Again: “To allure our desires, he unveils the sanctuary above, and discovers the glories and joys of the blessed in the Divine presence, by a light so strong and lively that all the glittering vanities of the world vanish in the comparison, and a sincere believer will despise them, as one of a mature age does the toys and baubles of children.” Dr. Calamy says of *the Saints' Rest*,—“This is a book for which multitudes will have cause to bless God forever.” Though its author has been for nearly a century and a half an inhabitant of heaven, it is still travelling round the globe, speaking in the languages of divers nations, and multiplying its conquests of charity. It awakens the sinner; it sanctifies and comforts the believer. It is cheering to contemplate the glorified spirit of Baxter, hailing from day to day the arrival before the throne of redeemed men, who attribute, under God, their conversion, or more rapid progress in holiness, to *the Saints' Rest*, or other productions of his benevolent and powerful mind. His reward will not be fully attained, till all the elect shall have been gathered home, nor even till the capacities of the saved shall have reached the ultimate bounds of their improvement. Eternity alone can tell the distinguished felicity and honour awaiting those who turn many to righteousness.

Some nominal Christians have affirmed, that Baxter's heaven existed chiefly in his own fancy, and that his “Saints' Rest” is little else than a gaudy picture, adapted to excite and allure weak hearts, not content with simple and more philosophical views of the world of spirits.* No wonder

* The following is the representation given by that eminent Socinian, Dr. Priestly, of the situation and employment of the saved in a future state: “The change of our condition by death may not be so great as we are apt to imagine. As our natures will not be changed, but only improved, we have no reason to think that the future world (which will be adapted to our merely improved nature,) will be materially different from this.” Let the reader compare this with Rom. 8: 17, 18. 2 Cor. 4: 16—18. 5: 1—8. Rev. 22, &c. &c. “And, indeed, why should we ask or expect any thing more? If we should still be obliged to

that they who boast of their *exclusive rationality* as Christians, should make such an objection to the book, since it assumes, from first to last, that there is no holiness and no happiness without a cordial adherence to the method of salvation by mere grace, through a divine Redeemer. If no atonement has been made for sin, if we may be justified by our works, if no Holy Spirit operates effectually to overcome the resistance of the stubborn heart, then, without doubt, Baxter's notion of the nature of religion, and its reward, is the offspring of erroneous speculation, or of enthusiasm. To the devout Christian, however, who studies his Bible, and knows the plague of his own heart, taken as a whole, Baxter's work will seem as convincing in its arguments, as it is solemn, earnest, and resistless in its eloquence. Fawcett's *Abridgement*, which is now in common use, and which has been republished by the American Tract Society, by excluding much that is foreign and comparatively useless, is almost free from exception, as a work designed for general distribution.

In accordance with Baxter's design, we will offer a few thoughts, adapted, we humbly trust, to impress upon our Christian readers the importance of that contemplation on heaven, to which he most earnestly calls them.

The Bible is explicit and urgent in its inculcations on

provide for our subsistence by exercise or labour, is that a thing to be complained of by those who are supposed to have acquired fixed habits of industry, becoming rational beings, and who have never been able to bear the languor of absolute rest, or indolence? Our future happiness has, with much reason, been supposed to arise from an increase of knowledge. But if we should have nothing more than the *means* of knowledge furnished us, as we have here, but be left to our own labour to find it out; is that to be complained of by those who will have acquired a *love of truth*, and a habit of inquiring after it? To make discoveries ourselves, though the search may require time and labour, is unspeakably more pleasing than to learn every thing by the information of others. If the *immortality* that is promised to us in the Gospel, should not be *necessary*, and *absolute*, and we should only have the *certain means* of making ourselves immortal, we should have much to be thankful for. What the Scriptures inform us concerning a future life, is expressed in general terms, and often in figurative language. A more particular knowledge of it is wisely concealed from us."—*Priestly's Sermon on the death of Mr. Robinson.*

"You see, brethren," says Andrew Fuller in his comment on the above passage, "here is not one word of God, or of Christ, as being the sum and substance of our bliss, and, except that mention is made of our being freed from *imperfections bodily and mental*, the whole consists of mere *natural enjoyments*, differing from the Paradise of Mahometans chiefly in this, that their enjoyments are principally sensual, whereas these are mostly intellectual. Those are adapted to gratify the voluptuary, and these the philosopher. Whether such a heaven will suit a holy mind, or be adapted to draw forth our best affections, judge ye."—*Calvinistic and Socinian Systems examined and compared; Letter XIV.*

this subject. "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him." Again, "If ye then be risen with Christ, seek those things which are above, where Christ sitteth on the right hand of God. Set your affection on things above, not on things on the earth."

To enforce obedience to such injunctions, the inspired volume exhausts the utmost strength of language, in its descriptions of the future and endless rewards of true believers. It promises them exemption from every disappointment, privation and pain; perpetual and complete emancipation from the tyranny of the passions; perfect moral resemblance to the Saviour; uninterrupted enjoyment of the purest, most exalted society to all eternity; everlasting light; the full vision of God and the Lamb; and the most blissful worship without weariness, and without end. "Our light affliction," says the Apostle, "which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." The Greek phrase expresses the highest degree of intensity. "It is hardly possible," remarks Mac-nicht on this text, "in any translation, to express the force of the passage as it stands in the original. Stephens says of it, *Nothing greater can be said or imagined*. The Apostle about to describe the happiness of the righteous in heaven, takes fire as it were, at the prospect, and speaks of it in a rapture. He calls it not *glory* simply, but *a weight of glory*, in opposition to the *light things of our affliction*; and *an eternal weight of glory*, in opposition to the *momentary duration of our affliction*; and a *most exceeding eternal weight of glory*, as, beyond comparison, greater than all the dazzling glories of riches, fame, power, pleasure, or any thing which can be possessed in the present life. And after all it is a glory yet to be revealed; it is not yet fully known."

With such a prospect opened to Christians, ought they not, by earnest meditation, to make themselves familiar with those scenes of felicity, triumph and glory, on which it is the pleasure of Him who died to redeem them from sin and hell, that they should soon enter? Ought they not as strangers and pilgrims here, whose rest is beyond the grave, to muse, intensely and joyously, on their everlasting inheritance?

The *advantages* of devout contemplation on heaven are manifold.

We should not wholly overlook its tendency to improve the intellectual faculties of man. The mind dilates or contracts, as the objects on which it most frequently expatiates, are momentous or trivial. The mere sensualist, a child of earth, whose god is his belly, becomes incapable of any lofty flights of reason, or nobleness of purpose. The untiring devotee of wealth immures his high-born powers, by which he is allied to the angels, within the narrow confines of a few acres, mortgages, lands, stocks, and bales of goods. To him, the attractions of the New Jerusalem itself consist rather in its pavement of gold and gates of pearl, than in the manifested glory of the Divine presence, its freedom from all moral pollution, its holy love, its fellowship of kindred minds, and the sweetness, joyousness, eternity, and perfection of its worship. The student of natural philosophy, or the astronomer, on the other hand, by their familiarity with the mightiest works of the creation, may be expected to acquire a certain elevation and grandeur of views, corresponding to the stupendous laws and operations, which they are accustomed to contemplate. Genius catches her noblest inspiration, and seems to tread down every thing grovelling, amidst the beauties and sublimities of nature. Her lip quivers with rapture, and her eye darts celestial fire. But are any subjects so vast and glorious, as those which are presented to the survey of faith, in the accumulated wonders of God's heavenly kingdom? Compared with these subjects, literature, politics, and the various pursuits of mere human science, are but the amusements of childhood, or the unmeaning occupations of idiocy.

Earthly scenes appear great because they are near, and are not viewed in contrast with the glories of an eternal state. To unbelieving man, the latter are often like mountain tops, covered and concealed by clouds, or lost by distance in the blue horizon; while the former, like the shrubbery, trees and houses of his daily walks, meet him at every turn, and assume a factitious importance from the associations of neighbourhood and protracted intimacy. Faith is the telescope, and meditation the eye, by which we penetrate the clouds, and gaze on the splendours of God's throne. Then it is, that all below the sun is seen in its true littleness. Then, to use the language of the eloquent and pious Wilberforce, "the praises and the censures of men die away upon the ear, and the still small voice of conscience is no longer

drowned by the din of this nether world. Here the sight is apt to be occupied by earthly objects, and the hearing to be engrossed with earthly sounds; but there thou shalt come within the view of the resplendent and incorruptible crown, which is held forth to thy acceptance in the realms of light, and thine ear shall be regaled with heavenly melody. Here we dwell in a variable atmosphere—the prospect is at one time darkened by the gloom of disgrace, and at another the eye is dazzled by the gleamings of glory; but thou hast now ascended above this inconstant region; no storms agitate; no clouds obscure the air; and the lightnings play and the thunders roll beneath thee.”

“Had I a glimpse of thee, my God,
Kingdoms and men would vanish soon,
Vanish, as though I saw them not,
As a dim candle dies at noon.”

Meditations on everlasting rest will inspire us with holy boldness in resisting the influence of popular error, and in contending for the faith once delivered to the saints. It is to be expected, that an earthly-minded Christian, will have a coward's heart. Loving his own repose and popularity, he has no perception of the preciousness of truth. Yet truth is precious. It cannot be valued with the gold of Ophir, with the precious onyx, or the sapphire. No mention shall be made of coral, or of pearls, for the price of wisdom is above rubies. Hence the divine command is, “Buy the truth, and sell it not; also wisdom, and instruction, and understanding.” One great object of our Saviour's mission into this world, was to bear witness to the *truth*. Truth is the instrumental cause of our sanctification; and a full discovery of truth, in its purity and moral loveliness, is a principal, if not the only source of happiness, to saints and angels in the world of glory. Contemplation brings these objects of faith, which the carnal heart most strongly opposes, into the field of our vision; and while it invests them with superlative brightness and excellency, gives to them the vividness and impressiveness of present scenes. With such views, the Christian can no more be indifferent to revealed truth, than he can be regardless of the honour of God, the glory of the Redeemer, the interests of evangelical virtue, and the promised bliss of heaven. He can say with Edwards, “I have loved the doctrines of the Gospel; they have been to my soul like green pastures. The Gospel has seemed to me the

richest treasure ; the treasure that I have most desired, and longed that it might dwell richly in me." As he looks above, and sees the eternal efficacy of the truth there, he deems no lawful means too expensive in maintaining it against the invidious assaults of its adversaries, and in diffusing its sanctifying influence among his fellow men. It was for such a purpose, that apostles and martyrs incurred the loss of reputation, wealth, ease, all that the world calls great and good ; and, instead of complaining, gloried in the sacrifice. For this, a Luther, a Knox, a Whitefield, counted not their life dear to themselves ; and met, undaunted, the ridicule and the frowns of earth and hell.

A clear view of heavenly glory would at the same time cure all the evils commonly attendant on religious controversy. Argument and discussion, in vindication of evangelical principles, will always be necessary, so long as any of the human race shall continue to pervert, deny, or hate the Gospel. In this indispensable and holy war, the only approved weapons are those which are drawn from the Heavenly armoury, and are wielded by love. Such weapons, however, will be used by none, save those who, casting an eye of faith within the inner sanctuary, the abode of the divine presence, rejoice in hope of the glory of God. Men, whose "conversation is in heaven," must instinctively revolt from all unholy means in defending their religion. They need not the arts of low intrigue ; for their trust is in that God, who is the Author of the Gospel. They cannot fail to temper their zeal with kindness and generosity. Bigotry dies away as she beholds the faithful of different denominations and communions, losing at length all their distinctive prejudices, in the enjoyment of a common good, and the untrammelled interchange of thoughts and affections, forever. The pride of opinion is subdued, in sight of the humility of the glorified ; the meanness of sectarian jealousy and rivalry, is seen as it is, in contrast with the nobleness of the eternal union of all the ransomed in Christ their King ; partizan zeal expires, as the gales of Paradise, perfumed with love, are wafted to her sense ; and the harsh voice of anger and contention is lost, amidst the harmonious songs of cherubic choirs, and of "the spirits of just men made perfect." Ye defenders of the citadel of truth ! look to "the glory which shall be revealed ; so will ye not yield

to discouragement when foes increase, nor be in danger from those worldly passions which mingle and lead in every inferior conflict.

The present is an age distinguished for excitability. We behold a chaos of strange and warring principles. We see nations, smaller political communities, and churches of nearly all denominations, driven from their ancient moorings, and borne along by the resistless force of events, to the very vortex of revolution. As we rejoice in the unprecedented advancement of liberty, arts, sciences, we witness, in connection with all this good, a restlessness, and a combined opposition before unknown, against those doctrines and institutions, which are the very pillars of social order and genuine improvement. Radicalism is regarded as identical with the genius of freedom, reform, and the spirit of the age,—this "*spirit of the age*" often meaning little else than a peculiar kind of pride, the rashness of innovation, and hatred or contempt of all that has been sanctioned by the experience and wisdom of former days. One might infer, from the boastings of many a political and theological sciolist, that the essential characteristics of human nature had been changed within the last half century; or that the ancients, whether inspired or uninspired, knew nothing of the intellectual and moral attributes of their species. *Vox populi est vox Dei*, bursts from myriads of tongues, and rolls over a hundred nations. The entire social fabric seems standing upon the brink of a crater; we hear the subterranean roar, and we feel the ground beneath our feet heaving with portentous convulsions. What crimes, what miseries, what wide ruin, may ensue from the rush of the moral elements, already moved to some fierce encounter, we can hardly conjecture. But let us fix our eye on the country above the skies, that rest of the weary, that haven of the tempest-tossed church; and we shall be prepared to contemplate the most extraordinary developments of Providence, not only without fear, but with triumph. When Luther heard of any events peculiarly unpropitious to the Protestant cause, he was accustomed to say to his friends, "Come, let us sing the forty-sixth Psalm."

Contemplation on heavenly glory is needful to prepare us for the various dispensations of Providence towards ourselves individually, and our friends. We must suffer; it is

the indispensable condition of our existence in this world of mutation and sin. To meet with Christian firmness what is inevitable, is alike our wisdom and our duty. But what shall we do, that we may bear affliction with becoming patience and dignity? Will pride, will philosophy, will mere stubbornness, avail us? Religion alone can carry us unharmed and triumphant, through the billows of temptation and sorrow. Pecuniary losses, disappointments in business, sickness, pains, unmerited disgrace, injuries from mankind, and the ravages of death in the circles of earthly friendship, —*all* these may well be borne without a murmur by him, who, with a steady eye, beholds a crown of life waiting for him in heaven, and anticipates a speedy re-union with lamented kindred that have gone before him to glory. See that widow, desolate, forgotten by the world; yet serene and cheerful. Why is she happy? She loves the hand that hath smitten her; she adores, amidst all his chastenings, the wisdom, goodness, and faithfulness of her God. But this is not all. She seems to hear the voice of her sainted husband attuned to the melodies of heaven, and to behold his grave, which she has a thousand times bedewed with her tears, resigning its sacred contents at the bidding of the Judge of all. Her husband lives, adorned with glories unthought of here, to die no more. Oh! with what indescribable tenderness and love, does she look on her fatherless children, dear helpless ones, as she relieves her burdened heart in commending them to the more than paternal kindness and care of their father's God!

In a word, affliction has no sting which faith in the promises of God cannot destroy; no tears which the love and hope of heaven cannot dry. And ought not Christians, amidst the darkness and disquietudes of this world, to prove the superiority of their principles, by being "joyful in tribulation?" Is not the exhibition of such an affectionate confidence required of them, by the very nature of their profession, and the honour of the Being whom they serve? "If one," says Howe,* "should give a stranger to Christianity an account of the Christian hopes, and tell him what they expect to be and enjoy ere long; he would sure promise himself to find so many angels dwelling in human flesh, and reckon when he came among them he should be in the

* Blessedness of the Righteous.

midst of the heavenly choir: every one full of joy and praise. He would expect to find us living on earth as the inhabitants of heaven, as so many pieces of immortal glory lately dropped down from above, and shortly again returning thither. He would look to find every where in the Christian world incarnate glory sparkling through the overshadowing veil, and wonder how this earthly sphere should be able to contain so many great souls."

Contemplation on everlasting rest will prompt to that fervency of devotion, by which all the Christian graces are strengthened and expressed, and the soul walks continually in connection with her God, and in the sunshine of his favour. True prayer always implies fixedness of thought, strength of emotion, and intenseness of aim; and it derives its character in no small degree, from the nature of the objects which engage its attention, and excite its aspirations. The intrusion of worldly or sordid purposes destroys it; it lives only in the atmosphere of spiritual perceptions.

"In regions mild,
Above the smoke and stir of this dim spot,
Which men call earth."

Of all the various objects which awaken the spirit of prayer, what can be more sweet and ravishing than the glories of the upper world? In the light of these, to live for heaven is seen to be the great concern of man. Here is the region of shadows and of dreams; there, the abode of vast and unchanging realities. A boundless ocean is before us; through the clouds which overspread it, we behold ethereal shapes; amidst the gleamings of a faintly discovered brightness, we hear sounds of music, and voices that are unearthly, whispering to us of a love and blessedness which are eternal. We feel ourselves irresistibly drawn towards God, the absorbing centre of faith, love and holy joy; and we pour out our very hearts before him, in all the freedom and energy of prayer, thanksgiving and praise.

It is our worldliness, our distance in temper, designs, and pursuits, from all that is heavenly, which hinders and paralyzes our devotions, and converts our religion into an unmeaning routine of formality. Let us sever the bonds which attach us so strongly to these clods—these images of unreal bliss—fastening our hands on the skies: and we may hope to feel at once the expansive influence of our immortal-

ity, and rise to the grandeur of fellowship with the Father and His Son, Jesus Christ. So it has ever been with those whose affections were set on things above.

Meditations on future glory will especially excite to zealous efforts for the conversion and salvation of our fellow men. As the Christian thinks of his eternal inheritance, he can hardly forbear reflecting on the misery, as well as the guilt, of those who lose the heavenly rest. He would carry the whole world with him to those realms of purity and peace, which grace has prepared for the faithful. At the same time his bosom is warmed with the cheering hope of success, as he prays and labours to reclaim and save the lost. What, within the limits of the promise, may not be expected from that rich mercy, which has provided an atonement, a sanctifying Spirit, and a heaven, for such as are by nature children of wrath? The mere sense of obligation, and the clamorous demands of conscience, can exact at most but a reluctant obedience. The operation of the principles of natural humanity is irregular and uncertain. But a sight of the "sweet fields beyond the swelling flood," gives to the soul angelic wings, in all its toils of faith, and sacrifices of charity. It was when Stephen saw "the heavens opened and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God," that he kneeled down, and prayed with a loud voice for his persecutors and murderers,—“Lord lay not this sin to their charge.” It was with heaven in his eye, that Paul, contemplating the arduous duties of his ministry, could say, “For which cause we faint not, but though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day.”

The grave, we know, awaits us all; it may be just before us, ready to devour us without a moment's warning; rather we may say, its monitions are continually breaking upon our ear, “Boast not thyself of to-morrow, for thou knowest not what a day may bring forth.” What is so important as preparation for death? The interests concerned are infinite; the injuries, occasioned by a mistake, can *never* be retrieved. To sport with death, like Hume, or to exclude it from the thoughts, or to contemplate it with indifference, betrays the greater madness. The believer, it is true, has committed his soul to Christ; and Christ will never dishonour the confidence which is reposed in his faithfulness and power. But is there no danger of self-deception? Does not our Lord expressly assure us, that he will disown many who profess

to hope in his merits? The believer knows that his heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked. He needs such evidence of his adoption, and such views of eternal glory, as will raise him above fear, amidst the conflicts of nature's last agony. How dreadful is uncertainty in such an hour? Familiarity with heaven invests it with such glory, that all the affections leap forth to embrace it; and the kindlings of love towards the objects of the invisible world, afford to the soul the surest pledge of her title to "the inheritance of the saints in light." The Christian whose thoughts have been in heaven, while an inhabitant of the earth, departs from his mortal tabernacle, but to mingle with scenes and occupations already familiar to his faith and most dear to his heart. Let the Christian muse on that "land of pure delight, where saints immortal reign," and his own inheritance there, till he shall be ready to exclaim with Simeon, "Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace." Here he is a stranger. He has no continuing city below the sun.

"How should he scorn these clothes of clay,
These fetters and this load!"

Baxter's thoughts are derived from the depths of his experience, no less than from the treasures of his understanding. It is not as a man of a poetical fancy, or as a philosopher merely, that he speaks of an existence of holiness and bliss beyond the tomb. He had himself explored with strong faith, and with the affections of a native inhabitant, the mountains and valleys, the verdant fields and vineyards, the brooks and streams, and gorgeous scenery, of the promised land. He had listened to the sound of its waterfalls, the melody of its groves, and the joyous acclamations of the dwellers in its strong holds. He had tasted of its grapes; and many a cluster from its bowers does he bring, to refresh weary and fainting pilgrims on their way thither.

Were the Church more heavenly in her aims, her achievements for Christ would be proportionably increased; and did she think less of this world, as a place of rest, she would enjoy, in greater measures, the earnestness of another. It is pitiable to see her very heart engrossed by momentary acquisitions and pleasures, while she professes to believe, that it is her Father's good pleasure to give her the kingdom. Why should not she, the daughter of the Lord of glory, be

satisfied with his favour, and the ornaments prepared for her, by his own gracious hand? Is it becoming in her to descend to the pageantry, amusements, bustle and competition of earthly scenes? One might think, from looking at the church, that the objects of sense had acquired an importance which they did not once possess; and that the success of Christianity depended on the pursuit of wealth and earthly distinction, by those who bear the Christian name. The warnings of the Saviour on the danger of riches seem to be forgotten, or to be regarded as inapplicable to the present state of the world. "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God? It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven." Are not these the true sayings of God?

Entertaining these opinions respecting this work of Baxter, and of the importance of the subject on which it treats, we rejoice to see it published in such a form as will adapt it to extensive circulation. And we rejoice in this the more, when we consider how many works are now published and widely scattered through the community, which have a directly opposite tendency, and are fitted only to displace from the mind all thoughts and sentiments, which are worthy of its powers and immortal destination! Can it be denied, that much of the popular reading of the day encourages a shallow understanding, flatters a bad literary taste, and adds incentives to the vicious propensities of the heart?

We are not hostile to polite literature; we appreciate its connection with all that refines and adorns society; and we can have no sympathy with the Vandalism, which would proscribe it as a thing necessarily impious. Yet being no worshippers of either poetry or classic prose, we must say that we regard them with unfeigned abhorrence, when they appear as the caterers of vice, or the patrons of infidelity. Genius shall receive from us little commendation, unless we can add to the account of its creations, that it has been baptised in the name of Christ, or at least, that it does not set itself as an enemy to his cause. We are not willing to honour any book which would dethrone the Bible, and strengthen the natural opposition of men's hearts to evangelical holiness. We will not drink, much less will we spend our breath in extolling, the virtues of a deadly poison, though it be contained in a golden chalice. We remember who it is

that has said, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? or, what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?"

As an antidote, then, to the poisonous publications which are continually issuing from our press, we would recommend to our readers the "Saints' Rest." It will lead them to the fountain of true wisdom—the Holy Scriptures. It will teach them to seek their supreme happiness in the knowledge and service of Him, under whose just and benevolent government we must ever exist. It would be well could it be found in every student's library, in every mechanic's shop, in every merchant's counting house, on every lady's toilet, in the cabin of every vessel which ploughs our rivers or the ocean. With such a work in their hands, the young would be guarded against the corrupting influence of many of our popular fictions, and of the vain amusements of the world. If those who are in the midst of life would save a few moments from their business, and devote them to this work, it would enable them to rise to a higher sphere, beyond the reach of earthly cares and perturbations. Pointed by this work to an everlasting rest in the heavens, the aged and the dying might witness the decays of nature without dread, and find their descent to the grave marked with tranquillity and glory.

ART. VI. REVIEW OF MATTHIAS.

By Rev. C. S. HENRY, Bristol College, Pa.

Matthias and his Impostures; or the Progress of Fanaticism. Illustrated in the extraordinary case of Robert Matheus and some of his forerunners and disciples. By William L. Stone. New-York. Harper & Brothers, 1835. pp. 347.

THIS is certainly an extraordinary narrative. We learned, two or three years ago, through the newspapers and common report, something about the appearance, in the city of New-York, of the impostor commemorated in these pages—the strange influence he had obtained over the minds of two or three gentlemen of wealth and respectability—and the singular style of pomp and luxury in which he was indulging himself at the expense of his dupes. Subsequently we heard but little about his proceedings, until the death of Mr. Pierson, and the trial of Matthias, brought the matter again before the attention of the public. We confess we were not a little surprised to be informed that Col. Stone was about to put out an account of this impostor; for we could not imagine that his story would furnish materials for any thing better than a shilling pamphlet, coming under the same respectable category in literature, as the edifying narratives of Martin the highwayman, Moon the jail-breaker, and similar choice morsels for the appetite of vulgar curiosity. It therefore puzzled us extremely, that a man like Col. Stone should be employing himself upon such a subject. A perusal, however, of a portion of the proof sheets, while the work was going through the press, convinced us how entirely we were mistaken. Simply as a story it had for us all the interest of a romance; and we waited for the remainder with an eagerness we have not recently felt in regard to half-read books, always excepting, however, the inimitable stories of *Captain Marryatt*, for another portion of whose "*Japhet*" we confess a very impatient yearning.

In truth this is a work of more diversified and far higher interest, than any one would be at all likely to imagine before reading it. It is lively and well written, (though we think Mr. and Mrs. Folger's narrative is somewhat too long,)

—and besides being the developement of an extraordinary train of events, it has the graver merit of being a curious chapter in a much larger work, that yet remains to be fully and philosophically written, we mean a History of Religious Delusions.

Although the author tells us he has aimed simply to give a recital of facts, without pretending to philosophize about them, yet he has furnished a most valuable contribution to the philosophical history of Fanaticism. With one part of this subject, as it relates to the doctrine of Divine influence, our attention has been engaged at intervals for several years. The materials for the illustration of it, though widely scattered, are very rich and we cherish the hope of being able to bring them together, at some future day, in a form that may not be unacceptable or useless to the public.

Our notice of this volume must be very cursory. There seems indeed but little occasion for giving a particular account of the contents of a book, of which seventeen hundred copies were sold on the day of its publication, and of which, we understand, four or five editions have already been disposed of in the few weeks that have since elapsed. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a few brief remarks, with an occasional extract; for those who have read the work it would be needless to repeat here the substance of the narrative; and to those who have not read it, we prefer to recommend the perusal of it, as a volume not only highly interesting in itself, but exceedingly valuable for the instruction which it affords, in these days of religious ultraism, folly, and extravagance.

One of the most remarkable things in this narrative, is the developement of a train of events, commencing in the city of New-York, ten years before the advent of Matthias, and while he was unknown and at a distance, which seem, by the strangest coincidence, to have prepared the way for his appearance on the scene, in the spring of 1832, and for the setting up of his extraordinary pretensions, with all the advantages afforded by the wealth and influence of those who had been his forerunners, and then became his disciples and instruments. For ourselves, we are perfectly free to say, that we look upon the strange details of fanaticism, folly and impiety, displayed in this volume, as only part and parcel of the manifestations of a morbid condition of the religious community, which, commencing about a dozen years

since in the western part of the state of New-York, or at least there first decisively breaking out, has extensively prevailed throughout the country.

Although the impostor Matthias is the central figure, around which the events narrated in this volume are grouped, yet we believe every reader will feel that the main interest of the work by no means depends upon the personal history of the impostor himself, but consists far more in the assemblage and series of the disclosures which are here made, and especially as illustrative of the progress and character of that morbid state of the religious community to which we have adverted. One of the most remarkable things, as we have said, is the developement of events that preceded the advent of the prophet in the city of New-York. We will briefly glance at the progress of these events.

It appears from this volume, that a woman was the *fons et origo malorum*, the head and source of the singular series of events that prepared the way for the prophet, and gathered him a people ready for his coming. About the year 1821—22, this lady, whose education and character placed her in a highly respectable rank, and who had but a short time before become a communicant in one of the Presbyterian churches in the city of New-York, began her singular career, in the usual manner in which the beginnings of fanaticism show themselves, by pretensions to superiour sanctity. This displayed itself in the mode, at this day so common, of exceeding censoriousness in the condemnation of the members of the same church, particularly in the matter of female dress. This was the point to which her *reforming* spirit was first principally directed.

Having gained a small band of proselytes, the conversion of the whole city by a system of female visitation was next projected. These new evangelists, like the seventy of old, were to go forth, two by two, into all the dwellings of the city, not excepting the hotels and public boarding houses, and to pray for the conversion of the inmates. One of the first places visited by Mrs. ***, the lady referred to, and one of her associates, was the house of her pastor, for whose conversion they immediately commenced praying, in his presence and within his dwelling. It may seem astonishing to those who remember the Apostolic injunction to women professing godliness, to be keepers at home, and not be seen praying in public, that these ladies could have supposed such

conduct the proper way to adorn their profession ; but they seem to have preferred to follow the impulses of their own misguided zeal, and the instigations of a certain preacher of the name of TRUAIR, whose pretensions and proceedings made no little stir in some parts of the country several years ago, but who has since been silenced and degraded from the ministry by ecclesiastical authority.

The next step was the formation of an association composed of members of several different churches. It was not, however, as before, confined to the "female brethren," but embraced several gentlemen of considerable standing, and some of them of professional celebrity. The members of this association—which by the profane was sometimes called the *Holy Club*—arrogated to themselves more holiness than was possessed by others, and alleged that they came out from their respective churches because of their comparative lack of piety. Step by step they proceeded in fanaticism, until they laid claim to extraordinary gifts in the interpretation of prophecy—to the power of working miracles through "the prayer of faith." They believed also in dreams and visions, and at their meetings related them for comment and interpretation. They did not believe in the special observance of Sunday ; they disliked the institution of marriage, as unfavourable to entire devotion to the service of God ; and some of them even went so far as to maintain that all marriage bonds were dissolved. They believed in their power to heal the sick, by anointing with oil and the prayer of faith, which they attempted in several instances.

"They did not believe in a final day of judgement, but maintained that mankind were judged for their deeds every day. At one of these meetings, when this tenet was the subject of their devotional meditations, a lady-orator became apparently almost frantic. She screamed wildly—for both sexes "prophesied," and their meetings were sometimes very noisy—and danced back and forth across the room, declaring, "This is the judgement seat of Christ—the Judge is now on the throne, and he is judging every one of you *now*."

"They were also Perfectionists. On one occasion, one of the perfect ladies proclaimed, that she was even then standing on the sea of glass, and holding converse with God. She declared that she held sweet communion with him daily—conversing with him 'face to face.' At another meeting, one of the male members declared that he had not had a

single temptation for ten years—dwelling much upon his own perfection, the strength of his faith," &c.—pp. 41, 42.

Such was the association of enthusiasts formed in 1825, of which Mrs. *** was a conspicuous member. This lady, in addition to her other pretensions, now laid claim to special revelations by the Holy Spirit, in regard both to her own personal concerns and the affairs of the church. At this period Mr. and Mrs. Folger, who subsequently figure in the history of Matthias, appear on the scene. About this period Mrs. Folger, then recently become a Christian communicant, came under the influence of Mrs. ***, who soon obtained entire ascendancy over her mind, and led her to the adoption of all her peculiar views about dress, abstinence, fasting, &c. The house of Mr. Folger then became the centre of her operations, though this gentleman himself did not then come into her views. Her influence through Mrs. Folger was, however, sufficiently strong to lead him, in 1829, to take up his residence at Bowery Hill, in the upper part of the city, whither Mrs. *** had, some time previously, removed, and where also several other families and individuals resided, who were her disciples and followers, among whom was the late Elijah Pierson, subsequently the dupe and victim of the wretched Matthias.

"It was here, and in the same year," says Col. Stone, "that the celebrated '*Retrenchment Society*' was devised by Mrs. ***, and organized under the influence of a tract which she wrote, and under her own immediate auspices." In addition to the obligation of a rigid abstinence from all the luxuries, a great proportion of the commonest comforts of life, the members were to fast two or three whole days every week. "This last rule was most rigidly enforced, even upon the tender pupils of a school taught by one of the ladies, who, it is said, were compelled to fast with her, until they would cry for hours after bread and water, until, in fact, in some instances, they were made sick by their abstinence." This Society was not "confined to the small circle of visionary women in whom it originated. It embraced at one time a considerable number of members. Some of them lived in fine houses, in the most fashionable part of the city." They sold all their costly and fashionable furniture, and in other respects rigidly conformed to the rules of the Society,—apparently unaware, however, that consistency required them likewise to give up their costly and magnificent residences, and betake themselves to more modest dwellings.

Mr. Pierson has been mentioned as one of the band of disciples gathered at Bowery Hill. "Mrs. Pierson was one of the ladies attending the multitudinous female prayer meetings in 1825, under the auspices of Mrs. ***, at the house of Mr. B. H. Folger. But it is not known that she gave any other evidence of religious extravagance until about the year 1828." Mr. Pierson had, however, for some time previous to this date, begun to entertain peculiar and extravagant notions, to the great grief of his pastor and religious friends, by whom he was highly esteemed and loved for the uncommon excellence of his character. Mr. Pierson, it appears, must be regarded as a true Christian and an eminently good man; and there is nothing more afflicting in this whole book, than the story of his progressive delusions, from their small beginnings to the entire derangement of his understanding upon the subject of religion; for it seems his judgement on other matters was never impaired. After mentioning the extravagant opinions which he successively entertained, Col. Stone goes on with his account, from which we here give the following passage:

"Among the unsound and unscriptural notions which Mr. Pierson now held, was that of *direct revelation to him of the will of God through the agency of the Holy Spirit*. This belief, or pretension, it will be recollected, was avowed by Mrs. ***, with whom, it must be borne in mind, Mrs. Pierson had been associated as early as 1825. Mr. Pierson was indeed a man of prayer—of habitual, constant prayer; and after he began to entertain these opinions, it was his daily habit to record his religious exercises,—his prayers, and the answers which he received. These prayers were put up upon all occasions, upon every subject of duty or business, for direction in every undertaking, spiritual or temporal, and for every person with whom he transacted business, or was connected in religious duties."—p. 59.

Many of these prayers, with other pious memoranda, are given by the author, who had access to the private papers of Mr. Pierson; and many of them breathe the spirit of the most unexceptionable devotion, in regard to the matter and language of his petitions, without any other trace of fanaticism, than in the notion of special answers communicated by the immediate teaching of the Holy Spirit.

Mr. Pierson went on increasing in his unhappy delusions, until we find him attempting to raise his wife from the dead by the prayer of faith—then conceiving himself

endued with the power of working miracles—set apart also as preacher,—and as having become, in very truth, Elijah the Tishbite. But our limits forbid us to follow the story of Mr. Pierson. Early in the year 1832, another gentleman, still living, who appears in this volume under the initials M. H. S., and who had for nearly two years previously been exceedingly unsettled in his mind in regard to his spiritual state, became an attendant on the preaching of Mr. Pierson, and soon came to sympathize with him entirely in his feelings and pretensions.

In this state of mind, they were not unprepared for the reception of the impostor MATTHIAS, who, dressed in a singular costume, with a flowing beard, presented himself to them on the fifth of May, 1832, and announced his extraordinary pretensions as the Spirit of Truth, come on the earth in the person of Matthias, the apostle, to establish the personal reign of God the Father, which God the Father he himself was.

These pretensions were immediately admitted by the two gentlemen; their houses were thrown open for his reception, and he entered at once upon the almost entire controul of their wealth, which was very considerable. Subsequently Mr. Folger and his fortune, were also brought under the influence of the impostor.

It is not our purpose to pursue the narrative of events after the appearance of Matthias upon the scene. We must refer the reader to the book itself. We have glanced at the train of events which prepared the way for this new prophet, mainly because we wished to direct the attention of our readers to two or three points, which are very distinctly noticeable in this narrative, and which we consider extremely important to be remarked. It will be perceived that this train of events had their origin in a very sincere, but *misguided religious zeal*—a zeal not according to knowledge. Then we perceive the *arrogation of superiour holiness*, accompanied by the *spirit of censure and denunciation* towards others. The *next step* is a false and *fanatical doctrine* touching special revelations, and the immediate teaching of the Holy Spirit. Now what we wish to say is, that we humbly conceive it is just in these particulars, that we find the commencement of almost all fanatical delusions which have ever prevailed in the world; the wildest and strangest of them, we doubt not, if traced backward, would disclose

the same source. Whenever any person, no matter what may have been his previous excellence of Christian character, comes under the influence of *misguided zeal*, accompanied by *spiritual pride* and a spirit of *ensoriousness*, there is the greatest danger of his taking up with some *false and unscriptural notion of Divine influence*; and when this step is once gained, the road is open to all the follies and impieties of the most boundless fanaticism. The earlier history of Matthias himself, as the reader of this book may perceive, illustrates this point. Though this man, from the time of his appearance in New-York, was, we are inclined to think, a wilful and wicked impostor, yet at the outset of his career, beginning with the excitement of his mind at Albany, we are disposed to believe him an honest and self-deluded fanatic; at least we think that, like Cromwell, a large mixture of real fanaticism mingled with his hypocrisy; and perhaps there was a leaven of it, with, possibly, a touch of *insanity*, throughout his whole career, though we are more inclined to doubt as to this latter particular.

We shall not enlarge here upon the dangers of spiritual pride and censoriousness, to which we have adverted; but we wish to make some further remarks upon the doctrine of Divine influence, the fanatical perversions of it, and the strange things that have, at various times, been referred to the Holy Spirit.

The true doctrine concerning Divine influence, we take to be this: that while there *is* an immediate and supernatural influence of the Divine Spirit, exerted in man in his conversion and in his moral progress, yet *this influence is a matter neither of direct consciousness, nor (much less) of sensation*. It is not directly perceived in its working, but only to be inferred *from* its effects, and *those effects only which are described in Scripture, as the "fruits of the Spirit;"* and in no individual case, is any one warranted to ascribe any thing to the influence of the Spirit except those fruits. The *effects* of the Divine influence are indeed discerned in the consciousness, but the influence itself is not a matter of consciousness.

On the other hand, the essence of fanaticism on this subject, consists in regarding the Divine influence as a matter of *direct consciousness*, or, (as a still grosser form of it,) of *sensible* experience; and in arbitrarily holding certain internal frames, states of emotion, or impressions, or bodily

sensations and affections, as the direct working of the Holy Spirit, or as proofs of his presence,—as a part of the work of conversion, or as evidences of it.

If this distinction be given up, there remains no criterion by which to discriminate between the spurious and the genuine in religious emotions; there is no necessary stopping place; and the wildest conceits of the religious Bedlamite may put in their claim to be recognized as immediate Divine inspiration.

We have often deeply regretted that the bulk of the community, who are so liable to be misled on this important subject, should not be better instructed in regard to some parts of human physiology, particularly the laws of the reciprocal influence of the mind and body. If they were better acquainted with the physical principle of automatic sympathy or involuntary imitation, and with the influence of the imagination and nervous sensibility, it would take away in their minds the basis of a vast amount of religious delusion. They would then perceive that multitudes of those phenomena, which they so piously ascribe to the influence of the Holy Spirit, have necessarily nothing to do with it; but may all be explained by the principles just referred to; and that numberless instances of similar effects have occurred, and are perpetually occurring, without any connection whatever with religion. We are indeed "fearfully and wonderfully made," and the connection of mind and matter, and of the soul and the spirit, in man, is one of the most mysterious depths of our nature. Yet, if we cannot penetrate into the recesses of the frame-work, from which the ceaseless evolutions of life and thought are developping, observation can still take cognizance of the phenomena, and is competent to refer them to some general laws. A vast field of deeply interesting enquiry yet remains to be explored. Still, multitudes of facts have been already established in regard to the reciprocal influence of mind and body, which might, if generally known and understood, be of great service in correcting fanatical notions of Divine influence. We can here only mention a few of this class of facts.

In 1780, at St. Roch, in an assembly of young ladies belonging to a Seminary, one of the number was seized with convulsions. The affection spread with such rapidity, that fifty or sixty of the girls were thrown into the same convulsions. From that time it continued to recur and spread

itself, until it was necessary to separate the girls into different schools, and to permit but very few to meet together at a time. In this way, after several weeks, the affection was subdued. Boerhaave gives an account of a similar contagious spread of convulsions in a school of young ladies, which he at length contrived to put a stop to, by threatening to brand those who should be seized by the affection, with red hot irons, which he showed them ready for the purpose. In this way he overcame the sympathetic imitation by the stronger influence (as it proved in that case) of fear. In the medical books, many cases are related of Hydrophobia produced by the imagination, in many instances, by the mere sight of those who were afflicted with it. Heckers' Epidemics of the Middle Ages, contains some most remarkable illustrations of the propagation of nervous diseases, as the *Tarantula* in Italy, and the *Dancing Disease* of Germany, which for a long time prevailed in those countries, affecting hundreds and thousands of persons in the most extraordinary manner, fostered indeed by many of the superstitious notions current in those days. We are glad to understand that Dr. Babington's translation of this interesting and instructive work is about to be republished in this country.

The history of Animal Magnetism abounds also with curious illustrations of this subject—whether the phenomenon in question be referred, as by some, to imagination and involuntary imitation, or as by others, to a deeper, mysterious, and special principle of our nature. About the facts themselves there can be no doubt, as is abundantly established by the recent report of the Medical Section of the French Academy. Spasmodic bodily affections, magnetic sleep, somnambulism, *clair-voyance*, or the power of seeing, reading, playing at piquet, &c., &c., in state of perfect somnambulism, and with the eyes perfectly closed and bandaged, together with a great variety of phenomena even more strange, are described by the most impartial and competent witnesses, as produced by the magnetizers, and that by mere gestures and motions, made often without touching their patients.*

* About two or three years since, the Medical Section of the French Academy appointed a Committee, consisting of a large number of the most distinguished members of their body, none of whom were believers in Animal Magnetism, to investigate the subject anew. This committee, under the most favourable circumstances, instituted a prolonged, most able and critical exami-

To the same general class of facts belong the cures effected by Valentine Gretrakes, an Irish gentleman, by touching persons affected with divers diseases; also those performed by the metallic tractors of Perkins, which some years ago excited so much attention in this country and abroad.

The history of Witchcraft is another fruitful source of illustration in respect to the bodily affections that may be produced and propagated through the influence of imagination and involuntary imitation, where the requisite conditions of belief in its reality, &c., exist.

It would be impossible here to go into a particular account of the immense mass of facts that might be brought from these and other sources. Some general conclusions, however, may be stated, which these facts go to establish:

1. The contagious nature of various bodily affections—of the kind of some of those referred to—even apart from any mental passion or emotion.

2. On the other hand, also, the tendency of many *emotions*, felt, or supposed to be felt, by one individual, to spread themselves among other individuals present.

3. Again: when the feelings or emotions of a crowd are in unison, or thought to be so, from any common cause, and when at the same time, these emotions begin to show themselves in bodily agitations, the influence is propagated to an astonishing extent, through the inexplicable contagion of involuntary imitation.

4. There is, besides all this, something in the very sight and contact of a crowd, favourable to the exaltation of the imagination, and to the production of such affections. Eyes speak to eyes, and, as Buffon says, "body speaks to body."—Dugald Stewart has mentioned these general statements with considerable illustrations.

From these facts it will appear that if a crowd can be brought together, in circumstances favourable to the excitement of the imagination, and under the influence of some

nation of the matter, using every precaution that habits of scientific investigation could suggest in the conduct of the enquiry. Their report consists of a minute detail of the facts and results, without expressing, however, any opinion on the general question as to the existence of a special principle, except only that they classify all those facts which appeared to be susceptible of explanation from generally recognized physiological principles. This report was never published, but a limited number of copies were lithographed for the use of the members of the Academy. It has however been translated and published in England by Mr. Colquhoun of Edinburgh, with an interesting introduction.

common cause—and most of all in connection with *Religion*, especially if there be any considerable degree of credulity or “faith”—you may produce and propagate, to a greater or less extent, almost any form of nervous affection you wish, from the frenzied whirlings of the dancing dervishes of India, to the unknown tongues of Edward Irving; and that without a grain of Divine intervention in the matter.

That these affections are so extensively connected with religion, is doubtless to be explained from the fact, that the religious principle is one of the strongest in man's nature. Hence the pages of religious history are full of illustrations of fanatical delusion in regard to the doctrine of Divine influence.

In the earlier history of Methodism, under the exciting preaching of Wesley and his fellow-labourers, acting upon the exalted imaginations and nervous sensibility of his auditors, *brought together in crowded assemblies*, convulsions, hysteric cries, fallings down, trances, extasia, and almost every form of cataleptic affection, were produced. These, *being encouraged by the reference of them to Divine influence*, propagated themselves from one to another to an incredible extent. It is a curious fact, in this connection, and well deserving to be noted, that Whitefield always *doubted* of these affections and discouraged them, *consequently they seldom and but slightly occurred under his preaching*. Wesley himself, at a later period, discouraged them, *with a like result*. We cannot here forbear referring our readers to Southey's *Life of Wesley*. It is one of the most remarkable, and, in our opinion, one of the most valuable books which this age has produced—replete with almost every kind of interest, and full of practical instruction; and especially on the subject of which we are speaking, it is rich in food for philosophical reflection. No one can candidly and carefully peruse that most excellent work, without deriving clearer and better views of the nature of true religion, of the religious principle in man, and its connection with the other principles of his constitution. No one can read it without being fortified against fanatical delusions, while at the same time he will find every feeling of scorn or scepticism in regard to the reality of internal religion rebuked; he will rise from the reading of it with a clearer perception, indeed, of the errors of Wesley and of the grounding principles of them, but also with a deeper reverence for that truly

great and good man, and many of his eminent coadjutors. We can scarcely conceive of any thing more desirable, than that a cheap edition of that invaluable work should be brought out, and extensively read throughout our religious community at the present day.

Col. Stone has taken a striking passage from Barclay's Apology for the Quakers, which illustrates the effect of involuntary imitation and imagination upon persons brought together in a close assembly, even where nothing is spoken. After speaking of the Divine influence as coming down upon them, and producing "a trembling and a motion of the body upon most, if not all," Barclay goes on to say: "and from this the name of Quakers or Tremblers was first reproachfully cast upon us, which if it be not of our own choosing, yet we are not ashamed of it, but have rather reason to rejoice, in this respect, even that we are sensible of this POWER that hath *sometimes laid hold on our adversaries*, and made them yield to us, and join with us, and confess to the truth, *before they had any distinct or decisive knowledge of our doctrines*; so that *sometimes many at one meeting have been thus convinced*: and this POWER would also sometimes reach to, and wonderfully work, even in little children, to the astonishment and admiration of many!" This passage is indeed a very curious illustration of fanatical delusion, in attributing to the Divine influence effects which are referable only to the principles of imagination, nervous sensibility, or involuntary imitation. The persons thus affected by "*the Power*," had, it appears, little or no knowledge of the doctrines of the Quakers, and some of them were little children who could not be acquainted with them. Nor was it at all necessary that they should. Every physiologist and medical philosopher knows, that this sort of affections propagate themselves not only *without* the concurrence of the *will*, in the person affected, but often in spite of its resistance; though, to be sure, the effects of this involuntary imitation are greatly increased, where the imagination is exalted, and the nervous system predisposed, by respect and credulity, or, as the initiated term it, by *faith*. In some cases indeed this *faith* is one of the necessary requisites for the production of the desired results. Hence this word *faith* has always been a term of great significance in the vocabulary of religious impostors and charlatans. Their votaries are constantly impressed with the im-

portance of their having faith; and the want of it, in some one or other, is dextrously assigned to cover the retreat of the pretenders, in any case of failure. This the reader will see frequently illustrated in this volume, as when the fanatical confidence of Pierson, and others, or the delusive expectations excited by Matthias, were disappointed.

About forty years ago, there was an extensive revival of religion (so called) in Kentucky, connected with the efforts of a class of pretenders to superiour sanctity, zeal, and spiritual illumination. This revival was characterized by a prodigious assemblage of fanatic and most ludicrous conceits and practices, among which were a great variety of bodily affections, mostly however reducible to certain classes recognized among the people, such as the "*falling exercise*," the "*jerks*" or the "*jerking exercise*," the "*running*," the "*barking*," and the "*climbing*" exercise, in which the subjects of them exhibited the various motions expressed in the names. Col. Stone has given some details of this extraordinary delusion, in the last chapter of his volume; and we may mention here an account which we received from a gentleman of the highest distinction in the literary and religious world. He described himself as present at a religious meeting in that region, at a period subsequent to the greatest prevalence of those delusions, but still before they had passed away. After the preacher had proceeded for sometime in his harangue, and himself and his auditors had become warmed into a considerable degree of excitement, individuals of the congregation began to drop convulsively upon the floor one after another, under the influence of the "*falling exercise*." The gentleman surveyed the scene for some time with the coolness of an unaffected spectator, and although his judgement was not overmastered by the slightest belief of any Divine influence in the matter, yet from the inexplicable influence of nervous sensibility, he found himself at length, in spite of his will, in danger of following the example of those around. He therefore left the room, and went into the open air, to recover himself. He related the case however of three young men, present at one of the meetings on a different occasion, who having less philosophy than himself, became dupes of the delusion. Going one day to the encampment where the meeting was held, they looked on for some time in the spirit of disbelief and mockery; when turning to remount their horses, they were seized

with the mysterious "*jerking exercise*," which threw them back with great violence every time they attempted to put foot to stirrup. Finding themselves foiled after repeated attempts to gain their saddles, in their amazement and fright, they yielded to the belief that it was the work of God, and surrendered themselves to the full influence of the scenes around them. All these various "*exercises*" were then piously believed by multitudes to be the work of the Holy Spirit. It would have been held impiety and blasphemy to doubt it. We have no doubt indeed that they were as much the work of the Holy Spirit, as many of the *feelings*, *impressions*, and *sensations*, which we have heard described, within the last three years.

The truth is that such phenomena, though occurring in connection with the religious principle, and with religious services, have necessarily nothing to do with the Divine influence, either as parts of its work, or proofs of its presence. They are explicable from those other principles of our nature to which we have referred, and religion and religious services are only one of the conditions under which the imagination, nervous sensibility, and imitation, are excited to the production of such effects.

These principles of our nature, however, precisely because they are real and strong principles, and yet not understood, furnish the strong hold of religious impostors, whether they are mere deceivers, or are themselves also deluded. Here is the secret of their power, and of the effects they produce.

Such facts as these should lead us to a careful discrimination of the true Scriptural doctrine concerning Divine influence from all fanatical perversions of it. They may well justify us, also, in expressing our distrust as to the reality of multitudes of those conversions that have been so rapidly made among us, at the present day, by a system of influences, which, in some essential features, bear so strong a likeness to those above mentioned. Nor can it be justly required that we should, at once and without question, allow that the *effects* which follow the labours of some of our most noted perambulating evangelists—the multitudes, namely, of those who "*declare themselves converts*"—have necessarily any thing to do with Divine influence, or are any certain proofs of God's approbation of that general system of doctrine and procedure under which they take place. These effects, as-

sumed as the tokens of the Divine approbation, are, we know, the strong argument of these people, with which they delude the weak, and overawe also the timid, who might otherwise be disposed to exercise their right of "trying the spirits whether they be of God;"—just as if these effects, because they occur in connection with religion, are therefore truly religious! Such a mode of arguing would almost equally put the stamp of Divine approbation upon all the abominations of the Anabaptists of Munster, the Fifth-monarchy men of England, and in short upon every thing most absurd, monstrous, and impious, in the whole history of religious fanaticism.

We are not in the least disposed to doubt, that many true conversions have taken place under the system referred to; but still solemnly believing, as we do, every thing most distinctive and influential in that system to be in its tendency ruinous to souls, and most baneful to the permanent interests of religion, we heartily pray that its credit and authority may soon cease all over the land. It is indeed, we trust, fast coming to this end; but long and lasting will probably be the evils it involves, in the spiritual deadness and desolation that follow in the reaction. The volcanic fires may expend themselves, but their effects will for years be seen in the barren wastes of lava which rolled over the fields and villages. It is mournful that the Past is so little instructive to the livers in the Present. While the human mind is like the pendulum, perpetually swinging from one extreme to the other, there seems also another law of human history, by which the same strange scenes perpetually re-appear in cyclical recurrence, and the same lessons must be impressed from generation to generation. The errors and heresies, the controversies, impostures and fanaticism of one epoch, are, with only slight and circumstantial modifications, essentially the renewal of those of a preceding epoch, and thus backward through the track of history. The notorious Davenport, who appeared in Connecticut about seventy years ago, and exercised such a prodigious influence in multitudes of churches, in the promotion of revival scenes much like those upon which we have animadverted, was but a prototype of the wandering evangelists of the present day. And though this man lived to see and deplore his errors, yet the mischievous effects of them lived long after him. He left the region where his influence was most decisive, a spiritual

waste; and to this day traces of desolation are painfully visible in the churches of that section. We have no doubt that more than one generation must pass away before the pernicious influences that have been abroad for several years in our land, shall have exhausted all their effects, or before their true character will be fully and generally seen. The indications, to be sure, are now sufficiently clear to the sober observer. The licentious doctrines of Perfectionism are fast getting hold in many places that have been regarded as the choicest spots in Zion, in having been favoured with outpourings of this latter day spirit; and if credible report be true, these atrocious doctrines have already borne their legitimate fruits, not only in the denial of the Sabbath, and the renunciation of all the positive institutions of Christianity, but in loathsome scenes of sensual indulgence. Yet these things, together with the disorder and anarchy that are abroad—the almost entire destruction of the official authority and exclusive functions of the ministry—the exaltation of the “spirit of the times” above the spirit of Christ—and the reckless and irreverent assailing of the peculiar institutions of Christ,—all these things, we fear, are but “the beginning of the end.” Indeed there is much, in the tone and spirit, the tenets and feelings, the cant and pretensions, which have fallen under our observation, that reminds us of nothing more strongly, than of the atrocious and loathsome fanaticism of the times of the English Commonwealth. In fact these things are all of one family; and we could listen with as much sympathy and respect to a *Ranter*, or a *Fifth-monarchy man*, of those times, as to a *Perfectionist*, or a disciple of *Truair* or *Burchard*, of the present day.

ART. VII. AN ENQUIRY INTO THE UTILITY OF MODERN
EVANGELISTS, AND THEIR MEASURES.

By REV. WILLIAM MITCHELL, Rutland, Vt.

CHRISTIANITY in its essential properties is endowed with the immutability of its Author. In its fundamental precepts and doctrines, in its spirit and purity, it was designed to be without variableness or shadow of turning. But it is otherwise in regard to the outward form of Christianity, and the methods by which its ultimate triumphs are to be achieved. A few simple means, most wisely adapted to the end, accordant with the true philosophy of mind, and expressly designed to secure to the rightful proprietor the excellency of the power, are explicitly ordained, and intended to be perpetuated to the end of time. But with these limitations the Gospel was left from the beginning to adjust itself to the civil, literary, and political changes of the world. In this aspect the kingdom of peace may be likened to a floating bridge. It rises and falls with the subjacent waters.

The correctness of this view is manifest from the example of the Master, and his Spirit-taught disciples. They neither commenced their mission with a tirade against the manners and customs of society, nor with an onset upon the powers that be. They did not compel the converted master to manumit his slave, as a condition of discipleship; but demanded only that he should treat him with Christian benevolence. They did not oblige the soldier to quit his post, and incur the penalty of martial law, on becoming a soldier of the cross; but simply required him to carry the spirit of the Gospel into his profession. They looked for the extinction of war only in the subjugation of the passions from which it originated, and regarded peace on earth as the *effect*, and not the *cause* of the prevalence of the Gospel. The weapons of their warfare, mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds, were truth and love, wielded in faith, prayer, and patience; and they held up the mirror of their example for the benefit of all who should succeed them in carrying forward the spiritual kingdom. It is quite apparent that Christ intended to direct the attention of his disciples in every age to the spirit of the Gospel, and to admonish them that their efforts in his service if effectual, must

be characterized by simplicity and godly sincerity, and be aimed chiefly at the renovation of the heart, by the force of truth, and the attendant power and demonstration of the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven.

We can never abandon the position, that the means Divinely instituted—the ordinary preaching of the Word, including the proper administration of its ordinances, and the fulfilment of pastoral duties, combined with prayer, faith, and the zealous co-operation of the churches—are sufficient, under the promised agency of the Spirit, to fill the earth ultimately with the glory of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea. If the Roman empire, with idolatry woven into the texture of its literature, philosophy and government, fell before these spiritual weapons, are they not still adequate, to accomplish the end for which they were designed? The fact is, that whenever the means of grace which God has appointed are skilfully and zealously employed, the Gospel still, as at the first, exerts immense power.

But while we affirm, that these means are adequate to the end, are sure from divine appointment and the blessing infallibly connected with their proper use, and that on them must be our main reliance, we readily admit, in view of the genius of the Gospel, the example of inspired teachers, and the ever varying phasis of the world, that some measure of discretionary power was intentionally confided to the church in every age. In the specified means of conducting the Christian enterprize, we find no mention, for instance, of Bible, Missionary, Tract, Temperance, and Sabbath School Societies; and yet has not God set to them the seal of his approbation? I know not what fields of usefulness remain to be explored, and occupied by expanding benevolence. This is a soul-stirring era, and will be so recorded in the annals of time. But of this I am sure, that the spirit and the essential doctrines of the Gospel can never be safely contravened; nor may any measures be adopted which, in the quaint but just observation of an old divine, are not “butted and bounded by the word.” The landmarks set up by the hand of God must remain hallowed and untouched in all time; and the anger of the Lord will visit him who attempts their removal. These things premised. I believe that every individual effort and combination of effort consonant with the spirit and intent of the Gospel may be lawfully employed, to accelerate the latter day glory of the church.

But the fact is as notorious, as it is lamentable, that the discretionary power of which I have spoken has been wantonly abused. The ordinances of the Gospel have been robbed of their simplicity, and buried under the parade of human magnificence. The pure word of truth has been sullied by the bigotry of denunciation, the bitterness of invective, the pride of orthodoxy, and the admixture of carnal philosophy. The constitution of the human mind has suffered violence by irrational and prolonged excitement. Numerous expedients have been set in operation for the furtherance of the Gospel, which find no warrant either in the letter or tenour of the Scriptures. It were well if these evils belonged wholly to the record of the past. But they do not. The present age, in its zeal for improvements, has revived measures and doctrines which former generations proved, discarded, and, but for the benefit of their posterity, would have buried in oblivion. There is no new thing under the sun.

Some of the prominent characteristics of the present times which awaken solicitude, are an over scrutinizing rationalism, love of excitement, and innovation. Principles regarded as settled by the voice of antiquity, are now subjected to unsparing revision: and unless we greatly misjudge, not a few adventurers in the various departments of reformation are pushing on to a hazardous extreme. We anticipate much good from this dominant spirit of enterprize,—this “rush of mind;” but we forebode also many evils. The van of the troop of mischiefs has already made its appearance in the disorder of the churches, the reveries and immoralities of Perfectionism; and what may be in reserve, it is impossible to tell. But at all events, it is time, in the judgement of reflecting men, to pause and consider.

*Est modus in rebus; sunt certi denique fines
Quos ultra, citraque nequit consistere rectum.*

It has become the decided conviction of many, that the labours of modern Evangelists are among the disturbing forces which threaten the ultimate prosperity of the churches. We beg leave, therefore, to bring the general utility of these labours to the test of a candid and faithful examination.*

* About five years ago this subject was brought before the public, occasioned by the proposition to organize a corps of Evangelists, as “helpers” of the pastors in the older settlements. Had the scheme been effected, we doubt not from the necessity of the case, that these helpers must have become *supplanters* of the pastors. The arguments of the writer who exposed the futility of the plan have

The term *Evangelist*, as denoting a distinct grade of office, has lost its original meaning. The order of men specified by this title is enumerated after prophets and apostles, and they received a temporary appointment to preach the Gospel and administer its ordinances, wherever the Holy Spirit should lead them. They visited destitute places and gathered churches among the heathen; but they were not employed either as promoters or conductors of revivals in the churches over which the Holy Ghost had appointed overseers; nor did they "boast in another man's line of things made ready to their hand." Their office terminated, like that of prophets and apostles, and we have now nothing analogous to it, except the trust committed to the modern missionary, and the labourer in places destitute of settled pastors. (Acts 9: 38; 21: 8; Ephes. 4: 11.)

But we will not press the enquiry, why the title of an office is perpetuated after the office itself has ceased, nor why it should be given to those whose field of operation is so entirely different from that originally occupied by Evangelists. We are concerned rather with *things* than *names*. The main question is, whether the labours of those who now bear the name of Evangelists are, on the whole, either necessary or beneficial to churches supplied with regular pastors. I speak not of occasional aid from this source, if circumstances require it. Such men as Wesley, Whitefield, the elder Tennent, and a few others of recent date, may have been needed to rouse the slumbering churches; and God will provide such extraordinary instruments when they are wanted. I shall direct my attention to Evangelists as organized into a distinct, permanent body, and selecting chiefly for their field of labour churches abundantly supplied with the means of grace.

To bring the general utility of these men and their measures to the proper test, it will be necessary to examine the consistency of their operations with the duties and usefulness of stated pastors. In the beginning, churches were organized and overseers were appointed by the Holy Ghost. They were charged, before the Judge of quick and dead, to feed the flock specially committed to their care,—to preach the Word in the sanctuary, and from house to house,—to in-

since been elucidated by monitory facts. We recommend a re-perusal of this candid and judicious article. Review on the employment of Evangelists in our older settlements. *Christian Spectator*, September, 1829.

struct the ignorant, reclaim the erring, visit the afflicted, and to perform various duties, silent as the dew in their influence, and essential to the fruitfulness of the vineyard, although neither adapted nor designed to excite the admiration of the multitude. I shall not stop to prove, that the benefits arising from this Divine institution are necessary to the prosperity of religion. The experience of every age, from the apostles down to the present hour, and the confusion which has invariably followed the subversion of this arrangement, fully demonstrate its wisdom and necessity. No other means than the unostentatious labours and persevering industry of the stated pastor, have ever been devised by which a due proportion of doctrinal instruction, and the consequent symmetry of Christian character could be at all secured. It is not believed that the churches are willing to exchange the services of the pastor, for the benefit of an itinerant ministry. They are not prepared to sever the bond endeared by so many tender associations. Whatever tends therefore, to produce so disastrous a result should be carefully avoided.

We ask now, if the measures at present pursued by Evangelists have not a direct and powerful tendency to disorganize churches, and to dissolve ultimately the pastoral relation? Look back upon the rise and progress of these measures. A few years since an eminent pioneer commenced the work of an Evangelist, going forth without *purse or scrip*, and we doubt not at the special call of Providence, to render his *invited* aid, where a revival was hoped for, or had already commenced. He, and a few who succeeded him, carefully preserved the unity of the churches, and strengthened the hands of pastors by their co-operation, and by yielding them, in all things, their place, as the constituted guardians of the flock. They performed, in fact, pastoral duties, visiting from house to house, arousing the careless, guiding the ignorant, and directing the anxious sinner. Much good was effected by these harmonious efforts of pastors and evangelists. But the introduction soon after of certain innovations upon established order, injurious chiefly in a prospective view, paved the way for numerous evils.

Among these innovations may be mentioned *the Conference of Churches*. By the consent of pastors, meetings were held, conducted by laymen; and two and two, after the

manner of the seventy disciples, were sent forth to prepare the way for the ensuing convocation. The exercises consisted chiefly of exhortation, prayer, and reports on the state of the churches. A few clergymen usually attended, but they acted a subordinate part. Some beneficial results attended these meetings; but they were also an occasion of evil. Imprudent disclosures respecting churches and individuals were made—young converts exhorted with more zeal than discretion—silent prayer was occasionally substituted for audible—pastors made a public confession of unfaithfulness—and, worse than all—were *re-charged by a deputed layman to apply themselves with new diligence to their vocation*. I well remember, that a sensible man, to whom was committed this mis-named duty, feeling the awkwardness of his position, prefaced his charge to a faithful minister with these significant words: "Suffer it to be so now." The spirit of lay-preaching, productive of so much evil, derived great encouragement from this source. Men, occupying a private station in the churches, suddenly became wiser than their teachers. Ignorant of the toils, trials, duties, and responsibilities of the ministry, they went about denouncing every pastor who did not come up to their standard.

The Conference of churches was ere long succeeded by protracted, or *four-days* meetings, as they were more usually called, from the time of their continuance. These were at first conducted with great caution by neighbouring ministers, subject to the direction of the pastor at whose request they were held, and a preparation was expected in each church by fasting and prayer. These meetings have exerted a salutary influence, and may be beneficial still, if they are wisely conducted, and are not prolonged to the disturbance of public worship on the Sabbath in adjacent congregations; the propriety of which we strongly doubt. Such concentrated efforts, however, are in our judgement, best adapted to the scattered population of new settlements, and regions where there are but few stated pastors. *There*, for a season, the great Pavilion, with its banner, Holiness to the Lord, may perhaps be profitably erected. But one fact in regard to protracted meetings is worthy of special notice. Notwithstanding the caution with which these meetings were at first conducted, and the delay in the admission of converts, many, and it is believed an unusual proportion, have been

added to the churches who mistook a momentary excitement for the renewing power of the Holy Spirit. If a comparison is instituted between those who have been brought into the church by *ordinary* and *extraordinary* means, we are confident that a greater number of the latter will be found to have made shipwreck of their profession. Other prominent evils resulting from this source, might be mentioned, but they are visible to every candid observer. Now in repeated instances of late, the *four-days* meeting has grown to a *forty-days* meeting, and here it is hoped has found its ultimatum. During these exercises, the chief *management* has been either assumed by the Evangelist, or of necessity yielded to him; and he performs, in his own irresponsible way, almost all the services. He has his own measures, proclaims the number of converts, accomplishes their speedy admission to the church, and assigns, for the time being, a subordinate place to the pastor in the care of his own flock.

Five years ago, an ardent advocate of the new system said of Evangelists, that "their *only commission*, so far as it is to come from this world, must be *the favourable opinion of a Christian community*."* It has come to this. The present system of Evangelism, has become well nigh a hierarchy, with its lords spiritual. It is claimed, I am aware, that pastors and churches concur in inviting these promoters of revivals, and harmonize with their measures. This may be true in general, but in many churches lamentable divisions have grown out of the offer of aid from Evangelists. And many a pastor is obliged to yield from necessity, and patiently witness evils that he cannot prevent. Sustained by a minority in his church, he summons fortitude and hope to his aid; but he feels like the care-worn Æneas:

Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum,
Tendimus in Latium.
Talia voce refert: curisque ingentibus aeger
Spem vultu simulat, premit altum corde dolorem.

What will be the final result of protracted meetings as they are now conducted by Evangelists? What effect will these seasons of intense excitement and mental exhaustion have upon the future interests of the church? These are questions of solemn moment; and we are apprehensive that

* Christian Spectator, Sept. 1829, p. 434.

they have not been sufficiently examined. Means not expressly sanctioned by the Word of God, should be viewed in their ultimate bearing, as well as immediate effects. We are confident, that many are deceived by *present appearances*, who will become wiser from experience. It is inspiring to see crowds, day after day, pressing into the house of God. Converts, real or apparent, multiply like the drops of the morning. Sinners, callous under the ordinary means of grace, are awakened. Christians are full of faith and joy; and the preacher holds the vast assembly in admiration by his bold and novel manner of exhibiting the truth, and the skilfulness of his movements. Painful doubts, indeed, are revolved in many a mind concerning the *machinery*; but the sensibilities become accustomed to the shock, and fear subsides into the belief that the Spirit of grace is present, and that the *end* will sanctify the *means*. This is the bright side of the scene. But it has also a dark side. How many will lose their zeal when the exciting causes are withdrawn? How many will make a hasty and vain profession? How many adjacent congregations will be broken up on the Sabbath, during the *twenty* or *forty days* convocation? How many will improve the occasion, to violate the Lord's day? How many churches will be prepared for disorganization, and the dismissal of their pastors, from the demand for the so called "revival preaching?" The long meeting at last closes. The chief agent retires. The crowd of strangers disperses. The sick and the exhausted seek for rest. The great congregation has dwindled away to its former size. The children born and cradled in the tempest grow languid in the calm. They have little relish for ordinary food, and crave the absent stimulus. What now is to be done? The *pastor*, if it were possible, must not imitate his *exemplar*. This would be fatal. The Evangelist himself, had he sufficient mental and physical strength, could not pursue his own measures in one congregation for a twelvemonth. And if the common means of grace are not adequate to *procure* the reviving influence of the Spirit, they are not adequate to *preserve* its reviving influence when procured by special means. We ask then, what next? Who shall calculate on the benefit of ordinary medicine, after the most powerful has been exhausted?

After revolving these thoughts, we must be permitted to doubt the expediency of committing the churches at all to

the spiritual guidance of an Evangelist. He is under the pressure of constant excitement. He is followed by a throng of admiring hearers, is subject to little responsibility, and probably receives a greater compensation for his services, than three ordinary pastors.* Is he likely under all these disadvantages, to be more spiritually minded than those who are set apart to feed the flock, and better qualified than they are to direct the enquiring, of whose previous character and habits he knows almost nothing? He is like a transient physician in a crowded hospital.

Stated pastors "certainly can impart that systematic instruction—that knowledge of all essential doctrines and duties, which a transient preacher cannot. Acquainted with individuals of the parish and with the community, they can be seasonable, pertinent, and judicious in regard to the amount and kind of ministrations which the occasion requires. But what is the preaching, the counsel, the efficiency, of the passing Evangelist? 'A bow drawn at a venture.' What is his whole ministration? If nothing worse, it too often is a vapour, which appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth away."

Look again at the means and measures employed and authorised by the errant Evangelist—the bold and reckless strain of preaching—the scores of requests for prayers for persons and places, presented by males and females—praying for individuals by name, in an irreverent manner—the urging of *immediate* choice, and the immediate public announcement of it—the unmeasured bitterness of opposers—the entering and retiring crowd—we say, look at these scenes to which we allude, only because we tremble for their results, and then enquire, how can pastors and churches maintain their ground under the disorganizing effect of such influences?

A voice of admonition has gone forth from those sections where these measures have been tried, and thoroughly tested by time. A correspondent writes, that the ministers of five churches were dismissed soon after the labours of an Evangelist. We state the fact without comment. He assures us

* The amount of donations received by Evangelists would not have been noticed, but for the fact that men indifferent to religion have turned the circumstance to the injury of the cause. The ascertained sum received by an Evangelist in one society, and that not the largest, would exceed *two thousand* dollars a year, exclusive of board. We make no complaint of this liberality; but could wish that the poor pastor, struggling with pecuniary embarrassments, might be remembered by these generous donors.

also that in one church, where *a hundred converts* were proclaimed, but were not immediately added, because they had no pastor for more than a year after the Evangelist left them, not *one* had made a profession. Another correspondent who speaks from experience, says that the present system of Evangelism divides churches and congregations into parties, in favour of, or against, the Evangelist and his measures.* It sets up as to matter and manner, a standard of preaching which the pastor can neither imitate nor avoid without creating dissatisfaction. It fosters, in the excitable and ignorant, a disrespect for the constituted guardians of the churches, and a spirit of censoriousness towards good men who do not enter into their views. It fosters in churches an undue dependence on *men* to produce revivals, and thus prevents their entire reliance on the Holy Spirit. It tends to substitute periodical excitement for growth in grace and a strait-forward performance of practical duties. The proof, in short, is abundant that the labours of our modern Evangelists are irreconcilably at variance with the duties of settled pastors.

But we have also the testimony of the past. All the essential measures animadverted upon, were tried in the great revival of 1740 in New-England, which was succeeded by a spiritual dearth of half a century. "A spirit of bitterness and denunciation went forth against all who hesitated to adopt the *"new measures."* In prayer, the solemnity and awe which become sinful beings in the presence of their Maker were exchanged for profane familiarity, revolting personalities, and disgusting vociferation. In preaching, decency and common sense were outraged in the perpetual effort to produce *effect*—to excite and inflame the passions. Erroneous or defective standards of personal piety were set up. The evidence of conversion was made to rest on heated zeal, sudden revelations of light and joy, forwardness to exhort and reprove others; and not on that spirit of humility and self-distrust which are the surest tests of Christian character.†" "In prayer, besides their shockingly irreverent familiarity with the Almighty, they not unfrequently trampled on the duty by mentioning individual persons, and interceding for them by *name*, as opposers of the good work.":

* The present compared with the past condition of Berkshire county, Mass., is full proof of this fact.

† Christian Spectator, Sept. 1829.

: Ibid. June, 1830.

Let us hear the voice of that great and good man, Pres. Edwards. In his *Thoughts on the Revival of Religion in New-England*, he describes the errors which resulted in so long a train of evils. "Some have been bold in some things that have really been errors, and have gloried in their boldness in practising them, though condemned as odd and irregular. And those that have gone the greatest lengths in these things have been by some most highly esteemed, as those that come out bold for the Lord Jesus Christ, and fully on his side." "There is also a great temptation to an *assuming behaviour* in some persons: When a minister is greatly succeeded, from time to time, and so draws the eyes of the multitude upon him, and he sees himself flocked after and resorted to as an oracle, and people are ready to adore him, and to offer sacrifice to him, as it was with Paul and Barnabas at Lystra, it is almost impossible for a man to avoid taking upon him the *airs of a master*, or some extraordinary person. A man had need to have a great stock of humility and much Divine assistance to resist the temptation." "Another wrong principle from whence have arisen errors in conduct is, that whatever is found to be of present and immediate benefit, may and ought to be practised, without looking forward to future consequences. Some persons seem to think that it sufficiently justifies any thing that they say or do, that is found to be for their present edification, and the edification of those that are with them. Indeed in things that are in themselves our duty, being required by moral rules, or absolute, positive commands of God, they must be done, and future consequences must be left with God; our election and discretion takes no place here: But in other things we are to be governed by discretion, and must not only look at the present good, but our view must be extensive, and we must look at the consequences of things. It is the duty of ministers especially to exercise this discretion.— And particularly ministers ought not to be careless how much they discompose and ruffle the minds of those that they esteem natural men, or how great an uproar they raise in the carnal world, and so lay blocks in the way of the propagation of religion. This certainly is not to follow the example of that zealous Apostle Paul, who though he would not depart from his duty to please carnal men, yet wherein he might with a good conscience, did exceedingly lay out himself to please them, and if possible to avoid raising in the

multitude prejudices, oppositions, and tumults against the Gospel; and looked upon it that it was of great consequence, that it should be if possible avoided. (1 Cor. 10: 32, 33; Rom. 14: 19; 15: 1.) I believe that if the rules of Christian charity, meekness, gentleness, and prudence had been duly observed by the generality of the zealous promoters of this work, it would have made three times the progress that it has, i. e. if it had pleased God in such a case to give a blessing to means in proportion as he has done."

"Under this head of carelessness of the future consequences of things, it may be proper to say something of introducing things new and strange, and that have a tendency by their novelty to shock and surprise people. Nothing can be more evident from the New Testament, than that such things ought to be done with great caution and moderation. Persons that are influenced by an indiscreet zeal are always in too much haste; they are impatient of delays, and therefore are for jumping to the uppermost step first, before they have taken the preceding steps; whereby they expose themselves to fall and break their bones. It is a thing very taking with them to see the building rise very high, and all their endeavour and strength is employed in advancing the building in height, without taking care withal proportionably to enlarge the bottom, whereby the whole is in danger of coming to the ground; or they are for putting on the cupola and pinnacle before they come to it, or before the lower parts of the building are done, which tends at once to put a stop to the building, and hinder its ever being a complete structure."

Other evils are noticed by this eminent divine, such as the promulgation of the doctrine,—“an occasion of some mischief and confusion,”—that “external order in matters of religion and use of the means of grace is little to be regarded;”—and the error which “some have been in danger of, that ministers, because they speak as Christ’s ambassadors, may assume the same style, and speak as with the same authority that the apostles and Christ did.” The interruption of family worship is also noticed, as having “been made too light of.”

I wish to submit to the reader one more extract from Edwards: “We go too far when we look upon the success that God gives to some persons, in making them the instruments of doing much good, as a testimony of God’s approbation of those persons, and all the courses they take. It is a

main argument that has been made use of to defend the conduct of some of those ministers, that have been blamed as imprudent and irregular, that God has smiled upon them, and blessed them, and given them great success, and that however men charge them as guilty of many wrong things, yet it is evident that God is with them; and then who can be against them? And probably some of those ministers themselves, by this very means, have had their ears stopped against all that has been said to convince them of their misconduct. But there are innumerable ways that persons may be misled, in forming a judgement of the mind and will of God from his providence. God was pleased in his sovereignty to give such success to Jacob in that which from beginning to end was a deceitful, lying contrivance of his, that in that way he obtained the blessing. God was for awhile with Judas, so that he by God's power accompanying him, wrought miracles and cast out devils; but this could not justly be interpreted as God's approbation of his person, or his thieving that he lived in at the same time."

Every sound divine will concur with Edwards, that *success* is not certain proof that God *approves* of men and measures. We doubt not that most Evangelists are pious men, and sincere in the belief that Providence has called them to their work. But we are confident that much of the so called success which attends their measures, may be accounted for from natural causes, and that the good is done at too much cost. It is believed that they have mistaken the path of duty by selecting for their field of operation, churches supplied with judicious pastors and sufficient means of grace; and that the churches who thus employ them will in the end sustain injury. Pastors adjacent are best qualified to aid each other in protracted meetings, and the churches are not justified in employing a surplus ministry, while the world is famishing for the bread of life. Pastors can harmonize with each other; but in general they can never harmonize with the present movements of Evangelists. If they can, we may soon count upon the dissolution of the pastoral office. Our chief reliance must be on the ordinary means of grace, made effectual by the agency of the Spirit. The general prosperity of religion must depend on the cultivation of individual piety, and the steady shining of Christian light. The path of the just, is as the rising sun, brighter and brighter, to the perfect day; and not like

the meteor's flash; nor is *growth in grace* synonymous with a *periodical religion*. It is lamentable that every revival, that of Pentecost excepted, has been followed by spiritual death. If the churches will not do their duty without a reliance on *extraordinary* means of grace, God ere long will suffer these means to become a scourge, or cast them away, as he did the idolized serpent of brass, and confine his people to those *ordinary* means with which he has infallibly connected his blessing.

I have endeavoured to exhibit my views on this subject candidly, but fully and fearlessly. Wherein I am wrong, I shall rejoice to retract. But if I have uttered any degree of truth, I pray that pastors and churches may "read, mark, and inwardly digest" the same.

ART. VIII. REVIEW OF VAN DYCK ON CHRISTIAN UNION.

By Rt. Rev. B. B. SMITH, Bishop of the Diocese of Kentucky.

Christian Union, or an Argument for the Abolition of Sects;—By Abraham Van Dyck, Counsellor at Law. New-York, D. Appleton & Co. 1835. pp. 227.

WHATEVER may be thought of the merits of this work, its appearance may safely be regarded as one of the signs of the times. The echo has hardly died upon our ears, of almost universal acclamations in favour of the division of Protestant Christendom into sects. But here we listen to a far more correct note of warning against the prodigious evils of so unchristian a state of things. And it is scarcely less remarkable that this first note is sounded, not from the other side of the Atlantic, where the principle of subdivision has been tested only in its milder forms, but from America, and from a section of Western America, where it has been experimented, one would think, on a scale exaggerated enough to satisfy the wildest advocate for the peculiar benefits of

united action amongst adverse and contending sects. This fact alone may be hailed with humble gratitude to Almighty God as one of many indications that America, in its influence over those who profess and call themselves Christians, will be most auspicious in numberless respects; not only by presenting an unobstructed field upon which Christianity may exert her highest energies; but also by giving scope to whatever elements of evil may have wrought themselves into its frame-work to manifest themselves suddenly in their more baleful forms, so as to compel the earlier use of appropriate remedies.

This thought has often forced itself upon our attention, when we have contrasted the far greater evils of endless subdivisions amongst Christian people in new countries, with the milder forms in which they manifest themselves in old and well established communities. Where population is dense, and causes long in operation have served to bind together a vast majority of the people in the support of a preacher of some one of the orthodox denominations, the evil is hardly felt to be an evil, and can easily be tolerated. But where enterprise and emigration have brought them together in a small new village at the West, men of all shades of religious opinion—representatives not merely of the leading sects every where scattered through the country, but also furious advocates of some two or three splits and subdivisions amongst all these sects; how they are ever to be brought together to erect a suitable place of worship, or to sustain Christian institutions upon a respectable and permanent footing, is a proposition which no modern inventor has yet had sufficient sagacity to solve. In such a state of things, Christianity must grovel dishonoured in the dust.

But we hold it to be impossible that evils so appalling and wide spread, can fail of working their own cure, and of opening the eyes of all dispassionate and truly benevolent Christians, as the eyes of the author of the work before us were opened, to the greatness of the evil of disunion, and the imperative duty of all Christian people to agree in the unity of the church. Here in America, where the curse of sectarianism has been the most bitter, its cure will be most sudden and most complete!

How the sentiment ever gained currency that sectarianism, is, upon the whole, a blessing, is utterly inconceivable!

Kindly dispositions must have led men to apologize for the prodigious evils of this system, or prejudice must have kept them stone blind, otherwise they never could have conceived that the base and low-born principle of emulation, (the only consideration adduced in favour of sectarianism,) could compensate for the innumerable evils of the spirit of party.

Volumes would ill suffice to unfold the evils of disturbing that unity, in which the Saviour prayed, that all his disciples might be bound together. A mere summary of those evils would cover too many of our pages with the blackness of darkness. It ministers food to pride and self-importance, it encourages upstarts, it magnifies the merest trifles into saving points of faith, it eats out the heart of personal and family religion, it divides families and convulses communities, it saps and undermines the due influence of the ministry, it encourages the spirit of insubordination and misrule, it alienates and embitters against each other the best of Christians, it strengthens the hands of the ungodly and loosens the loins of the church, it encourages the contempt of the blasphemers and hardens the heart of the infidel, it wastes and misdirects the energies of the church, fills Christendom with mourning, and covers it with dishonour, whilst it abandons the unenlightened heathen to their own forgotten and unpitied miseries. Sectarianism is one of the master devices of Satan. It goes farther than any other influence, perhaps, in keeping real Christians from that fulness of growth and vigour to which, without it, they might attain; stands directly in the way of the conversion of the multitude in Christian lands; presents Christianity to the heathen in a mutilated and degraded form; and fritters away or paralyzes the energies of Christians for evangelizing the world. It may almost be questioned which yields the adversary of souls most victims,—a debased and corrupt form of Christianity, or Christianity deformed by the curse of sectarianism!

Most of the remedies pointed out by Mr. Van Dyck for these evils, are mere expedients and palliatives. It could hardly be otherwise, since he has not even attempted to point out the causes of division. That mind to which God in his providence and by his Spirit, shall reveal the true causes of the evils which exist, will, most likely, become the honoured instrument of exhibiting the true remedy. God only knows whether the deep seated and true cause has ever

yet been fully discovered. And it may be reserved for some champion of the cross, more honoured and more happy than Luther or Cranmer, to usher in a new reformation, the effect of which shall be to restore the church to its primitive oneness and glory.

We have not the presumption even to dream that either of the causes about to be disclosed, is that one great secret, but true cause of all this difficulty, upon the discovery of which the remedy must depend. But discussion, in the spirit of candour and sincere humility, cannot have the effect of heaping more rubbish upon these causes where they lie concealed; but may, on the other hand tend somewhat towards removing a little of the rubbish, and to bringing us nearer to laying our hand upon the great cause.

It would be aside from our present purpose, to attempt to trace the cause of divisions and dissensions in the churches to the self-love and restlessness of base and ambitious men, or the impatience and headiness of mere novices, or to the pride and wilfulness of the human heart. The attempt is, to point out some of the nearer and more palpable causes in which these elements of evil, belonging to our common nature, have betrayed themselves.

Has not the time come when the enquiry may safely be pursued by Protestant Christians, whether one of the grand mistakes of the Reformation were not separation from the church, instead of reformation in the church? Might not all that patient perseverance, and humble energy which distinguished the very eminent saints of that day, if exerted long enough within the church, have prevented in the end any separation from it? might they not have resulted in the entire removal of all material error, either in doctrine or practice, which had been gathering around primitive Christianity during the space of more than a thousand years? It would seem that a return to those outward forms and symbols of our faith which prevailed in the earliest and comparatively uncorrupt ages of Christianity, must yet be the standard after which all Christians must agree to copy. How much better would it have been to have returned to these standards without ever having violated the unity of the church!

May we venture upon another fundamental enquiry? Was it wise to attempt to add to the brief, general, comprehensive creeds, by which, down to the time of the Reforma-

tion, Christians were content to regulate their faith? Has any thing been gained by spinning out the standards of faith into all the more minute ramifications of metaphysical and polemic theology? May not the thousand-and-one splits amongst Protestant Christians, on points of doctrine, be mainly traced to this fundamental mistake? Agreement in essentials and freedom in unessentials, is a wise axiom. Has it been the leading axiom of doctrinal sects? The knife which divides the polypus cannot be more prolific, than that knife which has been so much in use, in cutting off every member from the church who differed in any thought from some standard, by which the operator has been pleased to try his opinions. An unnatural effort to keep men's minds pared close, in order to conform to a particular creed, has led to more numerous and far wider departures from it, than could otherwise have taken place.

It would be venturing on still more delicate ground were we to ask, whether the effacing of the scriptural and primitive distinctions between clerical and lay officers in the church has not, by lessening the respect for the sacred order, and fostering a spirit of misrule and insubordination, greatly tended to the multiplication of sects? When the authority of proper officers ceases to be recognized, and the respect and obedience due to them are subverted, who can predict what endless discords may ensue? The tendency of this evil is manifestly to be traced in the far greater number of subdivisions amongst those sects, by whom the clerical order has been the most completely degraded.

It will be perceived that these three causes are of a general and permanent nature; and they are the rather adverted to, on account of a tendency too generally prevalent to refer these evils to casual, local, or temporary causes. We perceive as plainly as others can the operation of these latter causes, and we deplore them as devoutly. And indeed we know not but a summary of them ought to be sketched, for the sake of the unsuspecting. But we have felt solicitous in the present article, of directing the attention of reflecting men to the main and more influential causes of the divisions which abound among us.

Amongst the local and temporary causes which have aggravated the evils of sectarianism in our country, may be mentioned the radical spirit of the age, the fever for excitement and change, the prevailing disregard for office, and

contempt of government, the violent impatience of restraint, and the almost universal desire of power. These tendencies to evil have been rendered more precipitant, by the cast of education given to religious teachers, bewildering them with nice and useless doctrinal distinctions, diverting their studies from the history of the church, and inflaming them with impatience for immediate results, instead of teaching them to lay deep and well the foundations of a future and permanent increase. But enough of this.

Let us hasten to the most important practical part of the subject, the suggestion of remedies. And here it is also aside from our object to point out the one grand remedy—THE OMNIPOTENCE OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY, because we are not penning an exhortation, or dreaming of the time as already come when all Christians shall be perfect Christians; but we are endeavouring to bring out practical suggestions, which may meet the exigencies of the present times, taking Christian people as they are.

And thus are we brought precisely to the knotty point of our subject. All are agreed that disunion exists and is increasing to a frightful extent. Most men are becoming sensible that such divisions are grievously unchristian and pernicious. Many think themselves quite prepared to adopt any effective remedy which may be proposed. But *what shall be done, what that remedy is*, we have found comparatively few who are quite prepared to determine.

Preliminary to the discussion of this topic, the great question arises, what sort of a union amongst the followers of Christ, should be proposed? Shall they be called upon to unite, in some way or other, as they now stand divided, or are they bound to agree in one outward form of Christianity? Mr. Van Dyck, and multitudes with him, appear to entertain no other idea of union amongst Christians, than an agreement that they shall not bite and devour one another. For our part we most explicitly avow our conviction, that every attempt to put a stop to the dissensions and subdivisions which distract the church must forever prove futile, until Christians are agreed in ONE OUTWARD FORM OF CHRISTIANITY. We have no room to pause for unfolding in full our reasons for this opinion. They are briefly these however. Our Saviour Christ in his last prayer for his disciples, and St. Paul in frequent arguments in his epistles, refer to the ONENESS of the church—and at that period no

idea could have been conveyed by their language, but a church one in form, as well as in spirit. The earliest and purest writers of the church employ language precisely similar, and by the unity of the church, always mean unity in form and practice, as well as unity in doctrine and spirit. Common sense can repose with satisfaction on no other idea. Outward Christianity, with the multitude, is the whole of Christianity. Disunion in practice, is disunion in fact. And to talk about union in feeling and spirit, whilst there is disunion in fact, is about as wise as to exhort those to love one another, between whom some occasion of deadly feud actually exists. This common sense principle is sufficiently tested, by asking contending sects in Great Britain and America, how they can present one Gospel to the people of China, without a previous agreement in what outward form Christianity must be sent to them?

The hopelessness of such a union is the great argument against it. But is it any more hopeless than the triumph of Christianity over the tempers of men, whilst actual occasions of difference are left unremoved? Is more grace necessary to guide the understanding to right results, than under the most unfavourable circumstances, to regulate the affections of the heart? We look only to a Divine influence controuling the thoughts and hearts of men, to lead them into all truth, and to bring them back again to the unbroken unity of the church. Is it too much to hope that under this influence the minds of all good men will be guided into all truth?

But when the preliminary question is settled that, in order to heal the divisions amongst Christian people, there must be a return to one outward form of Christianity, a much more difficult question occurs, what that form shall be? Shall it be any one of the existing forms exactly as it is? shall one of the best of these be modified so as to approach more nearly to some supposed perfect standard? shall the excellencies of each be chosen and formed into an entirely new model, avoiding all the evils of those which now exist, and combining all their advantages?—or shall it be abandoned to chance, or left to expediency to determine what that form shall be? Neither of these methods will bear the comments of common sense. Under either of these suppositions it would be impossible to put into the hands of every honest and good man precisely the same cue, with the perfect confidence that it would lead him, upon principle, to the same results.

As inductive men we do not like to state what that principle is, in the form of an axiom; and yet we know not how it can better be stated than in the words of Tertullian: "Whatever is first is true; whatever is more recent is spurious." In other words, we must go back to that period in the church when it was as free from corruption in doctrine and practice as it can well ever again become before the millennium; when the church did appear in absolute oneness of outward form. By correct methods of investigation, we must ascertain what that form was, and with willing minds and hearts, we must agree, in all essential respects, to return to that unity.

Here enough is fixed and permanent to satisfy the honest enquirer. Here all is plain, for facts and truth become the objects of search. And it has appeared to us one of the strangest anomalies of the human mind, that so much which belongs to our common external Christianity should universally be received by Protestant Christians upon this only correct principle, and yet so many disputed points, involving the most disastrous consequences, should never be brought to the test of the same principle.

Is it important that Christians should agree in one Bible? Might the most desolating and disastrous consequences result from controversies respecting the books which go to make up this one Bible? Would it prove fatal to Christianity to leave the determining of this question to caprice, or expediency, or chance? There Christians have done well in agreeing upon those sound principles of investigation which lead them to substantial and sufficient agreement, what the Canon of Scripture is. The principle is correct, and therefore all honest minds rest satisfied in the same results. Abandon the question of the oneness of the Bible, to be agitated and kept afloat on the perturbed ocean of expedience, as the question is respecting the oneness of the church, and very soon we should have amongst us almost as many books claiming to be Bibles, as we have sects claiming to be churches.

And what are the laws of evidence, guided by which all Christians come to such admirable agreement as to the Canon of Scripture? Do we settle that grave point by appeals to the Scriptures alone? Do we require a "thus saith the Lord," for the admission of any book within the compass of the Bible? If not, how may the method of investigation, in few words be stated?

We select some period of Christian antiquity by universal consent anterior to great corruptions ; and in order to be quite safe, anterior to the existence of great causes tending to corruption ; the year 300 for example, previous to the conversion of Constantine, or the year 250, when the documents of the then existing Christianity were abundant, or the year 200, even when men were living who had conversed with the disciples of John ; and we ask, what books were received by Christians every where, and with one consent, as sacred books ; and these and no others we admit into our Canon. Then, with utmost care, we look into every previous writer, for concurring, or for opposing evidence. Finding nearly every thing clear and satisfactory, we finally repair to the books of the New Testament themselves for incidental and internal evidence, to endorse for, and confirm the whole. And here we rest satisfied, that we have grasped the TRUTH.

What hinders the application of precisely the same rule, which we apply to the integrity of the one Bible, to the question of the one church ? Here there is some change of subject as to a few details, but not as to principle. Both are outward matters, inseparable from Christianity. Both involve a great variety of facts, and the question can never be settled in either case except by an appeal to facts.

Is it then too much to hope that the progress of theological learning, stimulated by the evils of sectarianism, and guided by humility, true piety, and still increasing freedom from prejudices, will ultimately lead the best men, and the best ministers in our country to the adoption of correct methods of investigation, in order to restoring the unity of the church ? If here and there a ray of light has been scattered through those pages, we should be most thankful if we could concentrate every one of them upon the sentence ;—that men accustomed to investigation will be brought to agree in some external form of Christianity, just as soon as they are agreed as to the methods of investigation by which the truth of that one form may be ascertained !

We have purposely excluded every sentence which might even imply in what direction these plain principles might guide us. With us it would matter nothing to which of the existing denominations they would conduct ; or what modifications they would demand of each. Nay it would not startle us at all, were they to point out some outward form

of Christianity, buried and forgotten for fifteen hundred years. By following principle, we are quite fearless where we are conducted. We have only to hope and pray that the same spirit may be given to every enquirer, and that every candidate for the ministry may give the subject the attention which its importance demands, and then we shall all soon rejoice together, as members of one body, in the unity of the spirit and in the bond of peace.

It concerns us less than we can express, whether these opinions are regarded as foreign to the subject, or exceedingly new and strange. When unfolding great principles, praise or blame are alike indifferent. But far different are our feelings with regard to the place which we could wish that these principles might occupy in the minds and hearts of our most prayerful enquirers, and our leading theological teachers. To them, not the article, but the principles upon which the article is based, are most solemnly commended, in the name of God, with the earnest entreaty that they may be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny, that their fallacy, if any is to be found in them, may be exposed, or if not, that their correctness may be avowed, and straightway applied to practice. For many years, ever since that return to a better state of religious feeling, out of which the chief missionary efforts of Great Britain and America have grown, and more particularly since the great general societies, for the distribution of Bibles, religious tracts, &c., have sprung into existence, the subject of greater union amongst Christian people has been much discussed. And for a time it was confidently anticipated, that revivals of religion, and co-operation for great objects upon principles of almost boundless toleration, by effacing the distinctions amongst sects, and leading their respective representatives to bury their animosities, would, in the end, bring Christians to be much more of one mind. We rejoice to bear testimony to the hallowed Christian influences which owing to these causes, during short intervals, have evidently filled the hearts of the best Christians in the land. But the indications of any tendency to greater practical union from these causes, if it ever existed any where but in the imaginations of good and ardent men, have long since passed away. We know of none who continue to look to what have been called the great national societies, or to such revivals of religion as of late have run over the land, as sending forth

one ray of hope that the church will soon be restored by their means, to greater unity and love. On the contrary, the bad spirit seems to be converting these mighty engines, into the readiest instruments of his will, in creating more divisions, and more wide spread disorders.

We must look abroad, therefore, for other and better influences, which we may hope are tending, and that God will overrule, to the desired end. That there is an actual increase of the spirit of primitive Christianity amongst us, notwithstanding the increase of fanaticism and infidelity, is a fact which cannot be questioned. And we may rest assured, that just in proportion as primitive Christianity pervades the hearts of men, will it become more and more easy to bring them to unite in primitive forms of Christianity. There may be some religion where sectarianism prevails. But just in proportion as religion soars above and triumphs over sectarianism, will the one church prevail in its primitive glory.

We have already interwoven the sentiment with the whole of this article, that the exaggerated and frightful evils of sectarianism amongst us, will shame and compel all good men, to seize fast hold upon principles which must lead them to agreement. The multiplication of sectarian theological seminaries, in the end, must hasten this result. For, in proportion as men become truly humble and teachable by greater theological attainments—as they occupy more commanding points of view, for overlooking the desolating contests between Christians—and as the responsibility of training the champions of their party for the time to come weighs more heavily upon their consciences,—just in these proportions will they be compelled to become modest, distrustful of themselves, and obedient to the guidance of correct methods of investigation. Let the professors of all our Theological Seminaries apply head and heart and hand to the discussion of this subject, having no object in view but truth, ready to go any whither, if only guided by principle; and as to any remaining differences amongst them, they might as well make a faculty of one school!

It would seem, also, as if Providence were shutting up the advocates of scriptural and primitive Christianity to the necessity of uniting against a common foe. Radicalism, infidelity, and fanaticism seem to be making common cause, and to be raging with more than ordinary fury against the Lord and against his Anointed. It will be a madness in the

friends of pure religion past conception, should they fall in the contest, through their own internal dissensions.

A similar constraint presses upon them in reference to the present posture of the missionary enterprise. At first, the salvation of souls from amongst the heathen, was the great and almost exclusive object of the missionary. But the time has now come when the few scattered bands of converted heathen are to be gathered into churches, and to be supplied with a permanent ministry. Can it be that the conductors and friends of our various missionary societies will go forward in their labours upon principles which must perpetuate, on heathen soil, and to the ends of the earth, the palsy and degrading controversies which agitate the church at home?

Should the present state of things continue, and its tendencies be still further acted out, it is impossible to conceive how much more disgraceful to Christianity and more ruinous to souls, it may become. Of this, at least, we have reason to be terribly afraid, that Almighty God, wearied by the follies and sins of those who profess to honour him, will visit them with some great chastisement, calculated to restore them to a sense of their duty towards him. Some of the best Christian writers, for many years have been filled with apprehensions, lest nothing but a season of persecution should prove sufficient to restore the church to its sense of duty. Violent persecutions are like great weights upon the key-stone of an arch, they keep the true church together by mere force. May God in his mercy bring about the desired change without being constrained to resort to a whip of scorpions, to scourge Christians into a right state of feeling! The time is at hand! Christians, must at once, of their own free will, agree upon principles surely conducting them to one outward form of Christianity, and all with one consent cheerfully return to the unity of the church; or they must expect that the change will be brought about by convulsions and sufferings, at thought of which the heart sickens! May the Great Head of the church, for the great love wherewith he hath loved it, speedily purify "it unto himself, a holy church, without spot or wrinkle, (or rent,) or any such thing."

ART. IX. REVIEW OF BEECHER'S PLEA FOR THE WEST.

A Plea for the West; by Lyman Beecher, D. D. Second edition; Cincinnati, published by Truman & Smith. New-York, Leavitt, Lord & Co., 1835.

A PLEA for the West is always sure to obtain among us a ready and favourable attention. The West is part and parcel of ourselves; not, as some might say, the better half, but full three-fourths of our happy land. It contains at this present moment more than five millions of citizens; and will probably in the life time of some who are now members of our families, contain a hundred millions. This fact is, by itself, a sufficient apology for writing books about the West, and for exciting the widest and most practical interest in securing the moral and Christian character of its institutions.

The author of this Plea has special claims to be heard. He was till recently an Eastern man, educated and matured among us, and who, in the very meridian of his influence, yielded to a call from the great Valley, to identify with it his future efforts and interests. But waiving these peculiar claims, Dr. Beecher's book is not likely to be overlooked. It gives us, in the burning style of its eloquent author, the great impressions which a residence at the West has made on his mind. It does not, however, aim merely at impression. The object of Dr. Beecher is to excite the Christian philanthropists of the Eastern and older states, to benevolent action.

"The West," he observes, "is a young empire of mind, and power, and wealth, and free institutions, rushing up to a giant manhood, with a rapidity and a power never before witnessed below the sun. And if she carries with her the elements of her preservation, the experiment will be glorious—the joy of the nation—the joy of the whole earth, as she rises in the majesty of her intelligence, and benevolence, and enterprize, the emancipation of the world.

"It is equally clear, that the conflict which is to decide the destiny of the West, will be a conflict of institutions for the education of her sons, for purposes of superstition or evangelical light; of despotism or liberty."

With these views our author proceeds to consider, what is required to secure the civil and religious prosperity of the

West; by whom, and how it must be done; and the motive to do it.

The thing required for the civil and religious prosperity of the West is stated in a single sentence. It is "universal education and moral culture, by institutions commensurate to that result—the all-pervading influence of schools, and colleges, and seminaries, and pastors, and churches."

To the question, "By whom shall the work of rearing the literary and religious institutions of the West be done?" our author replies, "Not by the West alone." In this opinion we think, that all enlightened and Christian patriots will cordially unite. It is no disparagement to our brethren in the West to say, that they have need of our assistance in rearing their most expensive institutions. "No people," our author has well said, "ever did, in the first generation, fell the forest, and construct the roads, and rear the dwellings and public edifices, and provide the competent supply of schools and literary institutions. New-England did not. Her colleges were endowed extensively by foreign munificence, and her churches of the first generation were supplied chiefly from the mother country; and yet the colonists of New-England were few in number, compact in territory, homogeneous in origin, language, manners, and doctrines; and were coerced to unity by common perils and necessities; and could be acted upon by immediate legislation; and could wait also for their institutions to grow with their growth, and strengthen with their strength." Convincing however as this representation is, we think a little might be added to its force by the fact, that with all these advantages the literary institutions of New-England are not seldom observed to hang out the flag of distress. We shall not state how many of them have within the last ten years made their cries heard on this side Byram river; because we are not persuaded, on the whole, that this reciprocation of sympathy and aid even with the best furnished portion of our country, is any detriment to the great interest of charity. And we are persuaded, that New-England is not on the whole a debtor to any portion of the American family.

But if even the oldest and best supplied sections of our country, still call for foreign aid in perfecting their literary institutions, it is no wonder certainly, and no cause of reproach, if the great West in the infancy of its settlements, and while the hardy emigrants are yet in sturdy conflict

with the dark forest and the untamed prairies, puts in a plea for help. Still less should any Western man allow his feelings of independency to get the better of his reason, and turn back the proffered aid, or deny the substantial grounds on which it has been sought.

The Plea of Dr. Beecher exhibits to us some of the commanding reasons for extending immediate and liberal aid to the West. We have read and pondered his eloquent thoughts on this part of his subject with deep interest, and yet not without a measure of disappointment. There is certainly great force in the consideration which is made the ruling one in this part of the argument. We admit, after weighing well and long, the incompatibleness of Romanism, ministered by Jesuits, under the eye of a foreign prince, with the genius of republican institutions. We are not blind to its present influences, or its past history in the old world; nor do we deny the efforts which this power is making to obtain a superiority in the new. And yet, we desire not to see the energies of the church and of Christian patriotism, concentrated so exclusively upon a single point in this mighty conflict. We desire, if we may so express ourselves, a more peaceful war. Let us rather outdo these missionaries of Rome, in the multitude and perfection of our institutions. Let us sow this whole broad land with the best wheat, and employ more of our men and means in doing it, than in plucking up the tares. In this view of the subject, the author would certainly acquiesce; we are persuaded too that he would act in accordance with it; while the latter part, and, indeed, a large portion of his book might lead to a different impression. In this particular, there is, to our mind, a falling off from the great argument with which it commences. The battle is won; but when we look for the elevation of a new world to truth and righteousness and the largest measure of civil freedom, we are presented with almost nothing beside the conquest of Romanism. And to this circumstance do we attribute the fact, more than once mentioned in our hearing, that the pronouncement of this discourse, previously to its publication, left upon the minds even of those who listened with approbation and even with delight, a disappointment in respect to the depth and permanency of its impression.

ART. X. ON RADICALISM.

BY THE EDITOR.

IN a former number we pointed out some of the principles by which true Reform is conducted. It is our present design to hold up the contrasted features of that degenerate style of reform, denominated *Radicalism*. And we do this under the impression that at the present crisis, there is no subject more deserving attention. Our object is not to designate any person or party, but to characterize a general system of operation, which has been recently gaining ground among us.

Radicalism may be described in general, as a mode of Reform unqualified by any of those cautionary maxims which have been laid down, and always adopted and acted upon, by wise and successful Reformers.—The true Reformer, standing in the ancient way, well considers every project of change, before he enlists in it. The Radical, weary of the established order of things, rushes into every innovating enterprise, without waiting to enquire, whither it leads. The Reformer, cherishing profound veneration and love for the institutions under which he has lived, seeks their amendment only, not their subversion. The Radical, extending his disaffection from the abuses of these institutions, to the institutions themselves, would gladly witness their overthrow. The one, aware that the blessings of the social state cannot be enjoyed without some abridgement of the privileges of the state of nature, cheerfully submits to the restrictions necessarily imposed on his personal rights. The other is perpetually at war with these restrictions, though society could not exist without them. The one rather prefers to tolerate an acknowledged abuse, than by suddenly correcting it, to endanger the existence of the whole body politic. The other, reckless of consequences, will pluck up the tares, even if in so doing he should pluck up the wheat with them. The one carefully consults for the interests of those who are innocently implicated in an abusive system which is devoted to destruction; the other tramples upon them, if so his end may be sooner attained. The former, tracing the evils in the social state to their true fountain in the depra-

vity of the heart, and aiming at a permanent reformation, resorts to those grand influences of education and religion, adapted to effect a radical change in the quality of our nature, and thus applies his remedies to the seat of the disease. The other, confining his attention to the particular instances of out-breaking evil, sweeps his scythe through their flowering tops, leaving their roots in the soil, to produce a new harvest of vices. The one waits with manly patience and religious composure, while the reformation for which he labours is *gradually* evolved, under the operation of its appropriate causes, and the ordering of an inscrutable Providence. The other, with an impatience equally childish and irreligious, demands *immediate* results, even where they cannot be accelerated without a miracle, and where, if they are unduly hastened, they must be fatally disastrous.

Such are the general attributes by which Radicalism is contrasted with a right mode of Reform. And by as much as wisdom is to be desired in reforming institutions which are the pillars of the public weal, by so much is Radicalism, which rejects and spurns it, to be depreicated. It is zeal without knowledge, where knowledge is most of all requisite. It is passion without reason, where passion ought to be silenced, and reason alone heard. It is an eyeless vigour rushing through a path beset with perils. It is a chainless torrent of popular excitement, breaking through every barrier, and hurling itself, through lifted flood-gates, upon the delicate and complicated machinery of human society.

But let us pass from this more general view, to a nearer examination of the elements of which this system is constituted. And as nothing can be thoroughly understood unless seen in the *causes* from which it springs, let us look first at the state of mind which gives it birth. And here we shall find, that it is to *deficiency* in the mental structure, that the excrescency of which we speak may be traced. The monstrosities which occur in the vegetable and animal kingdoms are traced by physiologists to an incomplete bodily organization. And it is with equal propriety, that the various sorts of *ultraism* in the intellectual and moral kingdoms are traced to some *defect* in the structure of the inward man.

A fundamental deficiency in that mental structure, out of which radicalism usually grows, consists in the want of *discriminative judgement*, and of that *common sense*, which may be defined, as *the right application of general princi-*

ples to particular cases. Those in whom this deficiency exists, for want of comparing between different objects which solicit their attention, are exposed to fall immoderately in love with any meretricious extravagance which may present itself. They look at part of a subject, not at the whole, or they look at it as isolated, and not in its multiform relations, in its immediate effects, not in its remote consequences—abstractly and absolutely, like sophisters—not practically, and as modified by a thousand circumstances, like true philosophers. When they have adopted some just and important principle, they push it to excess, and then apply it to all cases, without allowing of exceptions.

Exactly such are the intellectual habits of radical reformers. They pamper themselves with a few favourite notions, and devote themselves to a few favourite objects, selected at random or by fancy. Where has one of this class ever been known to devise a comprehensive scheme, or follow a comprehensive plan, for the public good? On the contrary they are always driving, with all their force, at some one object, in comparison with which, whatever may be its real value, they deem everything else insignificant. In the earlier stages of their efforts, they are seen groping after some simple, unqualified principle on which their own minds can rest, and by which they can act upon the public. And since they have nothing of that depth or sagacity of mind, which would enable them to discern the true bounds of principles, how far they apply, and where and why the application of them fails, they soon arrive at some unlimited generality of doctrine. And their business thenceforward is, to carry it into effect, even in cases where its application, to an unsophisticated mind, must appear plainly unjust and pernicious.

It is submitted to the consideration of the reflecting reader, whether this is not substantially the course pursued by many of the ultra reformers of the present day. The over-zealous advocate of temperance, for example, not content with the just, but qualified principle, that the *abuse* of ardent spirits, as of every thing else, is immoral, and their common *use* to be dissuaded on grounds of expediency, soon arrives at the clearer, unlimited doctrine, that *all use of spirits is sin*. He now proceeds to the application of this sweeping principle, and is led by it, in consistency, to condemn the use of one after another of those substances in

which alcohol is found dispersed, in however minute proportions, and to whatever degree diluted. And now since even the purest fermented wines contain a portion of alcohol, they too must be condemned, not on the score of the inexpediency, but the immorality of their use, and not merely as a common beverage, but in the sacrament of the Supper, where they are one of the elements appointed by Christ and uniformly employed in the church. To such absurd and even impious consequences are men brought by neglecting to observe the fixed boundaries of right principles, and those infinitely varying circumstances by which their application must be modified! The same habit of extreme generalization applied to the subject of natural rights, furnished Rousseau and Paine with those unlimited maxims, which captivated the common mind by their clearness, and when carried into application produced the French Revolution. And it is the same unfortunate habit, applied to the same subject, which is now putting into the mouths of our anti-slavery societies, maxims equally unlimited, clear, and captivating, and equally false and dangerous.

Those who indulge in this habit doubtless seem to themselves to be approaching nearer and nearer the truth, the more abstract and general are the positions at which they successively arrive; while in fact they are receding farther and farther from it, every step they take in this direction. There is not a principle, however sound and excellent when tempered with the necessary qualifications, which does not become false and pernicious, when pushed to excess, and exalted above all exception, to a sweeping generality. It was a wise observation of Aristotle,* "that in discourse respecting our duties, *sweeping* doctrines are more doubtful, *limited* ones more true, since our duties always relate to specific things." "They that walk in darkness," says the judicious Hooker, "know not whither they go; and even as little is their certainty, whose opinions only *generalities* do guide. General rules, till their limits be fully known, (especially in matter of public and ecclesiastical affairs,) are by reason of the manifold secret exceptions which lie hidden in them, no other to the eyes of man's understanding, than cloudy mists cast before the eye of common sense."[†]

* Eth. L. 1. c. 7. 'Εν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις, οἱ μὲν καθόλου κενώτεροι εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι: περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις.

† Ecclesiast. Polity, Vol. II., p. 27, Hanbury's ed.

It should be borne in mind by those who are emulous of forming and directing the public sentiment by such abstract propositions and general rules, that however clear may be their evidence, and however mighty and irresistible their influence for a season, especially with the mass of unenlightened and unreflecting minds, they can never furnish a permanent basis for the success of any cause. Their falsity will soon begin to be surmized, from the consequences they involve; it will ere long be deeply felt, and at length fully detected and exposed. Common sense must sooner or later rebel against the tyranny of all such exclusive and extravagant dogmas; and will then avenge itself by holding up to universal contempt the figment by which it had been so long blinded and suppressed. Reaction of this kind must inevitably follow, whenever the fixed limits of nature and truth are overstepped by the metaphysical refinements of sophisticated reformers.

Naturam frustra expellas furca.*

For a time indeed, it often seems as if some such abstract and refined doctrine, would carry all before it, and achieve a universal and perpetual dominion. It rallies around its alluring standard the undiscerning mass of mind, the ardent youth of the schools, and even of the higher seminaries of learning. It dwells on every mind, burns in every heart, bursts from every tongue, and moves a nation as by a common life and in one direction. To question this simple and luminous doctrine, now, in its ascendancy, would be to expose ones' self to an overwhelming torrent of popular obloquy. But its power ere long begins to decay, and its hold on the public mind to be relaxed. And the few who had at first stood aloof, in a reviled minority, begin to be reinforced by constant desertions from the dissolving mass, until they have in their turn become *the many*, and the public mind is again restored to sobriety and truth. "With gross and popular capacities," says that inimitable writer last quoted, "nothing doth more prevail than unlimited generalities, because of their plainness at first sight. Nothing less with men of exact judgement; because such rules are not safe to be trusted over far."

It would be endless to trace all the ways in which this lack of sober judgement and common sense, is betrayed by

* Hor. Epist. I. 10, 24.

the radical reformer. One of the most common, is in overlooking all the obstacles which render their success doubtful, if not hopeless, and confidently calculating upon the speedy triumph of their cause. Says Paine, in the preface to the Second Part of his *Rights of Man*, "I do not believe that monarchy and aristocracy will continue seven years longer in any of the enlightened countries of Europe." And it has often been our lot to see in our over-heated reformers, a display of similar fatuity, in over-estimating the grounds of success, and underrating those of discouragement; though it has been oftener the case, that the continuance of the objects to which these men have been respectively opposed, has been measured by months, rather than by years.

The defective intellectual constitution which is here made one of the negative causes of radicalism, is very common, and is by no means always productive of this pernicious result. When connected with mildness of disposition, or when compensated by education and learning, it is comparatively harmless.

But let a man of a restless and fiery temper, ignorant and undisciplined, be also wanting in judgement and common sense, and he is admirably qualified to be a reformer of the latest stamp. Urged by his restless spirit to be ever doing something, he acts from the most crude and immature conceptions. For want of knowing what others have thought and done before him, he has no standard to which he may refer; and, like all ignorant men, trusting with an overweening confidence to his own opinions, he adopts scores of exploded errors, and dashes upon rocks where thousands had been already wrecked. If he should happen to begin right, he does not know where to stop, and is sure to end wrong. A man with a weak head and strong passions, is like a ship under full sail, without ballast or rudder, which is likely to dash itself to pieces, and every thing with which it comes in contact. Were not the matter too grave for ridicule, the furious onset of such a man upon the settled order of human life, might be likened, in blindness and fool-hardiness, though not in innocence, to the heroic tilting of *De la Mancha*, when, with vizor down and lance in rest, he rushed upon the arms of the windmill. The headlong manner in which such a man enters upon the most

momentous concerns, involved in the most complicated relations, illustrates the truth, that

"Fools rush in, where angels fear to tread."

But Radicalism always discloses a still greater destitution of *moral*, than of intellectual excellencies. There is a class of graceful virtues, which constitute a kind of code of honour, designed to regulate the demeanour of imperfect beings towards each other, and to soften the asperities to which their society is liable. To this class of virtues belong, modest diffidence in one's own opinion when opposed to that of all the world, candid indulgence of the prejudices of others, charitable forbearance of their faults, and a favourable construction of what may appear against them,—due respect to the claims of prescriptive authority of whatever kind it may be,—deference to age, office, and other titles to regard. The exercise of these virtues, while it is not inconsistent with the higher moral virtues, is absolutely essential to the decorum and happiness of human society. Disregarding them would soon introduce the most shameless barbarities, in place of all those pleasant charities by which the social state of depraved beings is sweetened and adorned.

Let the reader now present before his mind any one of the leading spirits of Radical reform, whom he may happen to know, and he will find, that his prominent characteristics grow out of the absence of these comely and excellent virtues. It belongs to the very idea of a Radical to be self-confident and dogmatical, uncandid and intolerant, censorious and contumacious. He lays no claim to the virtues which have been mentioned, and even despises and condemns them. Modesty and self-diffidence he regards as effeminacy and indecision; charity and tolerance towards the faults of others, as cowardly compromise with sin; and every kind of deference to authority or station, as base servility. Sternness, rigour, and rudeness of demeanour towards even the slightest delinquency, he considers as the indices of moral courage, and the distinctive graces of the lion-hearted Reformer. In following out his crude conceptions of *what should be*, he never allows himself to be in the least encumbered by *what has been*, and proceeds in all respects,

As if the world were now but to begin,
Antiquity forgot, custom not known,
The ratifiers and props of every word.—HAMLET.

The deformity of this self-confidence, and disregard of received opinions and customs, cannot be better shown, than in contrast with some of the beautiful exhibitions of the modest waving of individual judgement on the part of truly great men, out of respect to the general voice. Bishop Hall, thus writes to his brother,* "Let me advise you to walk ever in the beaten road of the church; not to runne out into single paradoxes. And if you meet at any time with private conceits, that seeme more probable, suspect them and yoursele; and if they can win you to assent, yet smother them in your brest, and do not dare to vent them out, either by your hand or tongue, to trouble the common peace. *It is a miserable praise, to be a witty disturber.*" It is recorded of Mr. Hale, by the great Clarendon, that he would often say, "that his opinions, he was sure, did him no harm, but he was far from being confident that they might not do others harm who entertained them, and might entertain other results from them than he did: and therefore he was very reserved in communicating what he thought himself, on those points in which he differed from what was received."†

The want of *religious sentiment* is another part of that deficiency of inward structure from which Radicalism proceeds. *Religion*, while it inspires the mind with unmingled abhorrence of evil, at the same time renders it tranquil in view of the existing disorders of the world. It teaches that consolatory lesson, by which the entire aspect of the world is changed, that evil is wisely permitted by God, and will be overruled by him for the promotion of his benevolent purposes. It does not diminish the motive to humane effort, but only quells every disquieting feeling, and induces over the mind of the truly pious philanthropist a calm and peaceful resignation. How opposite to this is the frame and temper of the turbulent reformer! He is not less agitated himself, than the agitator of others. Were God dethroned, and the world abandoned to the Powers of Evil, he could scarcely be more anxious and perturbed. It never occurs to him to think, in view of the towering forms of wickedness, that they exist under the permission of that Being who doeth all his pleasure, not only in Heaven above, but on earth beneath, and that however they may be regarded when separately viewed, they are to be esteemed *right*, as belonging to that

* Bishop Hall's Works, vol. I. p. 345.

† Life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon, vol. I. p. 50.

great system, in which partial evil is made the instrument of universal good.

There is no more common or offensive feature in the character of those men we are attempting to describe, than their assuming, in their own strength, and by means of their own, to effect the most signal revolutions in the state of the world, and their attributing to themselves the wisdom, power, and glory when such revolutions have been accomplished. How often are they heard to speak of what *they* have done, are doing, or are about to do, to change the state of society, without any reference, expressed or remotely implied, to that Power by which alone any change for the better ever has been or can be wrought. It has been said of some modern infidel philosophers, that they were accustomed to speak as confidently about the nature of things, and to seem to know as much about the laws of being, as if they had assisted in making the world. And it may be said with equal truth of some of our modern Reformers, that they are wont to carry themselves as loftily with respect to the existing state and coming destiny of the world, as though they assisted in governing it, and had enthroned themselves beside the Monarch of the universe. Deeming their allotted sphere of duty too private and inconsiderable for their superiour powers, they seek a larger stage, where they may act their part in view of the world. Without waiting either for a human call, or for the indications of the Divine will, they spend their strength in attempting to break open a door which Providence has closed against them, but which their wilful spirit prompts them to enter. Intoxicated with the idea of *universal Reform*, they soon forget their utter incompetency to effect it, and swelling in the conceit of their ability in proportion to the grandeur of the contemplated enterprize, they at length fancy themselves invested with power commensurate with the claims they suppose made upon them, and the responsibilities they have gratuitously assumed. Putting on the airs of Dictators in the moral kingdom, they decree, in the plenitude of their imagined authority, the downfall of existing systems, and ordain a new state of things.

Such aspiring aims, such lofty conceits as these, so often and so offensively exhibited by the great heroes of modern Reform, betray their entire destitution of every religious sentiment. Religion reconciles its possessor to a humble and secret walk with God,—to the rewards which crown a

life of simple obedience to his commandments. If called from a private to a public stage, and to a great work, Religion inspires the pious Reformer with a heart-felt sense of his dependence upon God for success in the work he has undertaken. Religion abases his pride, and checks his presumption, realizes to him his true place, and makes him conscious that he is only an instrument in the hands of that awful Power, by which the world is governed. It assures him that it is by God alone, that any true, great and permanent reformation can be effected in the world, and that the part of man is oftener to hinder, than to hasten, the work of God. Religion places the pious Reformer in the attitude of the captive Jews, so beautifully described by their Psalmist: "Unto Thee lift I up mine eyes, O Thou that dwellest in the Heavens. Behold, as the eyes of servants look unto the hand of their master, and as the eyes of a maiden unto the hand of her mistress; so our eyes wait upon the Lord our God, until he have mercy upon us."* Thus does he eye the movings of that hand by which the epochs of human history are revolved, and listen with silent reverence for the creative fiat, bringing light and order out of darkness and confusion.

There is another point in which the want of religious feeling is very often shown by ultra Reformers. We allude to the judicial authority, and the vindictive attitude, which they assume with respect to evil-doers, or those who do not come up to their standard of right. How often is every better feeling shocked by hearing these men, unauthorized by any official station, or by any pre-eminent purity of character, denounce the vengeance of heaven against their fellow-offenders! Not content with relieving, they would also *avenge* the oppressed; not content with restraining, they would also *doom* the oppressor. Having arrogated to themselves the prerogative of uttering the ordinances of heaven, they assume also to seize its lightnings, and launch them at those whom their imagination has invested with forms of gigantic wickedness. As if they were commissioned to be the special organs of the Divine Nemesis, they wave over the guilty the sword of judgement, and doom them to destruction.

Had these denouncers but learned the first lesson which Religion would teach them, that they themselves are involved with all mankind in a common guilt and ruin, and are

* Psalm cxxiii.

themselves, as well as the most criminal, obnoxious to the Divine displeasure, they would be less forward to devote others to a judgement, averted from themselves only by the clemency of God. They would not dare to expect forgiveness for themselves, while they granted no forgiveness to others. Rebuked by the injunction, "Who art thou, O man, that judgest another, and doest the same things," they would leave the perpetrator of wrong in the hands of the Judge of the world, and refer to Him the awards of justice, which He claims as his peculiar prerogative: "Vengeance is mine, I will repay saith the Lord."

But although many of the traits of Radicalism may thus be traced to deficiency in the higher attributes of intellectual, moral and religious character; this system cannot be adequately described without referring to some of the *positive* principles from which it springs. If in doing this, we should seem to allow too little for those better motives by which ultra Reformers always claim to be governed, let it be borne in mind that the danger is, of erring on the other side, and being duped by their specious pretensions. Through the fond credulity of our nature, when we hear one loudly professing his sympathy with the suffering, or see him making a show of unwonted zeal in a good cause, we are apt to take him at his word, and to believe him to be as much more humane and philanthropic than other men, as he pretends to be. This credulity or, to name it more justly, *gullibility* of human nature, is one of the chief instruments by which impostors of every sort promote their ends. And it is by no means necessary that one should possess great ability, or render valuable public services, in order to reach a high place in popular estimation. However moderate may be his talents, and however little he may have done for the public good, he will yet be taken by the great world to excel others as much in merit, as he can surpass them in bustle and display.* Hence it is, that

* This truth is well illustrated in the following fable.

Deux citoyens harangoient sur la place,
 Montés chacun sur un treteau :
 L'un vend force poisons distillés dans une eau
 Limpide à l'œil ; mais il parle avec grace.
 Son habit est doré, son équipage est beau ;
 Il attroupe la populace.
 L'autre, ami des humains, jaloux de leur bonheur,
 Pour rien debite un antidote.
 Mais il est simple, brusque, et mauvais orateur :
 On s'en moque, on le fuit comme un fou qui radote,
 Et l'on court à l'empoisonneur.

some men of the worst character, by putting forth specious pretensions, often reap from the public a harvest of golden opinions, while the truly deserving are left with no other reward than the secret satisfaction of doing good. So that if, in any instance, through the suspicious surmises of a few, injustice should be done to the motives of our monopolists of all that is wise and good, ample amends are sure to be made them in the grateful incense of applause ascending to them in clouds from the multitude of their dupes.

Those who assume the office of public Reformers are apt to pretend, that theirs is a most ungrateful task, and one which is forced upon them, against their will, by their strong convictions of duty. With true Reformers, this is doubtless the case ; to ultras it may perhaps appear to be so. But if they would inspect themselves more narrowly, they might discover other motives beside the love of right and a sense of duty which lead them to take up the seemingly odious business of public censure. One who reproves others, does thereby covertly commend himself. It implies a more than ordinary sagacity in him to detect evils which had been before undiscovered, and a more than ordinary virtue and courage to condemn that which had been long tolerated. Indeed, there is no better way of instilling into the minds of others a persuasion of one's pre-eminent goodness, than by boldly rebuking all manner of wrong. Perhaps now it might appear, on a thorough scrutiny of the motives which lead so many to take up the business of censure, which they profess to find so disagreeable, that they are unconsciously influenced by the desire of appearing wiser and better than others ; or at least, that the griefs they feel at pulling down the reputation of others, are slightly alleviated by the thought that they are at the same time building up their own.

Other principles which are more distinctly active in leading to radicalism are, sometimes impatience under the suffering of wrong, sometimes the spirit of personal revenge, or a querulous and fault-finding disposition ; sometimes a restless and uneasy temperament, which loves to sport on the waves of change ; sometimes an ambitious spirit, which hopes to rise under a new order of things ; sometimes even a fiend-like malignity, which rejoices in the confusion and turmoil of the elements of society.

The ostensible external motive in every reformatory en-

terprise, (and with true Reformers the real one,) is that specific evil which it is designed to remove. But with Reformers of the kind we are now describing, this evil is only the *pretext*, which affords them an occasion for exercising their innate propensity to be opposing and destroying something, no matter what. This is plain from the fact, so often noticed in the history of these men, that let what will become established, even that which they themselves had most insisted on, they are soon found opposing it, even if in so doing they take sides with what they had before most condemned.

An admirable illustration of the last mentioned trait, and of many other characteristic traits of the Radical, is furnished by the history of Cobbet. This remarkable man is thus described by Hazlitt :*

"Wherever power is, there he is against it : he naturally butts at all obstacles, as unicorns are attracted to oak trees, and feels his own strength only by resistance to the opinions and wishes of the rest of the world. To sail with the stream, to agree with the company, is not his humour. If he could bring about a reform in parliament, the odds are he would instantly fall foul of, and try to mar, his own handy work. I do not think this is vanity or fickleness, so much as a pugnacious disposition, that must have an antagonist power to contend with, and only finds itself at ease in systematic opposition. If it were not for this, the high towers and rotten places of the world would fall before the battering ram of his hard headed reasoning ; but if he once found them tottering, he would apply his strength to prop them up. He cannot agree to any thing established, nor to set up any thing else in its stead. While it is established, he presses hard against it, because it presses upon him, at least in imagination. Let it crumble under his grasp, and the motive to resistance is gone. He then requires some other evil to set his face against. His principle is repulsion, his nature contradiction. He is made up of mere antipathies, an Ishmaelite indeed, without a fellow. He is always playing at hunt the slipper in politics. He turns round upon whoever is next him. The way to wean him from any opinion, and make him conceive an intolerable hatred against it, would be to place somebody near him who was perpetu-

* Table Talk, or Original Essays, by Wm. Hazlitt. London : 1821. Vol. I. p. 124.

ally dunning it in his ears. When he is in England, he does nothing but abuse the borough-mongers, and laugh at the whole system. When he is in America he grows impatient of freedom and a republic. If he had staid there a little longer, he would have become a loyal and a loving subject of his majesty king George Fourth. * * He is the victim of self-will. He must pull down, and pull in pieces; it is not in his disposition to do otherwise. * * He has no comfort in fixed principles. As soon as any thing is settled in his own mind he quarrels with it. He has no satisfaction but in the chase after truth; runs a question down, worries and kills it, then quits it like vermin, and starts some new game."

The finishing stroke in our picture of Radicalism, (already become so dark and grim-visaged that we are feign to break company with it, and hope that others may be similarly affected,) shall be added by the graphic pencil of old Izaak Walton. In his life of Thomas Hooker, speaking of the Non-conformists of those times, he says:—"Of this party there were many that were possessed of a high degree of spiritual wickedness,—I mean with an innate restless pride and malice. I do not mean the visible and carnal sins of gluttony and drunkenness, and the like, (from which God deliver us!); but sins of a higher nature; because they are more unlike God, who is the God of love, and mercy, and order, and peace; and more like the Devil, (who is not a glutton, nor can be drunk, and yet is a devil); but I mean those spiritual wickednesses of malice and revenge, and an opposition to government;—men that joyed to be the authors of misery, which is properly his work that is the enemy and disturber of mankind; and thereby greater sinners than the glutton and the drunkard, though some will not believe it. And of this party there were also many whom prejudice and a furious zeal had so blinded, as to make them neither to hear reason, nor adhere to the ways of peace;—men that were the very dregs and pest of mankind; men whom pride and self-conceit had made to over-value their own pitiful, crooked wisdom, so much as not to be ashamed to hold unmannerly disputes, against those men they ought to reverence, and those laws they ought to obey; men that laboured and joyed first to find out the faults, and then to speak evil of government, and to be the authors of confusion; men whom company, conversation and custom had at last so

blinded, and made so insensible that these were sins, that like those that perished in the gainsaying of Core, so those died without repenting of their spiritual wickednesses."

If this description should appear to be unjust towards those for whom it was intended, it may be urged in apology, that it was extorted from the gentle spirit of Walton by the strength of his love for the venerable Hooker, who suffered much from the opposition of the Non-conformists. So true affection ever shows itself in spontaneous and indignant rebuke of all who would injure its object. It is only indifference which remains unmoved in seeing injuries heaped upon another: Love heaves the most placid natures into tumult, and would avenge even a look which threatened its object with insult. It was the most gentle of the disciples who invoked fire from heaven upon the villagers who insulted his well-beloved Master.

If, then, towards those among us who trample without compunction, now upon the purity of the doctrines, now upon the authority of the ministry, now upon the sacredness of the sacraments, which our Master has left us, there should sometimes break forth spontaneously a strain even of impassioned censure, let it not be thought unnatural, or be wholly condemned. It was a holy Apostle who said, with reference to the wrongs even of a fellow Christian, "Who is injured, and I do not burn?" Is it then to be thought strange, that Christian hearts should burn, when their Religion itself, its institutions, and its Author, are irreverently assailed? For our part, we neither covet nor respect that imperturbable quiet, that determined blindness to danger, that skilful neutrality, that calculating wisdom, that never-ending revision of fundamental things, that boundless toleration, sometimes exhibited by the friends of order and religion, in cases where the utmost decision is expected and demanded of them. To us it seems to betray indifference to the most sacred interests of humanity, to remain silent and unaffected while, one by one, the old landmarks in church and state are removed, to give place to a spirit of Reformation, which, by too much indulgence, has become at last so like the grave, as never to be satisfied. And we have felt that in times like these, we could not discharge our duty as public journalists, without bearing testimony, however feeble, against that spirit involving so many elements of evil, and at war with the spirit of Religion, and the best interests of society. If in discharging this duty

now, we have spoken any thing uncharitably of those well known among us as ultra Reformers, we must take shelter under the high examples of pardonable severity which have just been adduced, and trust we shall not be judged to have set down aught in malice, but rather in love for those civil and religious institutions, whose influence we sincerely believe to be marred, and whose very existence to be threatened, by that corrupt and atrocious style of Reform which we have attempted to pourtray.

LITERARY NOTICES.

1. *Life of Jehudi Ashmun, late Colonial Agent in Liberia, with an Appendix containing extracts from his Journal and other writings; with a brief Sketch of the Life of the Rev. Lot Cary.* By Ralph Randolph Gurley. Washington, 1835. 8vo pp. 556.

This is a noble tribute to the memory of a great and good man—more creditable, indeed, to the head and heart of the accomplished and estimable author, and more gratifying to the friends of African Colonization, than necessary to perpetuate the fame of Ashmun. His name is indissolubly associated with that humane enterprize. The firm foundations of the unexampled prosperity of Liberia were mainly laid by him, and he died a martyr in the cause. We say the unexampled prosperity of the colony at Liberia; for we maintain that this, spite of all the virulent misrepresentations that have been so industriously spread abroad, is merely the sober statement of the truth. In fact, Liberia, at the time of Ashmun's death, was a firmly established and flourishing colony—presenting all the elements of social prosperity, physical, civil, and moral, in as high a degree, and in some respects in a higher degree, than Jamestown and Plymouth, at the end of eight years from their settlement. Its progress since then has not disappointed its earlier promise; and we do not doubt that it is destined every year to strike deeper and deeper the roots, and spread abroad wider and wider the blessings of its growth, till they shall pervade all that country. Here is the everlasting monument of Ashmun; nor do we entertain the shadow of a doubt that, ages hence, his name will be a hallowed word over that continent, pronounced with grateful reverence by millions of the enlightened, the Christian, and the free.

We had intended to devote a portion of this number to a Sketch of the Life of Ashmun—an analysis of his character—a view of his public services in Liberia—together with some remarks on the history and progress of that colony. It is with the greatest regret that we find ourselves unable to fulfil our purpose. We have time and space only to express our pleasure and gratification with the manner in which, in general, Mr. Gurley has performed his task, and most heartily to recommend his book to every class of readers. The volume brings together a rich mass, of most interesting information, respecting the enterprize with which Ashmun's latter years were associated, and nobody was so competent to set it forth as Mr. Gurley. The personal history of Ashmun is also full of deep and peculiar interest. His character was made up of strong and decided elements, originally with many faults, but with a great deal of the truly heroic in his constitution. And nothing is more striking, nor, if we are not

mistaken, will excite a deeper interest in the perusal of this volume, than to observe, how, by the sharp discipline of Providence, his character was sublimated, and the heroic elements brought out and purified from the earthly alloy. His life, till within a few years of its close, was one continued struggle with almost every kind of difficulty; and worst of all, and most galling and unendurable to a mind like his, an early imprudence brought a stain upon his reputation for integrity, which seemed destined, in its consequences direct and indirect, to follow him irretrievably, and to blast all the purposes of his life.

It would seem that the spirit of any other man would have been absolutely crushed down and destroyed, by the almost universal distrust, and obloquy, and the manifold embarrassments, that, at different times pressed upon him. His was not, however, a spirit to give way or sink down. He lived to surmount the whole crushing accumulation of evils; to see his fair fame not only freed from suspicion and aspersion, at home and abroad, but to know that he had compelled the confidence and won the admiration of all on both sides of the Atlantic.

Liberia, indeed, under the circumstances in which he was placed, was a theatre well fitted for him; where his extraordinary energy, his high capacity, his various resources, in short all that was lofty, resolved and heroic in his character, found full scope for action.

Ashmun died at New-Haven, on the 25th of August, 1828, in the thirty-fifth year of his age, shortly after his return from Africa, worn out by his toils in behalf of the Colony.

II. *The Portion of the Soul, or Thoughts on its Attributes and Tendencies, as indicating its Destiny.* By the Rev. Herman Hooker. Philadelphia, Henry Perkins:—Boston, Perkins, Marvin & Co. 1835.

The reader of this Volume soon finds himself in a different atmosphere from that of many of our recent works on practical religion. The stifled spirit of devotion, breaking loose from scholastic fetters, moves freely, and rejoices in its liberty. Imagination lends its wings, with which it ranges and soars, until following its native instincts, and obedient to the upward attractions, it reaches its centre and rest in God. It is the object of the writer, to show that the conscious wants of the soul, incapable of being satisfied with earthly good, conduct to God, in Christ, as its true portion. This truth he illustrates with unusual strength of thought, fervour of feeling, and felicity and copiousness of expression. He shows a mind familiarized with the writers of the seventeenth century, and inspired with something of their spirit. We trust the writer will often favour the public with such gifts, and have the rich reward of knowing, that some have been induced by his persuasive appeals to forsake the troubled and failing fountains of earthly pleasure, for purer springs.